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Abstract
This dissertation proposes a critical realist framework of human rights and argues that emotion
plays a foundational role in constituting a human rights ontology. I build this framework as a
critical response to other IR human rights theories which have largely been developed in
accordance with either empiricist or rationalist paradigms.

Both empiricist and rationalist

theories fail to articulate a firm ontological foundation which can support their human rights
claims.
This ontological concern may not seem too important for human rights scholars interested
in more substantive political issues, but it does lead to problems because no human rights theory
is ontologically neutral.

Theoretical claims are always predicated on some ontological

presumptions, whether those presumptions are explicitly stated or not. As a result, scholars will
likely remain unable to resolve their theoretical debates without first recognizing how they
reflect ontological disagreements underpinning them.

This dissertation, then, calls for an

ontological intervention and employs the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar in order to build a
human rights framework.
At the root of my framework is emotion and the role that it plays in structuring human
rights. Emotion relates us to our environment and mediates our social interactions with others.
These interactions shape our values and behaviors from which we acquire a sense of rights and
responsibilities.

Underpinning this sense are real emotive processes which serve as the

ontological foundations from which human rights norms and practices emerge. Because these
real emotive mechanisms mediate our complex cultural interactions, rights practices emerge in
v

different ways to reflect particular cultural values. As a result, my ontological approach can
explain how human rights are naturally real while the practice of human rights are
simultaneously culturally relative.

vi

Introduction
Summary
Discussions regarding the importance of ontology in international relations research have grown
to be more prominent (see Patomaki 2002; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008; Joseph 2007). The IR
discipline has undergone several ‘great debates’ over the years, and some speculate as to whether
disagreements over ontology will constitute a fifth great debate (Brown 2007, 409). The primary
argument IR scholars give for taking ontology seriously is that it conditions the research it
underpins (Bhaskar 1989; Archer 1998). The scientific decisions a researcher makes are always
premised on some ontological presumption, whether those presumptions are explicitly stated or
not. As Colin Hay puts it “to commit oneself to an epistemology is also to commit oneself to a
position on a range of ontological issues” (2007, 117).
Despite this, very few political scientists and IR scholars take ontological matters
seriously. Wendt points this out saying that “ontology is not something that most IR scholars
spend much time thinking about” (1999, 370). This may be because ontological issues seem too
abstract for scholars interested in more substantive and urgent political issues. This leads to a
problem for political science and IR research: Because no research is ontologically neutral,
theoretical and methodological debates over political issues may persist without scholars
recognizing how they reflect the ontological differences underpinning them. I argue that this is
the case with the IR discipline’s theoretical debates over human rights.
The discipline’s theoretical understanding of human rights has been dominated by either
empiricist or rationalist approaches, both of which fail to provide a firm ontological foundation
1

to support their human rights claims. On one hand, empiricist approaches to human rights
pursue an anti-realist form of science which emphasizes the necessity for methods of
observation. In doing so, these approaches conflate the ontological nature of human rights with
what can be epistemologically known. This is an error in logic which Roy Bhaskar refers to as
“epistemic fallacy” (2008, 5).
On the other hand, rationalist approaches to human rights continue a philosophical
tradition which argues that human rights are ontologically founded on human rationality. In
doing so, it attempts to derive normative claims to human rights from a rational understanding of
nature. This is an error in logic known as the naturalistic fallacy. In the end, both empiricist and
rationalist approaches fail to provide a firm ontological foundation. Empiricist approaches
largely ignore ontology, while rationalist approaches fail to provide an ontology that can
logically support their human rights claims.
This dissertation inquires as to how an ontological framework for human rights can
address the limitations posed by empiricist and rationalist approaches.

Specifically, I’m

interested in exploring the prospects of an emotional ontology, and how it can resolve both the
epistemic and naturalistic fallacy. The research question guiding this dissertation, then, is how
can emotion provide the theoretical foundations to support both the ontological and normative
dimensions to human rights? In addressing this question, I propose an ontological framework
which responds to the failures of both empiricist and rationalist approaches. My ontological
approach affirms that human rights refer to real public goods that arise from the emotional
interactions of rights bearers. These interactions reflect how we appraise a situation and how
emotion mediates our relationship to others in that situation. In doing so, emotion provides us
with a sense as to what people are due and the responsibilities one has to another. Underpinning
2

this sense are real emotive processes which serve as the ontological foundations from which
human rights emerge.
My argument for the emotional foundations of human rights situates itself as a critical
response to other prominent human rights approaches in the IR discipline. Specifically, my
framework aims to correct for the errors of the empiricist and rationalist approaches to human
rights.

This dissertation a) counters empiricist approaches by affirming the ontological

foundations of human rights within a critical realist framework and b) challenges rationalist
approaches to human rights by anchoring those foundations within the emotional faculties of the
person. My dissertation, then, follows a two-tracked argument – one emotional and the other
ontological.
Together, these two tracks carve out a space in the literature to think about human rights
in new ways. The emotional track to my argument emphasizes the importance of social relations
and empathy. This breaks from traditional rationalist approaches of natural law philosophy
which have emphasized the importance of self-determination and personal autonomy. Emotion
functions to mediate our social and cultural interactions and it inclines us to build relations. It is
through these interactions and relations that emotion generates a sense of human rights and
responsibilities we have to each other. Because we come to understand human rights in terms of
our relations to others, emotion emphasizes the importance of reciprocity and empathy.
The ontological track to my argument affirms that human rights refer to real public goods
that reflect the emotional nature of the rights bearer. This challenges empiricist approaches to
human rights which reject ontology and, instead, argue that rights are socially constructed. I
agree that human rights are socially constructed, but my ontological framework asks about the
building blocks that they are constructed from. Emotions serve as those building blocks and,
3

because they also mediate our social and cultural interactions, rights practices emerge in different
ways to reflect particular cultural values. As a result, my ontological approach can explain how
human rights are naturally real while the practice of human rights are simultaneously culturally
relative.

The Ontological Track
My ontological track provides a framework to think about the relationship between human rights
and the emotive foundations underpinning them. I argue in this track that an ontology of human
rights arise from the complex interaction of both the social and natural world. Human rights are
real public goods that are socially constructed from naturally occurring generative mechanisms.
Specifically, human rights activity emerges from how the nature of human emotion mediates our
social relations.
I employ a critical realist framework to theorize as to how human rights emerge from the
complex interactions of both natural and social phenomena. Critical realism is not a theory of IR
but, rather a meta-theoretical framework to scientifically study social phenomena. It was created
by Roy Bhaskar who advocates for scientists to take ontological matters seriously. It argues that
the social phenomena which scientists aim to understand is a production of both the social and
natural world. It proposes a portrait of reality which illustrates how the changing and diverse
social world we experience reflects natural and stable mechanisms underpinning it. I employ
this framework to argue that human rights are real public goods that reflect how natural
mechanisms generating them are translated into culturally diverse social practice.
My critical realist argument positions itself as a response to much of IR’s human rights
research which has been conducted in accordance with the discipline’s empiricist orthodoxy.
4

While critical realism takes ontological questions seriously, empiricism rejects ontological
matters outright. Generally speaking, empiricism requires that science be based on methods of
testing and measurement, which naturally places unobservable phenomena outside the scope of
valid scientific inquiry. Social scientists, then, study the world in terms of what can be observed
– behaviors, discourses, artifacts, etc. By extension, the discipline’s theoretical development of
human rights follows the same scientific orthodoxy.

For instance, human rights are often

understood in terms of their cultural practice (Donnelly 1984; Renteln 1990; Walzer 1994), or as
rules produced by international agreement (Taylor 1996; Habermas 1998), or as manifestations
of political power (Mutua 2002; Grovogui 2011; Peck 2011).
The major limitation to these empiricist approaches, however, is that it provides a
superficial understanding of the social world. Simply put, there is more to the world than what
we see. If we limit the development of theory to observable phenomena, then our theories
describe our experience of the world more than they describe the world itself. The focus on
observation, then, leads empiricist research to conflate ontology with epistemology – an error
that critical realists call the “epistemic fallacy” (Bhaskar 2008, 5). Critical realism corrects for
this by divorcing the two and reprioritizing ontology over epistemology. It assumes that there
must be a real world that produces our experience of it. In this sense, critical realism is
concerned with the ontologically real causal mechanisms generating the world that science
attempts to understand. Several IR scholars have advocated for such a critical realist approach
arguing that it can move the discipline beyond the confines of its empiricist orthodoxy (Joseph
1998; Patomaki 2002; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008; Roach, 2010).
This dissertation contributes to this growing body of literature on critical realist IR by
developing an ontological framework to study human rights as it fits into international relations.
5

While the empiricist conflates human rights with their practices, my critical realist framework
inquires as to what those causal laws are that generate human rights activity. In doing so, my
analysis can probe further than previous human rights literature and answer questions about the
causal mechanisms that generate human rights overlooked by other theories.

A Critical Realist Framework
Critical realism is a meta-theoretical framework to scientifically research the causal relations
between natural and social phenomena. To do this, it critiques the empiricist understanding of
causality and proposes an alternative. Empiricism’s focus on observation assumes that all cause
and effect resolve on the same level as human experience. Empiricism, then, assumes that causal
relations can be studied in terms of the constant conjunction (if A, then B forms of analysis).
Critical realism takes issue with this arguing, again, that not all causal mechanisms are
observable.

To illustrate this, it paints a complex portrait of reality with two important

dimensions – ontological stratification and open systems.
Ontological stratification refers to the vertical dimension of Bhaskar’s framework.
Instead of a flat surface, critical realism argues that observable phenomena at the top are
generated by causal mechanism from below. It organizes this into three levels: the empirical,
actual, and real (Bhaskar 2008, 2). At the top is the domain of the empirical which refers to our
experience of events. This is the domain that empiricist research is concerned with given its
focus on observation. In the middle is the domain of the actual which consists of events that we
experience on the domain of the empirical (it also includes those which have not yet actualized
but have the potential to). Underpinning this is the domain of the real which refers to the
unobservable causal mechanisms always at work whether they are generating events that
6

actualize or not. In this sense, the domain of the real refers to causal potentials which may
translate into events given the right environmental conditions.
The second dimension refers to those environmental conditions and the system they are
in. This system refers to the horizontal dimension of Bhaskar’s framework and whether it is
open or closed. Closed systems are controlled environments that empiricist research tends to
favor in order to isolate constant conjunctions. However, the phenomena that the social scientist
researches occurs in an open system and cannot be replicated in a controlled environment. Nor
can the causal laws observed in a closed environment sustain themselves in an open system
where causal processes interact with other intervening variables. Critical realism argues, then,
that an ontological approach should understand the complex reality that causal relations resolve
in. As a result, they prefer to understand how social phenomena unfold in an open system. The
focus on open systems, then, requires an understanding that how causal potentials on the domain
of the real generate events depends on the environment conditions within an open system
(Bhaskar 2008, 3).
Both of these critical realist dimensions – ontological stratification and open systems –
provide the framework to theorize as to how human rights emerge from the complex interactions
of the social and natural world. Stratification provides the vertical dimension which illustrates
how human rights exist on different ontological levels: the social practice of human right
actualize on the domain of the actual and emerge from natural generative mechanisms constantly
at work on the domain of the real. Openness provides the horizontal dimension to explain the
diversity of human rights practices: natural human rights mechanisms on the domain of the real
produce cultural variations of human rights practices depending on the social conditions of the
domain of the actual. In the end, critical realism’s portrait of reality provides the framework to
7

theorize as to how a world of culturally diverse human rights practices reflect the natural
foundations underpinning them. I use this framework to articulate the role that emotion plays as
those natural foundations and how they function on the domain of the real.

The Emotional Track
I build my emotional argument on top of the critical realist framework outlined above in order to
illustrate how the nature of human rights reflect the emotional foundations of the people they
serve. Emotion plays a central role in mediating our social relations and judging situations. In
doing so, it provides us with a sense as to what people are due and our responsibilities to each
other. This emotional sense reflects natural mechanisms on the domain of the real which
produce behaviors within culturally diverse human rights contexts on the domain of the actual.
In doing so, I argue that emotion provides the ontological foundation from which human rights
emerge.
My focus on emotion challenges a long philosophical tradition which, throughout history,
has argued that natural rights are founded on human reason. The focus on reason is a trend
beginning in ancient philosophy (see Plato; Cicero) and continued throughout Medieval religious
thought (see Augustine; Aquinas), Enlightenment philosophy (see Leibniz; Kant; Bentham), and
contemporary moral philosophy of today (see Finnis; Gewerth; Smith).

In general, this

rationalist tradition has advanced the argument that rights and morals derive from our rational
nature through which we also come to understand them.
While this rationalist tradition has been the predominant philosophy of right and ethics
throughout history, it does suffer from a major problem. The argument that right derives from,
and can be understood through, human reason commits the naturalistic fallacy.

Generally
8

speaking, this fallacy states that one cannot predicate what is good based on what is natural. The
reason for this is simple – an evaluative conclusion cannot be rationally justified on a factual
premise. This is closely related to Hume’s guillotine which claims that you cannot rationally
derive a normative ‘ought’ from a positive ‘is.’
My focus on emotion, and how I frame it within a critical realist ontology, corrects for
the naturalistic fallacy. What is right is not understood purely through deliberate and rational
analysis but, instead, reflects the visceral and often spontaneous experience of emotion. It is this
emotional experience which informs our sense of right and inclines us to act in accordance with
it. Underpinning this sense of right are real emotive structures that provide the ontological
foundation for it. Human rights, then, are real in that they reflect natural structures generating
them, but this eschews the naturalistic fallacy because the sense of right produced does not
depend on a rational understanding of how those natural structures work. Instead, our sense of
right just instinctively comes to us as a matter of viscerally felt emotion.
There is some precedence in the history of philosophy to ground rights and ethics on
emotion. The best examples are the moral sentimentalist philosophies of Adam Smith and David
Hume which argued that moral senses come from our emotional interactions with others. Moral
sentimentalism has grown in popularity in just the past couple of decades with the work of
Michael Slote (2009), Simon Blackburn (2001), John McDowell, and Jesse Prinze (2007).
Contemporary political philosophy has also discussed the role of emotion in constituting civic
values and notions of justice. The most famous is Richard Rorty’s article “Human rights,
Rationality, and Sentimentality” (1993) in which he argues that human rights require an
emotional education. Other works include Annette C. Baier (1995) who argues that emotion
plays an important part in building civic care and trust; Ian Ward (2003) who argues that
9

sentiment plays an important part in constituting international justice; and Martha Nussbaum
(2015) who discusses how intense feelings of love constitute civic values and bind a community
together.
This dissertation builds on this literature by discussing the role that emotion plays as the
generative mechanism underpinning human rights.

I not only engage this philosophical

dimension to emotion and human rights, but I contribute to it by considering the real
psychological structures that underpin human rights practices. Specifically, my use of critical
realism provides me with an ontological framework to ground emotion and human rights in the
nature of reality. In doing so, I consider much of the experimental research conducted by the
cognitive sciences on emotion.

Specifically, my understanding of emotion borrows from

emotional research within the social psychology discipline.

My Emotional Framework
While there is currently no agreed upon definition of emotion, the field of psychology generally
understands that emotions are complex biological reactions to internal and external stimuli that
motivate behavior (Russell & Barrett 1999, 806; Nairne 2000, 444; Daniel 2011, 310; Schacter
2011, 373; Sternberg 1998, 542). This basic psychological understanding of emotion includes
both an observable and unobservable dimension.

The observable dimension includes the

displays of emotion and the environmental situation inducing it. The unobservable dimension
includes the physiological and cognitive processes that react to the situation and produce the
display of emotion.

Social-psychology researches both the observable and unobservable

dimension to behavior and, because both are important for my argument, my emotional
framework borrows a lot from the social-psychology field.
10

The social-psychology field studies the observable and unobservable side of emotion
through two approaches: situationism and dispositionism (Houghton, 2008; Bliss 1991; Endler
1976).

Research on the observable side is called situationism because it researches the

environmental situation that induces the observed behavior. Examples of situational factors may
include family life, socio-economics, culture, immediate surrounding, etc. Research on the
unobservable side is called dispositionism because it researches the internal structures – or
dispositions – that govern behavior. Examples of dispositional factors may include cognitive
processes, neurological structures, personality, etc.
Social psychologists acknowledge that the way people think, feel, and act is actually a
combination of both their surroundings (situations) and their psychology (dispositions)
interacting with each other in complex ways. This has lead psychologists to develop a third
perspective, known as interactionism, which combines the two. In general, interactionism argues
that human behavior expresses those internal factors of the individual as they appraise and relate
to the external pressures of their environment (Blass 1993; Norenzayan 2002; Caprara &
Cervone 2000; Endler & Magnusson 1976; Snyder & Ickes 1985). It frames these interactions as
a process whereby environmental factors of the situation select or “activate” certain internal
dispositional factors in order to produce behavior (Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein 2001; Bargh 1997;
Kihlstrom 2008; Reynolds et al 2010).
I use this interactionist framework to explain how human rights express the emotional
values of people as they appraise and relate to others and the events around them. Human rights,
then, have a situational and dispositional side. The situational side refers to events that implicate
the rights of people and how we behave in response to those events. The dispositional side refers
to the real emotive structures “activated” by events and how they shape how we feel about them.
11

Together, both situational and dispositional sides illustrate how human right emerges from both
social and natural processes interacting with each other. At the core of those interactions is the
role that emotion plays in mediating our social relations. It is through these social relations we
emotionally judge the treatment of others which generates a sense of rights and responsibilities.

Proposing a Combined Approach
I bring the two tracks together into a combined approach capable of demonstrating how an
ontology of human rights arise from the emotional interactions of rights bearers. Interactionism
and critical realism integrate nicely into a combined approach because the former coheres with
latter’s portrait of reality. First interactionism’s disposition-situation framework presupposes a
stratified ontology. Again, critical realism’s stratification assumes that observable phenomena at
the top are produced by both social and natural mechanisms from below. This is consistent with
interactionist psychology which aims to understand how human behavior reflects both the social
situation and the unobservable natural dispositions underpinning them. Second, dispositionsituation interactions presuppose an open system. Again, open systems refer to the uncontrolled
social environment that diversifies the behaviors within it. Interactionism recognizes this open
system in order to understand how natural dispositions produce social and cultural variations in
behavior; how behavior actualizes depends on the social conditions of the situation.
Together they provide a combined framework that demonstrates how human rights exist
on different levels. Human rights practices occur on the domain of the actual and arise from the
emotional judgements of rights bearers on the domain of the real. These judgements constitute a
sense of right that a) reflect ontologically real dispositions of the rights bearer and b) result from
the social situations through which rights bearers interact with each other. This combined
12

framework paints a pictures of how complex human rights really are. Human rights are more
than just the observable behaviors and events that empiricists study; they reflect ontologically
real unobservable dispositions that make those behaviors and events possible. Additionally,
human rights are not, as natural law philosophies argue, rational goods. Human rights emerge
from how emotive dispositions interact with, and judge, social situations. In this light, our sense
of right reflects viscerally felt emotion; conscious analysis may or may not be present.

Structure of the Dissertation
I organize the dissertation into four chapters. The first chapter discusses the limitation of the
human rights literature and the need for an emotional ontology of human rights. As previously
mentioned, the discipline’s understanding of human rights commits either the epistemic fallacy
or the naturalistic fallacy. I divide the chapter into two in order to discuss both at length. I begin
by discussing how empiricist approaches to human rights commit the epistemic fallacy. They do
this by conflating the causal mechanisms of human rights with the cultural or legal practices they
generate. The second part discuss how rationalist approaches to natural rights commit the
naturalistic fallacy. I discuss how rationalist philosophies attempt to justify rights on the premise
of rationality. Both of these demonstrate how the human rights literature rests on unstable
ontological grounds.

Rationalist approaches to natural law fail to establish an ontological

framework that can support their human rights claims, while empiricist approaches either
conflate ontology with epistemology or ignore ontology altogether. I end this chapter by stating
that an emotional ontology to human rights can correct for this.
The next two chapters discuss my ontological and emotional tracks. The second chapter
discusses how my ontological track corrects the epistemic fallacy committed by empiricist
13

approach to human rights. I divide this chapter into two parts. The first part discusses the
empiricist approaches to human rights and how they commit the epistemic fallacy. Positivist
human rights theories reduce scientific knowledge of rights to what can be scientifically
observed, while constructivist approaches argue that the scientific research of rights
simultaneously constructs our knowledge of them. They both commit the epistemic fallacy, and
the theoretical disagreement between them is symptomatic of their unacknowledged ontological
differences. The second part of the chapter introduces critical realism as an alternative to
empiricist sciences and discuss how it can address the ontological gap in the human rights
literature. I provide an ontological framework that can theorize about the foundations of human
rights.
The third chapter discusses how emotion serves as those foundations. I divide this
chapter into three parts.

The first part discusses how emotion corrects for the rationalist

approaches which commit the naturalistic fallacy. In assuming that rationality serves as the
natural foundations of human rights, rationalist approaches argue that claims to rights can be
premised on a rational understanding of nature. In doing so, they derive a normative ‘ought’
from a positive ‘is.’ The second part discusses how an emotional framework corrects for this.
The motivating force behind human rights action is an emotional sense of rights and
responsibilities.

My argument roots this sense in nature as it reflects the functioning of

ontologically real psychological structures, but I avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy
because this sense does not require a rational understanding of nature. In other words, a sense of
rights and responsibilities are informed by viscerally felt emotion. The third part of this chapter
anchors this emotional sense of rights within the interactions that we have with fellow rightsbearers. Emotion can generate a sense of right because they mediate our social relations through
14

which we observe and emotionally judge how people are treated. These emotional judgements
serve as the sense or rights which may inform and motivate human rights actions and practices.
After discussing both the ontological and emotional tracks separately, the fourth chapter
discusses how I integrate them into a cohesive human rights approach. I divide this chapter into
two parts. The first part discusses how the ontological and emotional dimensions address issues
within the human rights literature.

Specifically, critical realism provides the ontological

framework to explain how natural emotive mechanisms can produce the cultural diversity in
human rights practices. Additionally, interactionism provides the psychological framework to
explain how human rights arise from social relations. The second part of the chapter discusses
the contributions this approach can make to human rights. It is important to state that my
approach is not meant to rationally justify a list of specific human rights items – that would
reproduce the errors of rationalist approaches.

Rather, it focuses on the social conditions

necessary for the recognition of human rights. If people realize rights and responsibilities
through their emotional interactions with others, then a social and political environment that
fosters these emotional relations serve as a requisite condition for human rights. I argue that
these conditions constitute a different kind of rights in their own terms. They do not emerge
from emotional interactions but constitute the social conditions necessary for such interactions to
take place.
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Chapter 1
The Errors of Empiricist and Rationalist Perspectives: Ontological
Foundations and Human Rights Theories

Introduction
The IR discipline’s theoretical understanding of human rights has been dominated by two broad
perspectives – empiricist and rationalist approaches – both of which fail to provide a firm
ontological footing to theorize about human rights.

First, empiricist approaches follow an

antirealist form of science which holds that research should be based on methods of observation.
Because it ignores unobservable phenomena, empiricism makes the mistake of conflating
ontology with human experience, an error known as the epistemic fallacy.

Empiricist

approaches to human rights commit this fallacy by either reducing the ontological foundations of
rights to observable phenomena or ignoring ontology altogether.
The second broad perspective are natural law philosophies which, unlike empiricist
approaches, do take ontology seriously. However, their ontological assumptions fail to fully
support their human rights claims. They follow a rationalist paradigm which argues that human
rights can be understood through the same rational nature they derive from. Such an argument
assumes that human rights claims can be rationally justified on factual knowledge about the
world. This commits the naturalistic fallacy, however, as positive knowledge about nature
cannot logically justify normative claims to human rights. Human rationality, then, fails to
provide a stable ontology for basing natural human rights on. In general, neither the empiricist
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nor the rationalist perspectives provide a firm ontological grounding that can support their
human rights theories.
The lack of a firm ontological framework in the human rights literature may not seem
like a serious problem. Debates over ontology often seem too abstract or inconsequential for
researchers interested in more substantive human rights issues. And IR scholars and political
scientists will likely continue their human rights research without giving ontological questions
much thought or attention. The problem with this, though, is that no scientific research is
ontologically neutral. The scientific choices we make always reflect some deeper ontological
assumption, whether those assumptions are explicitly stated or not (Hay 2011; Kaidesoja 2013).
Choosing to ignore or overlook these deeper assumptions means that ontological disagreements
in the discipline go unresolved. As a result, theoretical and scientific debates over human rights
may persist without researchers realizing how they actually reflect the ontological disagreements
underpinning them. I demonstrate in this problem how this problem is present in IR human
rights theory.

Aims and Structure of the Chapter
The first section discusses the empiricist approaches to human rights and the antirealist forms of
science underpinning them.

The primary empiricist approaches are agreement theories

(common-core theories and overlapping consensus theories) and relativist theories (including
cultural relativism and postcolonial perspectives).

Because both share epistemological

commitments to scientific antirealism, they both research the casual mechanisms of human rights
in terms of what can be observed. Specifically, both agreement theories and relativist theories
research the causal mechanisms of human rights in terms of how they are practiced. Doing so,
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however, commits the epistemic fallacy because it reduces the ontological causal mechanisms of
human rights to what can be epistemologically experienced.
This epistemic fallacy creates a problem for human rights theories: there is no stable
ontological footing upon which agreement theories or relativist theories may base their
theoretical and methodological choices.

As a result, they focus on different observable

phenomena to explain the causal mechanisms of human rights (agreement theories argue rights
are structured by intercultural agreements, while relativist theories argue that rights reflect the
autonomous practices of cultural members) with no way to resolve their differences.

I

demonstrate in this first section how the epistemic fallacy underpins the methodological and
theoretical differences between agreement and relativist theories.
The second section discusses the ontological problem inherent with natural law
philosophies.

Unlike the empiricist approaches, natural law philosophies do explicitly

acknowledge their ontological commitments – again, they ground human rights in a rationalist
philosophy. There are two forms of this: derivationism and inclinationism. Derivationism
argues that we come to know natural rights using the same faculties of human reason that rights
derive from. In doing so, however, it commits the naturalistic fallacy because it attempts to
derive natural rights from our rational knowledge of nature. This creates problems for rationalist
approaches: derivationism fails to establish a stable ontological foundation from which it can
philosophically justify the epistemological understanding of natural right.
Inclinationism attempts to correct for the problems by arguing that rights do not derive
from a human reason. Instead, it argues that human reason merely inclines our behaviors to
conform with what is right and good. This successfully avoids the naturalistic fallacy because it
no longer derives right from reason, but it creates a new problem because it fails to provide any
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ontological foundation at all. Rather than address this issues, its rationalist commitment merely
shifts its focus to discuss the epistemological role of reason in rights. I discuss in this second
section how this rationalist focus prevents these philosophical approaches from providing the
ontological stability to theorize about human rights.

The Antirealism of Empiricist Approaches
The primary limitation of empiricist approaches to human rights is that these approaches assume
that human rights foundations can be observed at the same level of the human rights phenomena
which they generate. In other words, empiricist human rights approaches attempt to explain
human rights in terms of other observable phenomena. Specifically, empiricist approaches tend
to explain human rights in terms of observable cultural phenomena (culture generally understood
as shared and reiterated systems of behavior). For instance, agreement theories argue in favor of
human rights in so far as they can evidence observable cultural regularities. Relativist theories
argue against international human rights based on the observed salience of cultural differences.
(I explain these theories in greater detail in the following section).

While both advance

competing human rights arguments, they each rely on observable cultural phenomena to frame
the foundations of human rights.

As a result, they disregard the need to inquire about

unobservable and underlying structures responsible for generating human rights.
The focus on observation reflects the empiricist orthodoxy of the social sciences and the
antirealist epistemology it is built on. It is important, then, to briefly discuss empiricism and the
antirealist thought underpinning it. In brief, empiricism holds that all knowledge is acquired
through sense-experience and, therefore, restricts scientific inquiry to phenomena that can be
observed and/or tested (Godrey-Smith 2003, 35-37; Chakravartty 2007, 8-15; Shapere 2000,
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153-163). This can be traced to John Locke who introduced empiricism as an approach to study
the world scientifically. According to Locke, the mind is born a blank slate and acquires
knowledge only through experiencing the world around it (Locke). This epistemological claim
serves as a predicate for its methodological extension – if sensory experience is the sole source
of knowledge, then science must be based on observation. Those parts of the world that cannot
be observed/experienced are not suitable subjects of research.

The limits to observation,

however, prevent empiricism from researching the ontological nature of things (van Fraassen
1980; van Fraassen 2002; Harre 1986, 57-58; Bhaskar 1979). Empiricism studies only the world
as we see it, not the world as it is.
This has sparked a debate as to whether science can provide a true account of the real
world. In general, realists believe that scientific theory can and should work to offer a true
account of the real world, while antirealist argue that theory serves only as an approximate
representation of the world (Dewitt 2004, 71-77; Chakravartty 2007, 3-5; Bhaskar 2008). For
the antirealist, theory does not aim to explain the world as it is but, instead, aims to predict how
the world works. Antirealism does not disagree with the realist that science should be as
accurate as possible but, accepting the argument that knowledge is based on experience, it
disagrees with the ability of science to describe all aspects of the world with such accuracy.
There are a couple of reasons for this. First, according to antirealism, science requires
subjecting the researched phenomena to scientific methods of observation. Those things that
cannot be observed, then, are not suitable for scientific inquiry. Second, there are practical limits
to sense experience itself and even those observations made through scientific method reflect our
experience of the world rather than the world independent of experience (Chakravartty 2007, 1415, Okasha 2002). In essence, antirealism recognizes that our experience of the world does not
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accurately portray reality and, therefore, no theory can claim to offer a true account of the real
world. Instead, antirealism argues that science speaks only to those parts that we can experience.
At the heart of the conflict between realism and antirealism, then, are disagreements over the
scientific appropriateness of unobservable phenomena (Chakravartty 2007, 8-15, Bhaskar 2008).
The distinction between observable and unobservable phenomena is rather selfexplanatory – observable phenomena are those units of analysis that can be subject to observable
testing while unobservable phenomena are not. Realists believe that unobservable objects can be
subject of scientific inquiry (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 185-186; Chakravartty 2007, 14-15). For the
antirealist, however, unobservable phenomena marks the limits of scientific knowledge; if there
is a real world independent of human experience, how can we know anything about it without
referencing our experience of it? Because sense-experience does not correspond completely
and/or accurately with reality, the antirealist argues that science cannot advance claims
referencing the nature of reality.
Due to the scope of its research restricted to observable phenomena, empirical knowledge
plays a key role for antirealism. It is no surprise, then, that many of the disagreements to realism
come from the empiricist camp. As Godfrey Smith notes, “Indeed, one side of the debate about
realism is often referred to as the debate between realism and empiricism” (Godfrey-Smith 2003,
180). The empiricist philosophy that all science be based on scientific observation is predicated
on its epistemological assumption that knowledge acquisition occurs primarily through senseexperience. Thus, empiricism advances a purely antirealist agenda for the social scientist.
Because empiricism holds that our sense-experience marks the practical limits of science,
it requires that the scientist resist making claims of an ontological manner. In this light, theories
about the world serve more as devices or instruments that help us understand our experience of
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the world. Philosophers refer to this view as instrumentalism (Dewitt 2004, 72; Godfrey-Smith
2003, 183). In this view, theories are not meant to be taken literally but instead are tools that
help describe and predict our experience of the world. Thus, the success of science is not judged
according to whether it corresponds with reality, but whether it provides accurate empirical
predictions (Dewitt 2004, 71-77, Godfrey-Smith 2003, 183-186).

The Empiricist Approaches and their Focus on Culture
Empiricism serves as scientific orthodoxy within the political sciences and international
relations. Much of the IR literature discussing human rights, then, works within an empiricist
paradigm. Here I discuss those empiricist approaches to human rights and how they frame
human rights foundations in terms of culture.
The theoretical debate over human rights is shaped by competing empiricist approaches.
On one side are agreement theories which argue that international human rights can be
constructed on top of cross-cultural or international agreement. According to these theories, the
legitimacy of international human rights must reflect some intercultural consensus or patterned
regularities.

Agreement theory, then, explains the source of international human rights as

identifiable social regularities determined by cross-cultural structures. In this light, agreement
theories are interested in uncovering the possibility of rights within the intercultural and political
structure that allow for them.
On the other side are relativist perspectives which remain critical of international human
rights given the observable salience of cultural difference. These theories do not view culture as
a structural constraint on human agency but, instead, a reflection of it. According to these
theories, rights are culturally relative and, therefore, reflect the agency of the group practicing
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them. They argue, then, that rights only have meaning within a cultural context. Because of this,
they cast suspicions on international human rights as violations of cultural autonomy or
expressions of imperial power.
Despite their theoretical disagreement over international human rights, they both operate
within an empiricist approach to science which assume an antirealist epistemology. In other
words, they frame the foundations of rights in terms of observable social phenomena.
Specifically, they both emphasize the role that culture plays in serving as a rights foundation.
For agreement theories, cultural structure serves as a major constraint that determines
international human rights, while relativist theories refer to culture as expressing the agency of
groups to form culturally specific rights. I explain each of these in more detail below.

Agreement Theories of Human Rights
According to agreement theories, different cultures practice different sets of rights which
makes the prospect for human rights dependent on some form of agreement. For example,
Renteln describes the prospect of international human rights through agreement by saying
“where it is possible to demonstrate acceptance of a moral principle or value by all cultures, it
will be feasible to erect human-rights standards.

The reality of universality depends on

marshaling crosscultural data” (Renteln 1990, 135). There are two types of agreement theories
(Beitz 2009) which discuss the ontology of rights within a cultural and political framework. The
first is common core theories which frame the possibility of rights within a structure of crosscultural regularities, and the second is overlapping consensus theories which views the
possibility of rights within the political and cross-cultural structure of international agreements.
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Common core theories frame human rights as reflecting a core value held by all societies,
something akin to what R.J. Vincent describes as a “lowest common denominator” (Vincent
1986, 48). One way to describe this would be to consider this core as a set of general values that
other more particular and tangible rights may branch from.

Another example is Michael

Walzer’s argument for a “moral minimum” (Walzer 1994). Walzer recognizes how values are
expressed differently between cultures but discusses how moral judgments are possible across
cultural lines. He does this through a distinction between the thin global level of human values
and the thick local level of their cultural expression. Such general rights constitute the common
core of international human rights if they enjoy an intercultural consensus. In general, these
“lowest common denominators” or “moral minimums” are human rights attempts to work within
a cultural structure. Rights are only possible if they can work within the “social facts” of crosscultural regularities.
The overlapping consensus approach, differs in that it does not define human rights
narrowly to a “core” of inter-culturally shared values; cultural similarities are not necessary
prerequisites. Instead, rights should be seen as “norms for global political life reachable from a
variety of possibly incompatible foundational positions” (Beitz 2009, 76). In this sense, the
legitimacy of human rights rests on the ability for different cultures to bargain and compromise
on different values. The term overlapping consensus originates in John Rawls’ A Theory of
Justice (1971) where he discusses the possibility for different systems of justice to agree on
similar legal values. A better example of how it relates to human rights is found in Charles
Taylor’s argument for an “unforced consensus” (1996) where cultures with different interest find
common ground regarding how best to govern intercultural politics.

While common core

theories frame the possibility of rights in terms of intercultural structures, overlapping consensus
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frames them in terms of consensus which structures the concessions or settlements made on how
best to govern international rights. In this sense, the possibility of rights depends on either
intercultural compromise or overlapping cultural interests.
In general, both common-core and overlapping consensus theories define the status of
international human rights in terms of observable cultural phenomena: common core theories
argue for rights in so far as we can evidence cross-cultural similarities, and over-lapping
consensus theories argue that rights embody intercultural settlements on how best to manage
international rights issues. As a result, they frame the foundations of international human rights
within the observable phenomena of cultural regularities/agreement.

Relativist Approaches to Human Rights
Relativist approaches cast suspicion on international human rights. In general, cultural
relativism argues that rights derive their meaning from within the culture that practices them.
Thus, human rights standards are relative according to culture, and one cannot judge cultural
practices from an outside perspective.
Cultural relativism was originally proposed by Franz Boas as a methodological tool for
cultural anthropology (1887). He developed it to counter ethno-centricism and racism within the
cultural studies (Lewis 2001). Inspired by the philosophical idealism of Kant, Boas wanted to
emphasize the role that ideas play instead of race. For him “...civilization is not something
absolute, but ... is relative, and ... our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our
civilization goes” (Boaz 1887, 64). He argued that people are products of different social,
historical, and geographic environments from which cultural differences arise.
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Cultural relativism in the human rights debate serves less as a methodological tool and
more as a substantive perspective. As George Marcus and Michael Fischer point out, “through
academic and broader ideological debates in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s, the
expression of cultural relativism developed more as a doctrine, or position, than as a method”
(Marcus and Fischer 1999, 10). In this light, relativism holds that human rights values really do
have different meaning relative to one’s culture. Because culture is a lens through which we
make sense of the world, claims to rights and values derive their meaning within the context of
culture. As Teson puts it, relativism is a “position according to which local cultural traditions
(including religious, political, and legal practices) properly determine the existence and scope of
civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society” (Teson 1984-1985, 870-871).
For this reason, the cultural relativist argue that external judgments from non-cultural
members lack context and, instead, reflect particularized conceptions of rights that cohere with
their own culture (Mayer 1999). In fact, the observed salience of cultural difference refutes the
claim that rights can be internationally agreed upon. It is for this reason that the theory remains
skeptical of international standards. Instead, cultural relativism, as Jack Donnelly asserts, serves
as “a doctrine that is strongly supported by notions of communal autonomy and selfdetermination” (Donnelly 1984, 400).
Like cultural relativism, postcolonial perspectives are also critical of international human
rights in a culturally diverse world. While relativism discusses how rights have meaning within
a cultural context, postcolonial perspectives shift attention to how international human rights are
used as tools of power. Specifically, this perspective exposes how international law and human
rights interventions continue a pernicious history of imperialism. They reveal how the current
international human rights regime reflects the cultural hegemony of Western states given their
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shaping of the UDHR and international human rights law. In this sense, human rights function
as a tool for Western states to impose their interest on the less powerful, thus reproducing the
historical conditions of colonialism. S.P. Sinha makes this point by saying that “to the extent
these kinds of rights are concerned, we have the scenario of one particular culture, or one
particular ideology, or one particular political system claiming to be imposed upon the entire
world” (Sinha 1978, 144). For this reason, postcolonial perspectives view the discriminatory
aspects of human rights as a “history still in process (Gandhi 1998, 7-8).”
An example is the work of M. Jacqui Alexander who argues that the practice of human
rights today does nothing to address the legacies of colonialism but, instead, reproduces them.
According to him, liberal human rights organizations, agreements, and interventions advance
Western ideals through a “dominant knowledge framework” (Alexander 2005, 124). Human
rights, then, express the unequal distribution of power in the world by imposing a particular
cultural vision on others.
Makau Mutua echoes these sentiments that international human rights reflect the
imposition of a neo-imperialist agenda to export Western values (Mutua 2002). He argues that
“The levers of power at the United Nations and other international law-making fora have
traditionally been out of the reach of the Third World. And even if they were within reach, it is
doubtful that most Third World states actually represent their peoples and cultures” (Mutua
2017). This detachment makes it completely unfit to address the legacy of colonialism. For him,
“the human rights corpus is simply unable to confront structurally and in a meaningful way the
deep-seated imbalances of power and privilege which bedevil our world” (Mutua 157). For him,
this intellectual and organizational make-up of the human rights project are unfit to address the
problems created by colonialism.
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In general, both relativist and postcolonial perspectives recognize the active role that
cultural agents play in constructing rights. Rights have meaning precisely because they reflect
the constructive agency of cultural members.

For this reason, they remain suspicious of

international standards because such standards may reflect the imperial interests of the west
rather than the cultural interest of the local groups.

Below the Surface of Culture?
Both of the empiricist approaches above frame the premise of their human rights arguments in
terms of observable cultural behavior. Agreement theories argue that international human rights
are to be founded on the observation of cultural agreement. Relativists remain critical of
international human rights given the salience of cultural difference. Instead, they argue that
issues of rightness are founded in the cultural particularity of each group.
However, framing the foundations of rights in terms of culture assumes that the source of
rights can be evidenced on the same level of observation as the human rights phenomena that
they produce. Their tendency to frame rights in terms of other cultural phenomena, then, results
in tautology where rights are evidenced only through the observation of cultural norms and
customs. As a result, they conflate rights with culture and fail to identify the underlying
structures generating human rights.
This explains why empiricist approaches arrive at different human rights conclusions
despite the fact that they both begin with cultural premises. The reason is that they both make
different scientific/theoretical choices as to what they should observe: agreement theories
observe intercultural regularities while relativist perspectives consider the cultural particularity
of different rights practices. This exposes the limitations to empiricist approaches – they fail to
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establish an ontological foundation which can justify their scientific/theoretical decisions. In
other words, their theoretical disagreement over human rights actually reflects unacknowledged
ontological differences.
Taking human rights foundations seriously requires that we consider those underlying
structures responsible for both human rights and the cultural behaviors associated with them.
Contrary to antirealist epistemologies, philosophically realist approaches work to do this by
exploring unobservable phenomena. If we are interested in the ontological foundations of rights,
then we should consider those unobservable mechanisms responsible for generating rights.

The Rationalist Approaches to Natural Law
In its most basic form, naturalistic philosophies assume that rights reflect fundamental principles
that govern the natural world; natural right is an objective part of the world that we live in.
Understanding nature as the foundation of right, then, is the primary interest of these
philosophical approaches. They attempt to discuss the foundations of human rights in reference
to two basic principles: fundamentality and universality (Beitz, 2009, 52–53).
The first principle – fundamentality – refers to rights as “pre-institutional”, which is to
say that they operate separately from the cultural and legal ways of society.

Therefore,

naturalistic philosophies reject the empiricist assumptions that human rights are mere social and
cultural constructs. Instead, these philosophies argue that positive law should correspond with
natural law.
The second principle – universality – assumes that all people possess human rights. This
is closely related to the first principle. Naturalist philosophies assume that the fundamental laws
of nature are unchanging and govern all of life and, therefore, extend to all people. In general,
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these two principles suggest that the foundations of human rights operate as basic natural laws
governing issues of right.
This raises an interesting question, though, as to what exactly those foundations are and
how they can be known. Natural law philosophies have traditionally answered these questions
by framing the foundations of rights in terms of human reason. Specifically, human rights derive
from the same capacity to rationally understand them. I explain this in more detail below.

Rationality as a foundation of right
The history of natural law philosophies have emphasized the foundational role that human
rationality plays in both constituting rights and understanding them. The Stoic philosophy (c.
300 BC) held that there is a rational order to the universe, and that the recognition of right occurs
when rational beings live in accordance with it. Drawing on Stoic philosophy, for instance,
Cicero wrote that “true law is right reason in agreement with nature” (59-47 BC) which is to say
that natural right can be known to those who reflect upon their actions.
The emphasis on rationality was an important point in Christian and runs through the
works of Augustine (354–430) and later Aquinas (1225–1274). Augustine argued that natural
comes directly from God which is “inscribed upon the rational soul, so that in the very living out
of this life and in their early activities people might hold to the tenor of such dispensations”
(2002, 92). Centuries later, Aquinas provided a new interpretation which suggested that natural
law is not created directly from god but, instead, arises from the world that God created.
Specifically, people are part of the rational order of the world and, therefore, can rationally
understand it. According to him, natural law is “the participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature” (Aquinas, www.nlnrac.org). For him, our ability to rationally understand
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nature and our place within it is the very thing that natural right also derives from. In his words,
“the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts.”
The emphasis on rationality became a core tenet in much of the modern philosophies
associated with the Enlightenment. For instance, the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645),
often considered the “father of natural law” (1917), continued to emphasize the foundational role
of reason in natural law. Like much of the philosophy at the time, he broke from the Christian
tradition and its emphasis on God. Instead, Grotius argued that law itself derives from rational
people working in accordance with nature. We see this in the De summa potestatum, where he
writes that right “arises from the nature of the action itself” (Opera Omnia Theologica, vol. III, p.
187). In other words, rights are emergent properties from the rational nature of people. He states
this more clearly in “The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act,
according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness
or moral necessity” (1925, 38-39). In other words, it is the study of our rational nature which
informs us of natural right. Other natural law writers during this time echoed these sentiments.
For instance, Gabriel Vasquez (1549–1604) echoes this sentiment in saying that “The first
natural law in rational creation is, therefore, nature itself, as rational, for this is the first rule of
good and evil” (Kilcullen, 2012).
Other writings on natural law during this time include the work of the social contract
theories of Hobbes (1588–1679) and Locke (1632–1704).

In general, social contract

philosophies assert that the rules that organize a society derive from an agreement between
rational actors. Hobbes’ argument that authoritarian rule is preferable to the state of nature is
based on our rational desires for security. According to Hobbes, “it is a precept, or general rule
of reason: that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it” (2004,
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1980). Locke’s writings are more optimistic than Hobbes’ and argued that the social contract is
not designed to protect fearful individuals from each other but, instead, create a public sphere of
cooperation. According to Locke, “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which
obliges everyone: and reason which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or
possessions…” (117, 1994).

Our rational capacity is best developed in public sphere of

cooperation. Despite this different vision of society, he still presumed that our cooperative
nature stems from a collective rationality where reasonable people understand the benefits of
cooperation
Contemporary natural law philosophy still continues this rationalist tradition. This is true
for the work of John Finnis and his writings on “practical reasonableness.” His thoughts on
human reason and rights differs from many of the modern thinkers of the enlightenment who
argued that natural rights derive directly from facts about the natural world. Instead, Finnis
argues in Natural Law and Natural Rights that natural law is an intuitive part of us that inclines
us towards what is good (he refers to this as “basic human flourishing”). For him, practical
reasonableness – as normative mode of thought – inclines us to these ends. What is right and
good for human flourishing is not derive from anything but, rather, become intuitively known
through our practical reasonableness. He describes natural law, then, as “the set of principles of
practical reasonableness in ordering human life and human community…” (Finnis, 2011, 280).
In this sense, Finnis’ major contribution lies in his ability to overcome this naturalistic fallacy
where previous theories derived ‘ought’ from ‘is’. In this context, human reason provides the
intuitive understanding which makes sense of our actions in the context of the inclinations that
brought them about.
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Derivationism and Inclinationism
In general, naturalistic philosophies assume that rights are real because they reflect the laws that
govern human nature. Specifically, natural law philosophies ground the moral realism of human
rights in our innate capacity for rational thought. According to natural law philosophy, the
substance of rights can be understood through human reason precisely because they reflect our
rational nature.
This rationalist approach, however, just begs the question further as to what the
relationship is between rights and reason and, also, how human rationality allows for the
understanding of natural right. Naturalist theories have addressed this question through two
competing philosophies: derivationism and inclinationism. Both of these provide an account as
to how natural rights are known.
Derivationism, in general, argues that natural law derives from the nature of rational
beings who, in turn, can understand it through human reason. This is true for the works of
Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. Inclinationism, on the other hand, argues against the idea that rights
derive from anything and instead holds that knowledge rights become intuitively understood
through inclinations. This is the case with the work of John Finnis. I discuss these in detail
below.

Derivationism
Again, derivationism asserts our knowledge of right derives from acts of human reason
which assumes a rational human nature capable of moral discovery. To make sense of this, it is
important to make a distinction between practical reason and speculative reason.

In their

simplest form, speculative reason concerns claims about the world while practical reason
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concerns how best to act within it. Practical reason, then, is inherently normative as it concerns
how we should act. Practical reason’s normative approaches is what makes it different from the
positive approach of speculative reason which, again, is concerned with how the world works.
Both speculative and practical knowledge are important to understanding derivationism because
it argues that the latter derives from the former.
If we start with the premises that a) rational beings are capable of self-understanding and
b) that our ability to understand operates according to the laws governing the natural order of
things, than one can conclude c) that the rational being should, through speculative reason,
apprehend natural law so far as those laws relate in some way to the governing of human nature.
(Augustine takes this one step further by claiming that nature is comprised not only of physical
laws but divine laws of rightness as well). In other words, rational beings capable of selfunderstanding, through speculative rationality, recognize themselves as part of the world’s
natural order and, by extension, can understand how those laws work. How our practical reason
informs us to act in accordance with those laws, then, constitutes natural right, which derived
purely from speculative reasoning. In other words, we can speculate about the world and, in
turn, reveal insights through practical reason into moral action.
There are issues with this derivationist approach, however. The first is that the practical
reasoning of morality and rights requires deriving natural rights from the speculative reasoning
of how the world works. In doing so, these approaches attempt to draw a practical ‘ought’ from
a speculative ‘is’ which commits the naturalistic fallacy – you cannot derive values from facts.
Derivationists may challenge the fact/value distinction by claiming that the innateness of values
constitutes part of the facticity of the natural world, but they still must articulate how in order to
clarify where its normative authority comes from. Social contract theories do their best to trace
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this authority back to human nature, but this just further begs the question as to why facts of
human nature rationally authorize values.
Second, and a more obvious critique, is that derivationism puts a lot of faith in the
rational capacity of people to recognize natural law in an accurate way. Modern cognitive
science now recognizes the limits of rationality, let alone how our speculative account of the
world is based on imperfect perceptions and subjective experiences. The derivationist, then,
overlooks the cognitive limitations of human reason when it assumes that we can somehow
rationally understand how the world works through reason.
Third, and related to the second, its reliance on speculative reason oversimplifies a
culturally diverse world. Different cultures understand the world differently and these diverging
speculative accounts are going to produce practical knowledge along the subjective experiences
of culture, politics, economics, etc. In short, speculative accounts of the world vary according to
culture and the derivationist has no way to explain the plurality of these divergent
understandings. In fact, such a multitude of different “reasons” exposes the falsehood that
rationality is universal and serves as the foundation for human rights.

Inclinationism
Inclinationism counters derivationism and argues instead that our awareness of rights
occur through a non-derivative form of human understanding – a view associated primarily with
contemporary natural law of Finnis. Rather than actively discovering rights through reason or
making reference to facts about the natural world, our awareness of rightness occurs intuitively
through inclinations.
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Inclinations serve as an intuitive understanding of rightness. Specifically, acting in line
with rights requires some intuitive understanding that those actions are so. While eventually
rational understand that our actions are rights after reflection, they do not come from reason.
Instead, we reflect upon our actions and become aware of their rightness (Finnis 2011).
Thus, what distinguishes inclinationism from derivationism is their epistemological and
ontological focus. Contrary to inclinationism, derivationism emphasizes ontology because it
presumes a rational human nature in order to base its argument for rights.

This is why

derivationism emphasizes the importance of speculative reasoning – so that we can better
understand the natural world that rights derive from. By contrast inclinationism focuses more on
epistemology. It is concerned with how we know moral goods which do not need a concept of
human nature. Rather, rights naturally occur to the rational being intuitively. This is why
inclinationism focuses more on practical reasoning on how best to act, rather than speculative
reasoning.
This poses a problem, however, for inclinationism because it rejects the ontological
assumptions that make it a naturalistic theory – it claims that these self-evident goods are nonderivable.

The question rises then as to how rights can be self-evident without a natural

grounding. On one side, it fails to communicate how rights serve as an essential part of nature
but, on the other side, any attempt to ground the theory in nature just makes it another form of
derivationism.

Are the Foundations of Rights Non-rational?
The last section reviewed the derivationist and inclinationist approaches and discussed their
respective limitations. Here I wish to remark on how those limitations reflect upon the rationalist
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assumptions within natural law. Both approaches to natural law relate our understanding of
rights to our innate sense of reason. Each emphasize different aspects of that relationship:
derivationism frames the foundations of rights in the ontology of a rational human nature, while
inclinationism emphasizes the epistemological aspect of rationality as a process that inclines us
towards natural right. Both of these approaches have their limitations: derivationism fails to
articulate an epistemological account as to how we come to know natural right, while
inclinationism fails to offer an ontological account as to the source of those inclinations. In fact,
the focus of each of these approaches serves as a response to the other’s limitations. In other
words, they are two different sides of the same coin – both address the link between reason and
rights, but remain distinct and independent from the other. Any attempt to marry their respective
ontological/epistemological foci into a coherent approach results in a contradiction:
deriviationism cannot discuss how practical rationality derives from speculative knowledge
without committing the naturalistic fallacy, and inclinationism cannot articulate the source of
practical rationality without becoming just another form of derivationism. The inability to marry
both the ontological and epistemological dimensions of natural right into a coherent model
exposes the limitations of a rationalist approach. After all, rights have both an ontological and
epistemological dimension; something generates them and somehow we become aware of them.
If human reason cannot explain both of these dimensions without contradiction, then perhaps
human reason is not the source of natural right as traditionally thought.

In general, their

rationalist ontology cannot sustain their normative claims to human rights.
If we are to theorize about the foundations of natural rights, then those foundations
should articulate both an ontological and epistemological dimension without one contradicting
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the other. In other words, it should identify the source that rights derive from which inclines us
towards right behavior.

Conclusion
Both empiricist and rationalist approaches fail to provide a stable ontological foundation that can
support their theoretical arguments for human rights.

First, the antirealism of empiricist

approaches assume that the foundations of human rights can be located on the same level as the
observable human rights activity that they generate. Therefore, they frame the foundations of
rights in superficial terms of observable cultural practices while ignoring the ontological
structures that underpin them. Essentially, empiricist approaches commit the epistemic fallacy
by conflating the ontology of rights with our epistemological experience of them. Second,
natural law perspectives attempt to base human rights, and our understanding of them, within a
rationalist ontology. These theories argue that human rights can be understood by the same
rational human nature they derive from. However, this argument can’t explain how rational
agents come to understanding human rights without internal contradiction. Specifically, the
argument that we can rationally derive rights from factual knowledge commits the naturalistic
fallacy. As a result, rationalism fails to provide a stable ontological foundation capable of
supporting its epistemological claims about rights and reason. To conclude, the ontological
problems of both empiricist and rationalist approaches can be summed up in the following: the
antirealism of empiricist approach conflate the ontological foundations of human rights with how
rights are practiced, while the rationalism of natural law approaches fails to provide the
ontological stability to support their human rights theories.
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Having diagnosed the problems of empiricist and rationalist approaches, I have situated
the dissertation to argue for alternatives that can address the fallacies committed by the two
dominant approaches. I advance a two-tracked argument that can correct for a) the epistemic
fallacy committed by empiricist approaches and b) the naturalistic fallacy committed by
rationalist approaches.

In correcting for the epistemic fallacy, I propose a critical realist

approach which attempts to uncover the causal mechanisms generating observable phenomena.
In correcting for the naturalistic fallacy, I propose a social-psychological perspective which
emphasizes the importance of emotion in generating human rights values and behaviors. By
framing my two-tracked argument as a response to the limitations of both empiricism and
rationalism, I carve out a space to discuss the foundational role that emotion plays in generating
a human rights ontology.
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Chapter 2
Correcting for the Epistemic Fallacy: How Critical Realism Provides the Ontological
Framework Missing in Empiricist Approaches.

Introduction
Chapter 1 briefly discussed the ontological problems with empiricist approaches to human rights.
It argued that these approaches fail to conceptualize an ontological foundation to support their
human rights theories. This is largely due to empiricism’s focus on observation: researchers
conflate the causal foundations of human rights with observable human rights activity rather than
anchoring these foundations within the ontological structures producing them. The empiricist
tendency to ignore ontology creates more disagreement than it resolves. The reason for this is
that no theory is ontologically neutral, and the decision to research some observable phenomena
over others reflects deeper ontological presumptions whether they are explicitly stated or not.
This leads to theorietical debates over the causal foundations of human rights which will likely
persist without researchers realizing how they actually reflect the deeper ontological
disagreements underpinning them.
Correcting this problem requires an ontological intervention which can seriously and
critically investigate the unobservable structures generating human rights activity. This chapter
aims to initiate that intervention by proposing an ontological framework for human rights which
divorces their causal mechanisms from the social activity they produce. Specifically, I employ
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the ontological framework articulated by critical realism, a philosophy of science associated with
the work of Roy Bhaskar. While the empiricist conducts science according to what can be
epistemologically understood, critical realism asks how reality must be ontological structured in
order for science to be possible.

In answering this question, critical realism articulates a

structure of reality that divorces social activity from the natural mechanisms generating it. I use
this ontological framework to explore the foundations of human rights.

Structure of the Chapter
This chapter is organized into two major parts. The first part of the chapter deconstructs the
ontological problems of empiricist human rights theory from a critical realist perspective. These
ontological problems were discussed briefly in the last chapter as a way to justify an ontological
intervention. However, it is important that this chapter critically examine those problems further
using a critical realist perspective in order to demonstrate how it can correct for them. I begin
with a distinction that critical realism makes between the two epistemological camps within the
empiricist sciences: empirical realism (positivism) and transcendental idealism (constructivism).
Positivism holds that the social world operates much like the natural world, and that the job of
the scientist is to observe and identify the causal laws responsible for social regularities.
Constructivism argues instead that we impose our subjective understanding of the world onto
social phenomena in order to make sense of it (Bhaskar 1979, 2-4; Bhaskar 2008, 26-27). From
there, I discuss how these two empiricist camps buttress agreement theories and relativist
theories. Agreement theories follow a positivist form of science which explains why they
conflate the ontology of rights with empirical structures of cultural and legal agreement.
Relativist theories follow a constructivist form which explains why they reject the objective
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reality of rights altogether and, instead, conflate rights with how they are subjectively practiced
within culture.

Despite their theoretical differences, both agreement and relativist theories

commit the epistemic fallacy. This is important because it illustrates that underpinning their
theoretical debate over human rights are deeper unacknowledged ontological disagreements.
The second part of this chapter explains how a critical realist approach can provide the
ontological framework to theorize about human rights practices. Critical realism is comprised of
two philosophies: transcendental realism and critical naturalism. Together, they paint a complex
portrait of reality which I use to explain how human rights practices reflect deeper ontological
structures generating them. Transcendental realism argues that reality is hierarchically stratified
so that observable phenomena at the top are generated by natural mechanisms from below.
Critical naturalism explains how those natural mechanisms interact with social phenomena and
how this can be studied within the social sciences. It constructs a model that illustrates how
those natural mechanisms from below can, in turn, be affected by the same social phenomena
that they generate. From there, I discuss how these two core philosophies of critical realism can
theorize about human rights. Transcendental realism provides a structure of reality to theorize
how observable human rights practices at the top are generated by unobservable mechanisms
from below. Critical naturalism explains how the practice of human rights either reproduces or
transforms those unobservable mechanisms over time.

Critiquing the Empiricist Sciences
In general, critical realism divides empiricism into two camps that have dominated the social
sciences: empirical realism (which takes shape in positivist sciences) and transcendental idealism
(which takes shape in constructivist approaches) (Bhaskar 1979, 1; Bhaskar 2016, 44).
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Positivism adopts a naturalist approach to the social sciences, an approach which holds that
social phenomena can be studied the same way that we study natural phenomena. It builds
primarily on a Humean philosophy of causal relations, which I will describe in detail below.
Constructivism holds, instead, that the social world is inherently different than the natural world
and, therefore, must be studied differently. It borrows from Kant and holds that the social world
reflects human thought and language. In general, the differences between the two can be
summed up as such: Positivism’s naturalist assumptions focus on identifying observable
regularities within social phenomena, while constructivism argues instead that we impose our
subjective understanding of the world onto social phenomena in order to make sense of it.

Cause and Effect in the Empiricist Science
The aim of the scientific method is to establish a causal relationship between phenomena.
Despite the theoretical differences between positivism and constructivism, they both employ an
empiricist scientific method in regards to the nature of cause and effect. As Bhaskar points out,
“the mainstream in the philosophy of science, in both its classical empiricist (Humean) and
transcendental idealist (Kantian) currents, presupposes an implicit empirical realism according to
which the real objects of scientific investigation are defined in terms of actual or possible
experience” (Bhaskar 1986, 5). At the heart of both positivism and constructivism is David
Hume’s empiricist philosophy of causal relations, also known as the “constant conjunction” (I
explain this below). Positivism accepts Hume’s philosophy as both necessary and sufficient,
while constructivist approaches view it as only necessary. This section explains how Hume’s
philosophy of cause and effect advances a purely antirealist foundation, and how the positivist
and constructivist sciences work with it.
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David Hume’s philosophy of causa and effect (the “constant conjunction”) follows an ‘if
A, then B’ form of causal analysis. He justifies this form of analysis through his philosophy of
mind. For Hume, knowledge is either outwardly received through sense-experience or inwardly
understood through reflection. The former refers to empirical matters which can be observed
and verified while the latter deals with logical statements. Hume argued that these two different
processes of understanding reveal that knowledge separates into two different categories (also
known as Hume’s Fork): facts and ideas (Hume 1777, E 2.3).
This was an important distinction for Hume because it offers us a way to think about
cause and effect. He argued that causation cannot be a matter of relation between ideas and,
therefore, must be a matter of facts – it must be an empirical problem that we perceive through
sense experience. Accordingly, Hume provides three criteria for causal events: 1) The first refers
to what he calls the “constant conjunction” which is to say that cause and effect implies a paired
relationship between two empirical events, 2) the second is temporal priority where one of those
events precedes the other, and 3) the necessary connection between the cause and the effect
(Hume 1777, E 7.28).
Hume points out that there is an empirical problem with the third criterion. While the
first two lend themselves easily to observation, the third does not. We can experience both the
constant conjunction and temporal priority of causal phenomena – both of these are matters of
facts. However, we can never evidence their necessity – this is a matter of ideas. Hume writes,
When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes,
we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection;
any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible
consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the
other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the
whole that appears to the outward senses (Hume 1777, E 7.6)
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In other words, we only expect the conjoining of two events to be necessary based on our
previous observations, but this is not an empirical truth. Hume’s fork demonstrates how these
three criteria refer to two different forms of knowledge. Necessary connection between the
conjoined events is not a matter of empirical fact because it is not evidenced within the real
world but, instead, is a matter of interpretation. Following this line of thinking, Hume asserts
that the aim of sciences is to research cause and effect in terms of the constant conjunction
within space and time. This has shaped most of the social sciences as both the positivist and
constructivist strands of empiricism have adopted this view. According to Bhaskar:

The Humean theory of causal laws, the idea that a constant conjunction of atomistic
events was either necessary and sufficient (the empiricist variant) or at least necessary
(the neo-Kantian variant) for the attribution of a law, underpinned the standard (PopperHemel) deductive-nomological or covering-law model of explanation and almost all the
other theories of orthodox philosophy of science” (Bhaskar 2016, 6).
The following section a) explains how both positivism and constructivism incorporate Hume’s
constant conjunction as well as b) exposes the limitations of Hume’s causal philosophy as it
pertains to the social sciences.

The Positivist Camp
Positivism advances a naturalist approach to the social world, meaning that the social sciences
can study the world similarly to that of the natural sciences. If natural laws can be observed in
terms of constant conjunctions, then observed social regularities should also be treated as
expressing causal laws.

For this reason, the positivist camp accepts Hume’s constant

conjunction as both necessary and sufficient (Bhaskar 2008).
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However, there is a problem with researching social phenomena like the natural sciences,
and it concerns how constant conjunctions in the social world react differently in closed and
open systems. Closed and open systems simply refers to the environment that the researched
phenomena occurs in. A closed system refers to a scientifically controlled environment while an
open system does not.

The natural sciences can identify constant conjunctions within a

controlled laboratory environment and expect those casual laws to sustain themselves in a
completely different environment. This is not, however, how the social world works. Social
behaviors observed in a controlled environment will not necessarily repeat themselves in real
world contexts.
Understanding the differences between social and natural phenomena, as well as how
they react to open and closed system, illustrates the problems with positivism’s assumption that
constant conjunctions are necessary and sufficient. First, constant conjunctions are not necessary
because observed social regularities in a closed system will not necessarily repeat themselves
within an opens system. While natural constant conjunctions can repeat themselves outside of
laboratory conditions, social phenomena cannot; observed regularities of social phenomena
operate differently in open systems than they do in closed systems (Bhaskar 2008, Bhaskar 1989,
22-24). So, social events constantly conjoined within a closed system should not be understood
as causal laws, though positivism take them as such due to the emphasis that empirical realism
places on observation.
This focus on observation leads to the second limitation – constant conjunctions are not
sufficient because they ignore the unobservable structures implicated in causal relations.
Positivism accepts the sufficiency of constant conjunctions because it assumes a flat world where
everything occurs on the level of observation. However, causal phenomena behave differently in
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open systems than they do in closed systems because of unobservable mechanisms governing
their behavior. Thus, empiricism assumes a flat world which ignores the unobservable structures
governing social phenomena underneath it. In other words, positivism is concerned with only
the superficial dimension of social reality and is completely uninterested in the underlying causal
mechanisms making it (Bhaskar 2008; Bhaskar 1979).
In general, positivism assumes a flat and closed system where observed regularities are
treated as causal laws, despite the fact that they do not repeat themselves in an open system. It
thus conflates the underlying causal laws with the observable social regularities that they try to
describe. As a result, the positivist sciences fail at their naturalist mission to understand the
world because it treats only controlled observations as real and nothing else. By framing
observed regularities as natural – rather than the causal laws governing those regularities – it
frames the reality of the world in terms of our ability to study it. Positivism, then, commits the
epistemic fallacy by conflating ontology with epistemology.

The Constructivist Camp
Constructivist approaches differ from positivism in an important way.

While positivist

approaches are built on the empirical realism of Hume, constructivist approaches borrow also
from the transcendental idealism of Kant (Bhaskar 2008). Empirical realism considers only the
observable parts of the world as independently real, while transcendental idealism considers the
social construction of the world as dependent on the observer. While empirical realism assumes
that knowledge derives passively from our senses, “transcendental idealism maintains that this
order is actually imposed by men in their cognitive activity” (Bhaskar, 27). In other words,
positivism holds that knowledge is acquired from an external world while constructivism holds
47

that knowledge is socially constructed internally. Constructivist approaches to science, then, do
not treat the world as a surface as positivism does. Rather it treats the world more as a structure
reflecting theory, ideas, models, etc.
They agree with positivism that constant conjunctions are necessary for a scientific
understanding of cause and effect, but they disagree that they are sufficient. What is missing is
the active role that the observer plays in the construction of causal analysis.

The social

regularities observed reflect how the observer understands causal relations within society. This
changes the empiricist understanding of causality to make nature dependent on our
understanding of it rather than the other way around. By treating social reality as a reflection of
human understanding, it prioritizes our experience of the world over the world itself. In doing
so, it commits the same errors as positivism. Positivism’s dependence on Humean causal laws
reduces social reality to observed patterns of human behavior, while constructivism’s
interpretivist methods assume that such observed patterns are constructions of the theories
themselves; positivism refuses to acknowledge the real world while constructivism frames it as
construct of the human mind. Bhaskar sums this comparison up by saying,

Neither classical empiricism nor transcendental idealism can sustain the idea of the
independent existence and action of the causal structures and things investigated and
discovered by science. It is in their shared ontology that the source of this common
incapacity lies. For although transcendental idealism rejects the empiricist account of
science, it tacitly takes over the empiricist account of being. This ontological legacy is
expressed most succinctly in its commitment to empirical realism, and thus to the concept
of the ‘empirical world’ (Bhaskar 2008, 28)

In general, both positivism and constructivism understand the social world only in terms of our
experience of it. Despite their shared antirealism, they both exhibit philosophical differences –
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positivism relies solely on Hume while constructivism incorporates Kant. These epistemological
differences translate into larger disagreements regarding social theory. The next section explains
how their epistemological differences translate into disagreements in social theory.

Positivist and Constructivist Social Theory
There are two models of social theory associated with the positivist and constructivist
approaches: positivist models are built on Durkheim and constructivist models are built on
Weber (Bhaskar 19979). Sociological theory often draws on a distinction between Durkheim
and Weber because each viewed the relationship between the individual and society differently.
Durkheimian theory often considers social structure as a reality independent of individual
agency. These pre-existing social structures serve as a constraint on behavior which frames the
agency of the individual in terms of what social structure allows. This reflects Durkheim’s
concept of “social facts.” According to Durkheim, social facts are “a category of facts which
present very special characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking, and feeling
external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they
exercise control over him” (Durkheim 1895, 52). By contrast, Weber reverses this relationship
to make society dependent on the individual. Rather than serving as a constraint on agency,
social life is instead constituted by the individual’s meaningful thoughts and actions. As Ager
points out, “the former have historically wanted to reduce the subject matter of psychology to the
status of mere epiphenomena of the social structure, whereas the latter wish to reduce sociology
to the epiphenomena of cognitive psychology.”
These theoretical differences between the two stem from their differences in their
antirealist philosophies underpinning them. Bhaskar sums up the differences between the two
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saying that the constructivist approaches are “represented above all by Weber, in which social
objective are seen as the results of (or constituted by) intentional or meaningful human behavior”
and that the positivist approaches are “represented by Durkheim, in which they are seen as
possessing a life of their own, external to and coercing the individual” (Bhaskar 2008).
The Durkheimian assumption that behavior is governed by social structure reflects the
empirical realism of the positivist sciences. Again, empirical realism accepts social objects as
having an ontological status, but the facts of social reality are limited to what the scientist can
observe; society is considered real but is reduced to social structures that the scientist can
passively observe. This allows for the positivist to uncover causal laws within society by
identifying social regularities as they relate to real social structures. Durkheim builds on this
positivism to assert that real structures serve as the determinants of social phenomena. Hence,
positivist social theory subordinates behavior to society structure.
The Weberian mode, predicated on the transcendental idealism of constructivist
approaches, reverses this to make social structure dependent on agency. Again, transcendental
idealism highlights the active role that the researcher plays in constructing reality. Contrary to
positivism which assumes that the research passively observes the world, constructivism argues
that the scientist makes sense of the world by imposing our understanding on to it. Causal
relations are not objective laws of nature but instead reflect the ideas of those studying them. In
this view, science is not a structure that we depend on to understand society but, instead, actively
constructs our understanding of society. By prioritizing agency over structure, social theory
subordinates social reality to the agency of individuals acting within it.
In short, both positivism and constructivism affirm that the scientific discipline should
study the world according to our ability to understand/experience it. Positivist sciences are built
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on empirical realist epistemologies which reduce social ontology to what can be observed.
Constructivist approaches are built on a transcendental idealist epistemology which rejects social
ontology altogether by making social life dependent on the observer. These two camps propose
very different approaches to the study of social life. Positivist approaches adopt a Durkheimian
model which subordinates human agency to observable social structure which reduces social
reality to what can be experienced. Constructivist approaches adopt a Weberian model which
changes it to make social reality dependent on agency. This illustrates that underpinning their
theoretical disagreements is the epistemic fallacy, which they both commit.

Scientific Perspective

Positivism

Constructivism

Causal Philosophy

Hume’s Empirical Realism

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism

Structure/Agency

Durkheim’s “Social Facts”

Weber’s Agency-Centrism

Figure 1: Positivism and Constructivism
The next section discusses how these different frames have shaped human rights theory.
It discusses how agreement theories operate within the positivist approach and how the relativist
perspectives operate within the constructivist approach. By explaining how the different human
rights theories are associated with these empiricist frames, the next section hopes to expose the
epistemological limitations to empiricist human rights theory.

Critiquing the Empiricist Human Rights Approaches
The two core empiricist human rights approaches (agreement theories and relativist theories) are
both built on top of empiricist philosophies. Their disagreement over issues of human rights can
be traced to the specific disagreements between the particular antirealist philosophies
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underpinning them – agreement theories operate within a positivist perspective and relativist
theories operate within a constructivist perspective.
Agreement theories function according to a positivist form of science, so their theoretical
argument for human rights is framed within a) an empirical realist epistemology which treats
observable social regularities as real structures and b) a Durkheimian social model that treats
these structures as the determinants of social phenomena.

Agreement theory explains the

ontological source of international human rights, then, as observable social regularities
determined by cross-cultural and political structures.

In this light, agreement theories are

interested in uncovering the possibility of rights within the intercultural and political structure
that allow for them.
On the other hand, relativist perspectives function within a constructivist approach, so
their critique of international human rights is framed within a) a transcendental idealist
epistemology which asserts that science actively constructs the reality that it observes and b) a
Weberian social model which subordinates structure to agency. Relativist and postcolonial
theories, then, do not view culture as a structural constraint on human agency but, instead, a
reflection of it. According to these theories, rights are culturally relative and, therefore, reflect
the agency of the group practicing them. Because of this, they criticize international human
rights as violations of cultural autonomy or expressions of imperial power.
In general, culture plays an important role in each of these theories. For agreement
theories, cultural structure serves as a major constraint that determines international human
rights, while relativist perspectives refer to culture as expressing the agency of groups to form
their own rights. Because they both focus on culture, they each discuss human rights only in
terms of epistemology. However, they theorize about the relationship between culture and rights
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very differently – agreement theories reduce human rights to observable cultural regularities that
are structured by social facts, while both relativist perspectives frame rights as constructs
reflecting our subjective values. These theoretical disagreements are a result of their inability to
provide a proper ontological foundation that can support their theoretical choices. I elaborate on
this below.

Positivist Approaches to International Rights – Agreement Theories
Again, empirical realism accepts the ontological status of social structures so long as they can be
evidenced through scientific observation. This buttresses positivism which practices a naturalist
form of social science and attempts to identify social regularities within a flat and closed system.
Following Durkheim, these regularities serve as “social facts” that structure our agency. Human
rights theory that functions within this positivist perspective frames the foundations of
international human rights within the cultural and political structures that allow for their
agreement.

The human rights theories that work within this frame are common-core and

overlapping consensus theories.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, both common-core and overlapping consensus
theories frame the prospects of international human rights in terms of observable intercultural
regularities. Common core theories argue for international human rights in so far as we can
evidence cross-cultural similarities, and over-lapping consensus theories argue that human rights
embody intercultural settlements on how best to manage international rights issues.
Again, common core theories frame human rights as reflecting core values held by all
societies. Examples of these core values are RJ Vincent’s “lowest common denominator” or
Walzner’s “moral minimum.”

In general, these core values serve as the cross-cultural
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regularities, or “social facts,” which structures the possibility of international human rights.
Overlapping consensus functions in a similar fashion because they also frame the prospects of
international human rights within a structure of observed cultural agreement. Specifically, they
view rights as “norms for global political life reachable from a variety of possibly incompatible
foundational positions” (Beitz 2009, 76). An example of this is Charles Taylor’s “unforced
consensus” where cultures with different interests find common ground regarding how best to
govern intercultural politics.
Both of these agreement theories accept the empirical realism of positivist sciences by
reducing the reality of human rights to observable social structures. Specifically, agreement
theories recognize how cultural “social facts” structure the possibility of human rights. As a
result, they frame the foundations of international human rights in terms of structures of
intercultural agreement: common core theories argue that rights are real in so far as we can
evidence cross-cultural similarities, and over-lapping consensus theories argue that rights
embody intercultural settlements on how to regulate international issues.

Constructivist Approaches of Rights – Relativist Perspectives
Again, constructivism differs from positivism in that it does not reduce the world it studies to
observed phenomenal regularities. Instead, constructivism recognizes the active role that the
observer plays in constructing the world. Following Weber, constructivist approaches to rights
argue that rights reflect our agency in actively constructing them (this runs counter to the
positivist approaches to rights which argue that rights reflect social structure). Perspectives that
fit into this category are naturally critical of international human rights given the active role that

54

cultural in-groups play in constructing the meaning behind their own behavior. Theories that fit
into this category are relativist approaches (cultural relativism and postcolonial perspectives).
As I discussed in the previous chapter, both cultural relativism and postcolonial
perspectives recognize the active role that cultural agents play in constructing rights. Rights
have meaning precisely because they reflect the constructive agency of cultural members. For
this reason, these perspectives remain suspicious of international human rights because no
objective standard of right exists to base them on. In fact, such international standards tend to
reflect the imperial interests of the west rather than the cultural interest of the local groups.
Cultural relativism argues that rights derive their meaning from within the culture that
practices them. Again, cultural relativism was originally designed by Franz Boas who, inspired
by the idealism of Kant, wanted to argue for the role that ideas play in culture. For him, cultural
practices really are relative and cannot be judged from an outside perspective. In this light,
cultural relativism holds that human rights values only have meaning relative to one’s culture.
Like cultural relativism, postcolonial perspectives also argue that rights have meaning within a
cultural context, but they focus on how international human rights assume universal standards to
judge them. Specifically, this perspective exposes how international law and human rights
reflects particularly Western values rather than universal ideals. This is seen with Alexander’s
argument that liberal human rights advance Western ideals through a “dominant knowledge
framework” (Alexander 2005, 124). Another example is Mutua who argues that the West has to
justify international human rights by first demonizing non-Western people through a savagesvictims-saviors narrative.
The role that ideas play in these perspectives reflects the transcendental idealism of the
constructivist approach which assume that we project our understanding of social reality onto the
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world. Culture is not a structure that we act within but, instead, reflects our agency to construct
it. Rights, then, only have meaning when they reflect the subjectivities of cultural agents
actively constructing how the world operates. Both relativist and postcolonial perspectives reject
the ontology of international human rights because they recognize the active role that cultural
agents play in constructing rights. If notions of right reflect the constructive agency of cultural
members, than no international standard can exist. Rights only have meaning within a particular
cultural context (relativism) and claims to their universality usually reflect imperialist efforts
(postcolonialism).

Hence, they research the rights as they are practiced in closed cultural

systems.

Human Rights Approach

Agreement Theories

Relativist Perspectives

Scientific Philosophy

Positivist

Constructivist

Human Rights Foundations

Structured by Cultural
Agreement

Reflect Cultural Agency

Figure 2: Human Rights Foundations per Theory

Flat and Closed Systems in Empiricist Human Rights Theory
Both the positivist approaches to rights (agreement theories) and constructivist approaches to
rights (relativist perspectives) pursue an empiricist agenda to science where they frame the
foundations of rights in terms of observable cultural phenomena. This agenda is built on a causal
philosophy which researches constant conjunctions in terms of flat and closed systems.
Specifically, each of the human rights perspectives discussed above frame the foundations of
rights in terms of culture constantly conjoined with issues of right. Agreement theories discuss
the prospects of human rights as structured by social facts. For them, international human rights
are constantly conjoined with structures of intercultural agreement. Relativist perspectives, by
56

contrast, reject international rights due to the observable salience of cultural difference. For
them, the only constant conjunctions of rights exist within culture, not between them. The
theoretical disagreements between these perspectives stems from how each commits the
epistemic fallacy. I explain below.
Agreement theories are built on positivism’s empirical realism which treats social
phenomena as real so long as it can be evidenced. They follow the positivist tendency to treat
the social world like the natural sciences. Therefore, agreement theories a) view the constant
conjunction as both necessary and sufficient and b) subordinate agency to the “social facts” of
structure.

The job of the scientist, then, is to identify the causal laws responsible for social

regularities. As such, they assume that social phenomena operates in a way where causal laws
can be evidenced on the level of observation.

Thus, they assume a flat reality where all

phenomena is caused by observable structures.

As a result, agreement theories frame the

foundations of human rights in terms of the structures of observable cultural regularities that
determine them. Their attempt to evidence international human rights requires that they research
rights in an open international system. However, the assumption of flatness prevents them from
understanding the underlying structures responsible for cultural agreement/difference in an open
system.
By contrast, constructivist approaches a) view the constant conjunction as only necessary
and b) prioritize agency over social structure.

For them, the constant conjunction is not

sufficient because they consider the active role that agents play in constructing our understanding
of the world. Their emphasis on agency serves to highlight how social reality is structured by
ideas, perceptions, models, theories, etc. Thus, constructivists recognize how rights and culture
are constantly conjoined but, because culture reflects the agency of those practicing rights,
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culture serves as the constitutive cause of rights. In doing so, they assume a closed system by
observing how these ideational structures manifest within a singular cultural environment. This
closed-ness shifts their attention to cultural difference which prevents it from observing
international human rights.
Both demonstrates how their unacknowledged ontological problems leads to theoretical
differences. Agreement theories treat the world like flat surface and, therefore, reduce the
foundations of rights to observable cultural regularities.

Relativist perspectives close their

analysis to particular cultural systems and, therefore, ignore ontological questions altogether.
Instead, they focus on how culture constructs rights.

Summary of Part 1
This section discussed the empiricist human rights approaches and the theoretical differences that
arise from their inability to resolve the ontological problems underpinning them.

Both

agreement theories and relativist perspectives fail to understand the ontological foundations of
human rights because both study the world solely in terms of human experience – they both draw
conclusions about the foundations of human rights based on what the researcher can observe.
Again, this reflects their epistemological commitment to Hume’s constant conjunction. Because
of this, they struggle to explain the foundations of human rights in open and structured systems.
Agreement theories argue that international human rights reflect cross-cultural regularities in an
open international system. However, they reduce human rights to observable behavior which
reveals how they treat the social world as a flat surface. Relativist perspectives, on the other
hand, assume that the social world is socially constructed by ideas, perceptions, and ways of
knowing. Thus, they argue that rights only have meaning within a particular cultural context.
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Their decision to ignore ontological questions, however, begs the question as to what makes the
practice of rights possible.

In short, their inability to provide an ontological foundation

underpins their theoretical disagreement as to how to research human rights.
The empiricist assumption that foundations of human rights can be scientifically
observed in flat and closed systems commits the epistemic fallacy because it reduces the nature
of the world to what can be humanly experienced (again, the epistemic fallacy occurs when we
attempt to answer ontological questions in terms of what can be epistemologically known).
Correcting the epistemic fallacy means that we study the world as it really is, and that we take
unobservable phenomena seriously.

Specifically, researchers interested in revealing the

unobservable foundations underpinning human rights needs to study them in an open and
structured system. The next section reviews how a realist form of science accomplishes this.
Specifically, I review critical realism which offers a scientific frame to study the world in terms
of open and structured systems.

Critical Realism – An Alternative to Empiricism
This section reviews critical realism and demonstrates how it addresses the specific empiricist
limitations discussed in the previous part. While the empiricist researches ontological questions
in terms of what can be epistemologically known (the epistemic fallacy), the realist works to
understand the world as it is. After all, knowledge is about something that we assume pertains to
the real world.
This part is organized into two sections. The first discusses the core tents of critical
realism, which is comprised of two philosophies: transcendental realism and critical naturalism.
Transcendental realism serves as a scientific frame that establishes the primacy of ontology and
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how the observable world manifests as a result of underlying generative mechanisms which
actualize in an open and structured system. Critical naturalism discusses how this open and
structured reality shapes social phenomena in a way that resolves the Durkheim/Weber debate
over structure and agency.
The second section discusses how critical realism provides the framework to research the
foundations of human rights. Transcendental realism articulates a structured and open system
that allows for us to conceptualize the unobservable mechanisms which generate human rights.
Critical naturalism explains how those unobservable mechanisms structure human rights in a
way that still recognizes the agency of culture to construct the meaning behind rights.

Transcendental Realism
Bhaskar’s transcendental realism attempts to establish both a) the primacy of ontology and b) the
nature of that reality, or what he calls a “new ontology” (Bhaskar 2008) He builds both
arguments by correcting for the limitations of empiricism.

Again, the empiricist sciences

conflate ontology with epistemology by either reducing it to what can be observed (empirical
realism) or by framing it as a construct of the mind (transcendental idealism). Bhaskar’s
argument for ontology affirms a mind-independent reality (contra transcendental idealism) and
his argument for a “new ontology” asserts that reality cannot be reduced to observation (contra
empirical realism). He argues both of these points by way of a transcendental argument which
asks what reality must be like in order for science to be possible (Bhaskar 2008; Bhaskar 1979;
Collier 1994). The next section discusses his argument for ontology and the following section
discusses his argument for a “new ontology.”
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An Argument for Ontology – Rejecting Transcendental Idealism
Bhaskar builds an argument for ontology by challenging the transcendental idealism of
the constructivist sciences.

Constructivism avoids issues of ontology because the scientist

proactively constructs the world that they are studying. Thus, the scientist never describes the
world but, instead, their ability to construct the world. However, we must assume a mindindependent world in order for the sciences to have any meaning. Progress for the social
sciences, then, requires that we take ontology seriously and theorize about it in a way that allows
for our scientific understandings of the world to be possible.
Bhaskar corrects for constructivism by way of a transcendental argument, a specific
method of argument that asks what conditions must be necessary for something to be possible.
According to Bhaskar, transcendental arguments are “from a description of some phenomenon to
a description of something which produces it or is a condition for it” (Bahskar 1986, 11). Most
attribute this form of argumentation to the transcendental idealism of Immanuel Kant where he
argued that our sense impressions construct knowledge only by imposing our categorical
understanding of space and time on to them. Because, according to Kant, we can know the
world only by making it fit to our categories of understanding, we can never know the world as it
really is. Bhaskar’s transcendental argument, though, breaks with this and asks a realist question
what the conditions of reality are necessary for our knowledge to be learned about it. Thus he
begins his critical realist project not only by divorcing ontology from epistemology, but by
prioritizing the former over the latter.
Bhaskar accomplishes this reprioritization through a distinction that he makes between
the transitive dimension and the intransitive dimension. The transitive dimension refers to the
social experiences of science and our changing knowledge-base that it produces. The intransitive
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refers to those unchanging causal mechanisms that science attempts to explain (Bhaskar 2008,
21-24). This is an important distinction because, as Bhaskar acknowledges, science is inherently
social where “objects of scientific knowledge” (facts, theories, etc.) are not independent from the
processes that produce them.

Bhaskar classifies these objects of scientific knowledge as

transitive, a term which signals a directional relationship with those real subjects that transitive
knowledge attempts to understand (Bhaskar 2008, 22). These real subjects, by contrast, are
independent of our transitive understanding and, therefore, referred to as intransitive which
marks the direction of this relationship (Ibid 23). In essence, these terms refer to Bhaskar’s
realist attempt to divorce ontology from epistemology where empiricist science has only
conflated them. Articulating the ordered relationship between the intransitive world and our
transitive knowledge of it serves to prioritize ontology over epistemology. This is an important
step in assuming a mind-independent reality.
Divorcing ontology from epistemology through the transitive/intransitive distinction
implies that socially constructed transitive objects of scientific knowledge may not accurately
portray their intransitive natural subjects due to the limitations of methodological observation.
Bhaskar makes this point in order to maintain scientific fallibilism (Ibid, 43). We must assume a
mind-independent reality in order for science to have any meaning, but we must also recognize
the transitive dimension of our scientific knowledge regarding the nature of that reality. In other
words, the transitive/intransitive distinction affirms the real world while recognizing the limits in
understanding it.
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An Argument for a “New Ontology” – Rejecting Empirical Realism
Bhaskar builds his “new ontology” by challenging the empirical realism of positivism.
The positivist sciences reduce ontology to what can be observed and, thus, only explain the
world in terms of our experience of it. In doing so, they assume a flat and closed social reality
where causal laws can be identified on the same level as the regularities that they produce.
Again, this reflects the Hume’s philosophy (the constant conjunction) which analyzes causal
relations in terms of our experience of corresponding events. Bhaskar’s transcendental realism
corrects for the assumptions of flatness and closedness by articulating both a vertical and
horizontal dimension (Bhaskar 2008; Bhaskar 1979; Bhaskar 2016).
First, the vertical dimension organizes the world according to the transitive and
intransitive dimensions.

Because reality is comprised of both observable and unobservable

phenomena, we cannot assume that all of reality operates on the same level of experience.
Instead, reality is multilayered where different phenomena operate on different domains.
Bhaskar refers to this as a “stratified ontology” where observed phenomena at the top are caused
by unobservable mechanisms from below.

This stratified ontology is comprised of three

domains: the empirical, the actual, and the real. The empirical domain consists of our experience
of the world, including the transitive dimension of knowledge. The actual domain consists of the
observable phenomena which science attempts to explain. The real domain consists of the
underlying mechanisms that generate observable phenomena in the actual domain. While our
changing transitive knowledge rests on the domain of the empirical, intransitive enduring
mechanisms function primarily on the domain of the real (Bhaskar 2008, 13-14)
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Figure 3: Domains in Bhaskar’s Stratified Ontology
Second, the horizontal dimension “opens up” the sciences to study cause and effect in
uncontrolled environment. It recognizes that the domain of the actual is generated by multiple
and interconnected underlying mechanisms from the domain of the real. This is how it is
possible for the diversity of phenomenal variations at the top to be produced by the same
enduring underlying causal mechanisms from below (Bhaskar 2008, 33-35). Again, underlying
generative mechanisms will produce observable behavior differently in one system of
intervening variables than they would within another system with different intervening variables.
In an attempt to isolate the direct effect of causal mechanisms, positivism studied phenomena in
a closed and controlled environment. However, this is not how the social world operates; social
phenomena at the top is generated by complex processes of multiple and interconnected causal
mechanisms from below. Understanding how causal laws operate in the social world, then,
requires that we “open up” reality to include these complex causal relationships.
Together, the vertical and horizontal dimensions of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism
rejects Hume’s “constant conjunction” by framing causal analysis in an open and stratified
ontology. The vertical dimension of causal relations refutes the idea that such conjunctions
originate in the same domain as they are experienced, and their horizontal dimension refutes the
idea that such conjunction are “constant” (Bhaskar 2008, 26-28).

Instead, this

multidimensionality implies that causal relations are, what Bhaskar calls, “transfactual” (ibid,
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51). This means that the stratified complexity of cause and effect implicate natural mechanism
that are always at work whether they actualized in the domain of the actual or not. Because
causal relations do not occur purely as constant conjunctions, the social scientist must consider
how these relations emerge from the unobservable mechanisms in an open system.

A

transfactual analysis, then, understands that causal laws are basic functions which are always at
work whether they are actualized according to human experience or not.
This underscores an important concept in Bhaskar’s philosophy: emergence. The concept
of emergence refers to a process whereby unique objects arise from, but are not reducible to, the
interactions of other more fundamental objects (Bhaskar 2008; Bhaskar 1979; Bhaskar 1989).
This concept is often applied to explain how systems, which may appear to be designed or
ordered, actually arise from the aleatory interactions of their smaller parts.

For instance,

economists are interested in emergence as a way to explain how the order of free markets arise
from the chaos of self-interested actors. Neuroscientists are interested in it to explain how the
psychological awareness of one’s self arises from separate and unrelated parts of the brain. The
concept of emergence is an important concept for Bhaskar because it explains how new and
unique phenomena are generated in an open and stratified system. Specifically, it refers to how
observed phenomena, while caused by underlying structures, are uniquely different and
irreducible to those structures.

Critical Naturalism
Bhaskar’s critical naturalism establishes a) how his transcendental realism can be used for the
social sciences (including the psychological sciences), and b) why the social sciences must be
interdisciplinary.

First, Bhaskar agrees with the constructivist that social phenomena are
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inherently different than natural phenomena and that they should be studied differently as well.
However, he disagrees that this requires social phenomena be studied through an anti-naturalist
form of science. For him, cause and effect still function the same in the social sciences as they
do in the natural sciences, but the primary difference between the two is that social scientists
must also research how the underlying causal mechanisms are also affected by the very
phenomena that they produce (Bhaskar 1979). Critical naturalism, then, attempts to show how a
stratified and differentiated ontology allows for this recursive relationship.
This recursive relationship creates something that Bhaskar refers to as the “prevalence of
dualism” (Bhaskar 2016, 44).

For Bhaskar, the social sciences involve several persistent

debates, or dualisms. Examples include structure/agency, individual/society, mind/body, etc.
These dualism arise because the social sciences struggle with explaining the recursive
relationship between social phenomena and the causal mechanisms that generate them. He
resolves this debate through his Transformation Model of Social Action (TMSA), which I
discuss in the next sub-section. After that I discuss why it’s important for the social sciences to
be interdisciplinary.

The Transformational Model of Social Action
The prevalence of dualism within the social sciences simply refers to the disagreements
over philosophical/theoretical/methodological questions. The most obvious dualism within the
social sciences refers to the naturalist/anti-naturalist debate between positivist and constructivist
approaches.

However, a number of others persist within the social sciences including

facts/values, theory/practice, structure/agency, society/individual, materials/concepts, etc.
(Bhaskar 1979). Applying transcendental realism to the social sciences, then, requires some
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synthesis of the prominent dualisms that persists in social research. The major dualism that
Bhaskar addresses is the structure/agency and society/individual dualism which he reconciles
through his transformational model of social activity (TMSA) (Bhaskar 1979, 43-46; Bhaskar
1989, 73-77). Before I explain this, it is important to understand how the TMSA is a response to
the limits of both Durkheimian and Weberian social theory.
Again, Durkheim’s model assumes an ontologically real social structure that constrains
and shapes the agency of social actors. Where Durkheim reifies social structure, Weber frames it
as the product of the intentional behaviors of agents. Weber does this through an essentially
individualist approach which places emphasis on the agent to build structure (Bhaskar 1979, 40).
Bhaskar refers to a third model which he attributes with the work of Peter Berger and
associates. He refers to this as the “dialectical model” which attempts to correct for the linear
relationship expressed in the previous two models. It’s uncontroversial to recognize how the
social structures that constrain our actions are also reaffirmed by those very actions. According
to this third model, neither the individual nor society at large are completely independent of the
other. Instead, there exists a circular relationship between the two where structure and agency
co-constitute each other (Bhaskar 1979, 40-41).

Society
↓↑
Individual
Figure 4: Dialectical Social Theory
This dialectical model doesn’t actually solve the structure/agency and individual/collectivist
dualisms though.

This model refuses to recognize either the group/structure or the

individual/agency as apart from the other. However, Bhaskar takes issue with this model.
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According to him, “in seeking to avoid the errors of both stereotypes, Model III (the dialectical
model) succeeds only in combining them. People are not, I shall argue, related ‘dialectically’.
They do not constitute two moments of the same process. Rather, they refer to radically different
kinds of thing” (Bhaskar 1979, 42).
Bhaskar’s comment that the individual and society are “radically different kinds of thing”
is a reference to their place within the transitive/intransitive distinction.

The historically

contingent nature of the transitive dimension is comprised of the meaningful and intentional
agency of individual behaviors. The relatively stable social structures that agency behavior
within refers to the intransitive social reality that makes those behaviors possible. Society at
large, then, comprises of those underlying transcendental structures that make individual
behavior possible.
However, the produced behaviors at the top do, in turn, affect the underlying structures
that produced them. This is what makes the social sciences inherently different from the natural
sciences. How the agency of individuals in turn affects the structure of the group, though, is very
different than how the structure of the group affects the agency of the individual. The reason that
they affect each other differently is a matter of time. Social structure always preexists that
actions taken within it. Agents, then, do not create social structure but, instead, either reproduce
or

transform

it.

Future

iterations

of

social

activity

then

depends

on

this

reproduction/transformation. (Bhaskar 1979, 43-46; Bhaskar 1989, 73-77). Below is his model.

⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→ Society ⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→
Socialization ↓
↑ reproduction/transformation
⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→ Individual ⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→
Figure 5: The Transformational Model for Social Activity
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Following the graph from left to right, it illustrates how social structure and the individual are
not co-constitutive. Society serves as the intransitive structures that either enables or constrains
the individual’s action through processes of socialization. The actions of those individuals, then,
either reproduce or transform those parts of the society that constrained or enabled the behavior
to begin with. Variations of behavior allowed by the structure may transform the system to
allow future iterations of those behaviors, thus transforming the system over time.

Thus,

Bhaskar’s TMSA properly reconciles the Durkheimian model with the Weberian model by
framing social structure as the intransitive reality which allows for the transitive agency of
individuals to either reproduce or transform it. Importantly, the reproduction/transformation
stage of the TMSA demonstrates how the social sciences are different than the natural sciences
(in agreement with constructivism) but do so in a way that does not resort to anti-naturalism (in
agreement with positivism).

Laminated Systems and Interdisciplinarity
The TMSA frames society as the underlying (intransitive) mechanism which generates
actor’s behaviors (transitive) that reproduce/transform society. In this sense, the TMSA places
society as the ontologically real structure which imposes its conditions for meaningful action on
the individual. However, critical realism does not assume that social structure is the primary or
ultimate foundation for social phenomena. Instead, social reality has its roots in the non-social
world. According to Bhaskar “Ontologically, the social world is an emergent, concept- and
activity-dependent, value-drenched and political contested part of the natural world” (Bhaskar
2016, 60).
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Bhaskar’s assumption that social life is built on top of more rudimentary natural facts
(biology, chemistry, physics etc.) reflects his emphasis on stratification and emergence. Again,
reality is multidimensional with top levels emerging from lower ones. For instance, the social
level emerges from the psychological level, and psychology emerges from the biological level,
and biology emerges from the physical level, etc.
He refers to this multi-tiered reality as a laminated system. According to him, this
system, “is composed of a multiplicity of different levels, reference to each of which [is]
necessary in order to understand, or give the adequate account of, the phenomena in question”
(Bhaskar 2017, 44). There are a number of models illustrating Bhaskar’s laminated system, but
the seven scalar model below is the most common (Bhaskar 2010, 9-10; Bhaskar 2016, 83-84).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Sub-individual level (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.)
Individual
Micro-level (small-scale, face-to-face)
Meso-level (particular structures/cultures of society)
Macro-level (large scale, society at large)
Mega-level (geo-historic trajectories)
Global trends

Figure 6: Bhaskar’s Laminated System
What Bhaskar’s laminated system attempts to do is illustrate a more comprehensive perspective
of reality which recognizes how all phenomena (both social and non-social) relate to each other.
Because lower levels of reality serve as the generative mechanisms that produce phenomena in
higher levels, understanding one level of phenomena requires placing that phenomena in a
perspective which relates it to other levels that have generated it. For this reason, Bhaskar calls
for the social sciences to be interdisciplinary. The social sciences should not work to understand
human behavior as their discipline narrowly defines it. All of human behavior is affected by a
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variety of phenomena ranging from the political, cultural, and economic to the biological,
psychological, and geological. The interdisciplinarity of critical naturalism adds new meaning to
social change because change in a laminated system is not only a matter between social structure
and individual agency, but also includes sub-individual structures as well (again, including
physical, biological, psychological, etc.). Bhaskar attempts to account for this in his TMSA.

↑
↓
⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→ Sub-individual level ⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→
Figure 7: TMSA in Laminated System

Critical Realism of Human Rights
A human rights theory that adopts a critical realist frame of science would be able to correct for
the limitations of the positivist and constructivist approaches to human rights. Both agreement
theories and relativist perspectives build their argument for or against international human rights
by framing them in terms of cultural experience and, therefore, never account for the ontological
foundations of rights. Doing so would require identifying the underlying generative mechanisms
that human rights phenomena emerge from (which I do with Bhaskar’s stratified ontology) while
simultaneously accounting for the variations of human rights over space and time (which I do via
TMSA). In this second part, I outline how a critical realist approach (both the transcendental
realist and critical naturalist components) accounts for the ontological foundations of human
rights.
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First, Bhaskar’s transcendental realism outlines the stratified and open reality necessary
for phenomena to emerge within. Stratification allows me to demonstrate how human rights
emerge from those unobservable causal mechanisms that serve as human rights foundations
(again, I argue in the next chapter that those mechanism are human emotion, but it is important
in this chapter to first provide the framework to theorize how rights emerge from those emotive
mechanisms). Openness allows me to explain why universal mechanisms produce the cultural
diversity of rights (again, this occurs because human rights emerge in an open cultural system
where the practice of rights is produced by multiple social structures interacting with each other).
Second, critical naturalism discuss the relevance and application of Bhaskar’s
transcendental reality to human rights. His TMSA model demonstrates how cultural change over
space and time emerges from those ontological foundations. In other words, critical naturalism
recognizes the social reality of cultural change/relativity but explains it as a product of the
underlying ontological foundations manifesting in an open and stratified system. This is why it
requires an interdisciplinary approach. This is important because it demonstrates why agreedupon human rights standards may change over time.

Transcendental Realism and Human Rights
Again, Bhaskar’s transcendental realism outlines the ontological conditions necessary for social
reality to take place. Specifically, his stratified ontology provides the framework to theorize how
phenomena, and our experience of it, emerge from underlying generative mechanisms in an open
system. Emergence plays an important role in this framework as the observable phenomena that
we wish to explain become something qualitatively different than the unobservable mechanisms
that produce them. This transcendental realism provides the ontological framework to theorize
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how human rights emerge from their unobservable ontological foundations but, importantly, also
become something categorically different than those foundations. I demonstrate in this section
how transcendental realism provides for this theorizing.

Human Rights in an Open and Stratified Ontology
Bhaskar’s stratified ontology refers to the domain of the empirical as our experience of
the domain of the actual, and the domain of the actual as emerging from the domain of the real.
Because the empiricist human rights theories understand rights purely in terms of our cultural
experience (relativist perspectives frame rights as an expression of cultural agency and
agreement theories frame rights as legal or political agreements enabled/constrained by cultural
structure), they locate human rights either in the domain of the empirical or of the actual.
Specifically, the transcendental idealism of relativist perspectives reject the reality of objective
human rights foundations leading them to locate human rights purely in the domain of the
empirical, while the empirical realism of agreement theories reduce ontology to the observable
structures of culture where they expand human rights to include the domain of the actual. In
other words, their focus on culture prevents these theories from locating human rights in the
domain of the real. If a human rights theory is to take the domain of the real seriously, then it
must recognize culture as just another level of phenomena emerging from more fundamental
layers within a laminated system.
Obviously human rights are shaped by culture, and I will explain this later when I discuss
the transformational model for social action (TMSA). However, in a laminated system, culture
itself is a level of reality that rests upon more fundamental natural laws (again, this dissertation
will explain those more fundamental laws in terms of human emotion in the next chapter). None
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of the theories above can explain this because they lack an understanding of how causality
occurs in a stratified and open system.

Again, agreement theories reject unobservable

foundations of rights because they treat reality as a flat surface, while relativist perspectives fail
to understand the foundations of rights in an open system.
Correcting for the limitations of both requires taking the domain of the real seriously by
studying the culture/human rights relationship in an open and stratified ontology. This requires
asking the transcendental question of what conditions must be necessary for both culture and
human rights to relate to each other. A transcendental realism of rights corrects for this by
framing human rights as emergent goods deriving from the universality of generative
mechanisms within an open system. I first address stratification and then address openness.
First, in terms of stratification, the intransitive universal mechanisms from below
(domain of the real) generate observable phenomena at the top (domain of the actual) as well as
our transitive experience of that phenomena (domain of the empirical).

According to this

stratified ontology, an inquiry into the ontological foundations of human rights positions human
rights practices in the domain of the actual so that we may theorize about their foundations
within the domain of the real. At the top is our cultural experience of human rights. Such a
stratified ontology looks like this.

Domain of the Empirical:
Domain of the Actual:
Domain of the Real:

Observation of Human Rights Practices
Cultural/Human Rights Practices
Universal Foundations of Human Rights

Figure 8: Human Rights in a Stratified Ontology

Second, in terms of openness, human rights practices vary between different groups of
people. As Donnelly says, “cultural relativity is an undeniable fact” (Donnelly 1984). The
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challenge, then, is explaining how the ontological foundations of human rights produce
variations of their practices. This is explained in terms of open systems. Again, causal relations
operate differently in opens social systems than then do in closed laboratory systems.
Laboratory conditions isolate phenomena in order to control for intervening variables. Such
control is absent in an open international system where social phenomena – in a globalized world
– is often multivariated and interconnected. In other words, the universal foundations of human
rights (domain of the real) produce differences in human rights practices (domain of the actual)
because those foundations function in an open global system where they interact with other
political, cultural, economic, historical, phenomena each produced by their own generative
mechanisms.

Variations in Human Rights Practices on the Domain of the Actual
↑
Open System (including culture, politics, economics, etc.)
↑
Universal Foundations of Human Rights on the Domain of the Real
Figure 9: Human Rights in an Open System

Critical Naturalism and Human Rights
Again, Bhaskar recognizes (in agreement with transcendental idealism) that the social sciences
must study phenomena differently than the natural sciences. Yet he still believes (in agreement
with empirical realism) that social phenomena can be studied in naturalist ways. Bhaskar’s
critical naturalism discusses how to achieve this nuanced balance.

Specifically, critical

naturalism outlines how the social sciences can apply his transcendental realism to the social
phenomena. This section discusses how critical naturalism makes sense of human rights. There
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are two important points to make here when discussing critical naturalism and human rights.
The first refers to the TMSA and the second refers to laminated systems.

Human Rights and Social Change
What makes the social sciences different from the natural sciences, for Bhaskar, is that
underlying causal mechanisms in the social world not only produce observable phenomena, but
also are affected by it as well. Again, this was the source of the “prevalence of dualism” within
the

social

sciences

concerning

structure/agency,

individualism/collectivism,

materialism/idealism, etc. Both Durkheimian and Weberian social theory failed to understand
the cyclical relationship between causal mechanism and the phenomena they produce, while the
dialectical model failed to understand the role of time within that cycle. Bhaskar’s TMSA serves
as a solution to this puzzle.
The TMSA is an important model to discuss human rights because it provides an
explanation as to why human rights practices (both culturally contested and internally agreed
upon) change over time. Again, taking seriously the idea of human rights foundations requires
explaining why they change over time despite the relative stability of their generative
mechanisms. Both agreement theories and relativist/postcolonial perspectives frame rights only
in terms of cultural structure or agency (relativism/postcolonialism frames rights as an
expression of cultural agency and agreement theories frame human rights as enabled by cultural
structure). The TMSA shows how rights change over time due to its relationship to culture.
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⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→ Cultural Structure ⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→
Enable/Constrain ↓
↑ reproduce/transform
⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→ Human Rights Practices ⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→
Figure 10: Human Rights, Culture, and Social Change

The TMSA demonstrates how culture and human rights do not have a linear relationship but
instead a cyclical relationship. Culture does affect how human rights are practiced while the
practice of those rights does, in turn, have the potential to change the culture that enabled it.
Unlike the dialectical model though, the TMSA contextualizes social change in a dimensions of
time. Again, what this means is that culture precedes human rights in that actors practicing
rights behaviors do so within a pre-existing cultural structure. Thus, their actions only transform
the culture rather than completely constructing a new one. However, this particular TMSA
model of human rights illustrates only the domain of the actual (culture and human rights both on
domain of the actual) and does not include those more underlying generative structure on the
domain of the real. We need to recognize how social change occurs within a laminated system.

Human Rights in a Laminated System
Again, each layer of reality rests upon another layer of more fundamental natural laws. If
we are interested in the ontological foundations of human rights, then we must recognize the
deeper layers of reality undergirding human rights. In other words, accounting for the domain of
the real means that generative mechanisms may be located in more fundamental levels in a
laminated system. The dominant human rights theories study the meso-level and macro-level
(relativist/postcolonial perspectives consider the meso-level because they consider culture within
a closed system, while agreement theories consider the macro-level because they open it to
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international level).

However, these empiricist human rights theories ignore unobservable

phenomena and therefore cannot understand the more fundamental levels undergirding the mesolevel and macro-level.
My argument that emotion serves as the foundation of human rights necessitates that we
incorporate the micro, individual, and sub-individual levels of analysis. The next chapter will
discuss the literature on emotion in depth to justify why emotion serves this role, but it is
important to situate emotion within the theoretical frame to articulate the relationship between
emotion and human rights. Below is an illustration of how the relationship between culture and
human rights rests upon more fundamental levels of reality.

↑
↓
⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→Sub-individual/Individual/Micro Level ⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻⸻→
Figure 11: TMSA of Human Rights in a Laminated System

As the TMSA model above illustrates, culture does serve as a major structure that
enables/constrains human rights practices while also recognizing how those practices, in turn,
reproduce/transform culture.

However, this culture-human rights relationship itself is

enabled/constrained by more fundamental sub-individual, individual, and micro-level structures
which, to some degree, are reproduced/transformed but it. Specifically, those more fundamental
structures refer to human emotion (sub-individual levels refer to the neuroscience of emotion,
individual levels refer to the psychology of emotion, and micro-levels refer to the socialpsychology of the immediate local situation.
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Chapter 3
Correcting for the Naturalistic Fallacy: How Emotion Explains both the Ontological and
Normative Dimension to Human Rights

Introduction
The last chapter covered the first part of my two-tracked argument, namely that a critical realist
approach to human rights can help us to theorize about their foundations. This chapter covers
the second track which claims that those foundations can be understood in terms of emotion.
Emotion relates people to their environment by appraising a situation and mediating our social
interactions. In doing so, the felt experience of emotion informs us of our values and serves as
judgments as to how people should be treated. These feelings constitute a sense of right – they
inform us as to what people are due and the responsibilities we have to each other. This sense of
right underpins how human rights are practiced, but it does not translate into a fixed set of human
rights principles. Because emotion relates us to our environment, this sense of right is always
culturally situated and reflects how social interactions are mediated within a group.
My focus on emotion challenges much of the natural law tradition which emphasizes the
role that human reason plays in natural right. Naturalistic philosophies argue that people come to
understand rights using the same faculties of reason that rights derive from. As discussed in
chapter 1, however, these philosophies commit the naturalistic fallacy by arguing that knowledge
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regarding what is right can somehow be derived from a rational understanding of nature. In
essence, their rationalist ontology cannot support their normative claims to human rights.
I argue that emotion resolves this problem because it can support both the normative and
ontological dimensions to human rights. Emotion supports the normative dimension because it
functions to mediate our social interactions with others and appraise how others are treated. In
doing so, they invoke visceral feelings which inform us of our values and incline our behaviors
to conform to those values. (Haidt 2012; Greene 2013; Pinker 2003; Saver & Damasio 1991;
Moll et al 2002). Emotion also supports the ontological dimension because it implicates real
psychological structures underpinning these social interactions and appraisals. The values that
arise from those appraisals reflect involuntary (and often unconscious) processes embedded in
the biology of the human brain (Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991; Kunda 1990; Simone et
al 2014; Haidt, Björklund, & Murphy 2000). Together, emotion corrects for the naturalistic
fallacy because an emotional ontology can sustain the normative claims that arise from it. A
normative understanding of rights are not dependent on a rational understanding of how values
derive from nature. Instead, a sense of right is informed by the visceral experience of emotion
which is nonetheless still grounded in nature by virtue of it deriving from ontologically real
psychological structures.

My Emotional Framework
The emotional framework I use borrows from the field of social-psychology as a way to
understand how the internal mechanisms of emotion relates a person to others in their social
environment. While there is no agreed-upon definition of emotion, it is generally understood
that it refers to inward physiological/cognitive changes that produce a felt experience and that
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motivate outward behaviors in response to some environmental stimuli (Russell & Barrett 1999,
806; Nairne 2000, 444; Daniel 2011, 310; Schacter 2011, 373; Sternberg 1998, 542). These
inward experiences of emotion motivate outward behaviors following an appraisal of the
situation which inform the subject as to how to act within them (Lazarus 1991).
The social-psychology field uses a paradigm called interactionism to frame how behavior
is produced by inward psychological factors interacting with one’s social environment
(Gazzaniga 1992; Houghton 2008; Bliss 1991; Endler 1976; Zimbardo 2007). In the past, social
psychology studied the inward psychological factors and the outward environmental factors
separately within their own respective paradigms.

Dispositionism examined the internal

mechanisms (e.g., personality traits, cognitive processes, neurobiological structures, etc.) while
situationism focused more on how outward situations (e.g., one’s immediate surroundings,
family life, cultural norms, etc.) shape behavior. However, social-psychologists later developed
interactionism as a way to understand how human behavior is produced by both dispositions and
situations interacting with each other. (Houghton, 2008; Bliss 1991; Endler 1976; Zimbardo
2007). It frames these interactions as a process whereby situations select or “activate” certain
dispositional factors of the person in order to produce behavior (Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein 2001;
Bargh 1997; Kihlstrom 2008; Reynolds et al 2010).
I use this interactionist paradigm to theorize as to how inward emotive dispositions
underpin and shape how people interact with their social environment. It allows me to frame
social and cultural interactions as a ‘situation’ that is generated by, and interacts with, emotive
‘dispositions’ in order to produce human rights practices. In doing so, interactionism provides
the framework to consider emotion as ontologically real mechanisms underpinning human rights
activity.

It is important to point out how this framework fits with the critical realist
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understanding of cause and effect – emotive dispositions function on the domain of the real and
interact with situations on the domain of the actual in order to produce behavior later to be
observed on the domain of the empirical. Anchoring emotion within the social-psychology of
interactionism, then, corrects for the epistemic fallacy because it divorces the ontological
structures that generate a sense of right from the observable behaviors that they produce.

Chapter Structure
The chapter begins with some brief historical context of the psychology discipline in order to
demonstrate its empiricist roots and its eventual shift away from it. Attempts to make the
discipline more scientific in the 19th and 20th century pushed researchers to adopt experimental
methods of observation. These experimental methods naturally explained human behavior in
terms of the observable situations shaping it. Undergirding these experimental approaches was a
tabula rasa theory of mind inherited from the Enlightenment philosophy of John Locke.
Research built on this blank-slate philosophy rejected the role that dispositions play in human
behavior. It wasn’t until the cognitive revolution of the 1960s that scientists acknowledged the
importance of both situational and dispositional approaches.
The second part discusses emotion within the situational and dispositional frameworks in
order to demonstrate how it operates on both the observable and unobservable level. On the
dispositional side, emotion implicates real physiological mechanisms inherited through a shared
evolutionary history. This is important for two reasons because it affirms emotions as: a)
ontologically real by anchoring them within the material nature of the person, and b) universal as
those emotive mechanisms are commonly shared among all people. On the situational side, I
discuss the fact that emotion serves as both a) reactions to observable events as well as b)
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motivational forces driving behaviors in response to those events. This is important because it
demonstrates that emotions mediate the person-environment relationship.
The third part discusses the relationship between emotion and our sense of right, as well
as the dispositional and situational factors involved. On the dispositional side, I discuss the
cognitive and psychological dimension to values and rights. The literature on this discusses how
value-judgments have less to do with conscious reasoning and, instead, reflect the functioning of
involuntary and viscerally felt emotion. Not only are notions of rightness and justice laden with
emotion (Chebat and Slusarczyk 2005; De Cremer and Van den Bos 2007), but our ability to
recognize the inherent dignity of others or empathize with their suffering is a purely emotional
capability as well (Damasio 1994; Frith 2001). I also discuss, the importance that culture plays
in situating emotion within a social context that gives rights and values meaning. Emotions are
always culturally situated and, while they may generate a sense of right, they do so within a
particular cultural context.
I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of its two major arguments so that the
following chapter may integrate them into a critical realist frame of human rights. The socialpsychology of emotion provides an ontological framework to theorize as to how human rights
activity (on the domain of the actual) reflects how the real and value-laden emotive structures
(on the domain of the real) react to human rights issues. Those emotive structures, while
universal, motivate behavior in an open system to produce cultural variations of rights practices.

Situations and Dispositions in Psychology: A Brief Historical Context
This part provides a brief historical review of the psychology discipline. Before it developed
theories to research internal psychological factors, it followed a strictly empiricist mode of
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sciences. Some wanted to make the discipline more scientific and pushed researchers to adopt a
more experimental/observation approach. This emphasized the role of the situation in shaping
human behavior. Undergirding this rejection of unobservable phenomena was a tabula rasa
philosophy of mind, popularized by John Locke, which rejected the role of dispositions.
It wasn’t until the cognitive revolution of the 1960s that scholars challenged this
empiricist dogma and overturned blank-slate philosophies. This shift towards a more cognitive
approach aimed to identify the dispositional mechanisms necessary for behavior to operate. As a
result, researchers today acknowledge the importance that both external situations and internal
dispositions play in generating human behavior.

The Empiricist Roots of Psychology
Previous chapters discussed the role that empiricism plays in the political sciences, but the same
is true for the field of psychology as well. Empiricism helped shape and develop much of
psychology’s modern history. As a scientific discipline, modern psychology begins with the
research conducted by Wilhelm Wundt.

Many would call him the founder of modern

psychology (Hunt 2007, 141). In fact, he was the first researcher to refer to himself as a
psychologist (Carlson and Heth 2010, 18).
Wundt wanted psychology to be seen as natural science, but there was no way at the time
to study or measure unobservable cognitive processes.

Because of this, most of the

psychological writing was dominated by abstract methods of self-introspection. The problem
with these methods is that they weren’t seen as very rigorous. Attempting to make psychology
more scientific, Wundt endorsed research to focus more on what can be observable and tested.
In Contributions to the Theory of Sense Perception, he wrote “As soon as the psyche is viewed
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as a natural phenomenon, and psychology as a natural sciences, the experimental methods must
also be capable of full application to this science” (Wundt 1862, 70).
Wundt’s preference for empiricist methods was shared not only by his contemporaries,
such as Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) and George Elias Muller (1850-1934), but set a
trajectory for the radical behaviorism associated with John B. Watson (1878-1958) and later B.F.
Skinner (1904-1990).

Behaviorism, a scientific approach focusing solely on observable

phenomena, holds that human behavior can be studied purely in terms of the social conditions
shaping it. As Watson put it, the purpose of psychology is to, “predict, given the stimulus, what
reaction will take place; or, given the reaction, state what the situation or stimulus is that has
caused the reaction” (1930, 11).
However, behaviorism claims to be an objective scientific approach, it is predicated on a
rather questionable philosophy which claims that all behavior really is determined solely by
external stimuli. It assumes a tabula rasa, or blank-slate, theory of mind which rejects the idea
of any innate structures that can shape behavior. According to this view, no one is predisposed
to act one way or the other – dispositions are completely irrelevant or non-existent. In the words
of B.F. Skinner, “the inside of the organism is irrelevant either as the site of physiological
processes or as the locus of mentalistic activity” (Schutlz 2016, 318).
These empiricist and behaviorist approaches to contemporary psychology has its
philosophical origins in the enlightenment thoughts of John Locke. Aside from his political
writings, Locke is best known for his empiricist philosophy, which laid the foundation for
modern psychology.

He argued that all knowledge derives from sensory experience and,

therefore, all science should be based on testable observation. This is most notably asserted in
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding where he states:
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Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without
any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the
busy and boundless fancy of man has pointed on it, with an almost endless variety?
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word,
from experience (Locke 1979).

Assuming that the mind is born a blank slate, Locke rejects the argument that ideas are innate
and, instead, works to understand how thoughts and knowledge reflect our experience of the
outward world. He reasoned that if knowledge is acquired solely through sense-experience, then
scientific research must be based on methods of observation.

Such a scientific focus on

observation naturally limits the study of human behavior to the immediate situational conditions
effecting it.
However, his empiricist philosophy of mind and science suffers from a serious
contradiction. The primary problem is how a tabula rasa mind may acquire any information at
all. If it is “void of all characteristics” and “without any ideas” how can experience alone furnish
it without some preexisting cognitive framework to process it? Information must be received,
appraised, categorized, stored, and recalled – none of this can be accomplished by a blank slate.
Even the most simple of tasks (such as sensing a stimulus) requires some inherent cognitive
structures to comprehend those senses. This was later acknowledged by Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz who responded to Locke with,

[Locke] has not adequately observed that the ideas of being, of one and the same
substance, of truth, of good, and many other things are innate in our mind because it is
innate to itself, and that it discovers all these things in itself. For indeed, there is nothing
in the intellect which was not in the senses, except the intellect itself (Leibniz 1765, 36).
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In general, humans cannot be blank slates because, in the words of Steven Pinker, “blank slates
don’t do anything.” Without a preexisting cognitive framework to processes external stimuli,
there would be no way to respond to it.

There must be some pre-existing dispositional

equipment in order for people to function as they do.

The Importance of Both Situations and Dispositions
The scientific interest in the internal psychology, or dispositions, of people was not popular until
the cognitive revolution of the 1960s. This was led by the linguistic research of Noam Chomsky
who argued that there is a genetic component to our language faculty. Specifically, Chomsky
argued that all language follows certain structural rules that are innate to the human mind. This
cognitive approach to language challenged the behavioralist approach popularized by Skinner
who argued that language acquisition was a matter of positive reinforcement. Chomsky’s theory
countered by saying that without innate cognitive structures, there would be no way to first
acquire language, let alone translate one language into the other. In other words, Chomsky’s
cognitive theory of language was one of the first realist explanations of behavior because it
identified the generative and natural structures necessary for language acquisition.
Chomsky’s research sparked a paradigm shift in the discipline to recognize the
importance of researching the unobservable dimension of behavior and thought. Challenging the
empiricist orthodoxy, the cognitive approach works to understand the pre-existing dispositions
that make behavior possible. Research in this approach has rigorously demonstrated that the
mind is not born a blank slate and, instead, furnished with innate dispositional structures that
make intelligible our surroundings in order to interact with them (examples of this research
include: Dunbar 1992; Trivers 2002; Buss 2011; Deacon 1997; Cosmides & Tooby 2012;
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Chomsky 1976; Pinker 2003; Gaulin & McBurney 2004; Wilson Freeman and Herron 2007;
Wright 1994).
This is not to say that scholars assume that dispositions explain everything; eventually
researchers developed interactionism, an approach that recognizes how behavior arises from
dispositions and situations interacting with each other (see Endler 1976). This perspective aims
to understand how human behavior expresses those internal (dispositional) factors of the body as
they relate to the external (situational) pressures of its environment (Blass 1993; Norenzayan
2002; Caprara & Cervone 2000; Endler & Magnusson 1976; Snyder & Ickes 1985). It frames
these interactions as a process whereby situations select or “activate” certain dispositional factors
of the subject in order to produce behavior (Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein 2001; Bargh 1997;
Kihlstrom 2008; Reynolds et al 2010). A complete understanding of human behavior, then,
should consider how it arises from situation/disposition transactions. The next section discusses
emotion from the dispositional side and then discussion the role that situations play as a
necessary context to feel emotion.

Emotion is both Dispositional and Situational
This part reviews the literature on emotion to provide the reader with a basic understanding of
the internal psychology of emotion and the important role that social situations play in order to
feel emotion. The first section reviews the internal dimension. Here I discuss how emotion in
embedded in the materiality of the human body. In the words of Antonio Damasio, “their
content refers to the body of the organism in which they emerge.

Feelings portray the

organism’s interior – the state of interior organs and interior operations” (2018, 102).
Specifically, emotion entails a number of internal processes such as physiological arousal,
88

cognitive appraisal, and behavioral changes.

Furthermore, these internal processes refer to

universal traits (Plutchik 1980; Eckman 1970; Tomkins 1962; Izard 1971). Their universality is
a product of how emotion serves an adaptive function in our shared evolutionary history (Darwin
1872; Gaulin & McBurney 2003; Buck 1981; Bruce 1995; Plutchik 1980). Discussing these
dispositional aspects is important because they affirm emotion as the ontological real and
universal, an important task in arguing later that emotion serves as the generative structures
within a stratified ontology of human rights.
The second section discusses the situational dimension of emotion. While emotions are
embedded materially in the person, they are also about something in that person’s environment
(Lazarus 1991; Lazarus & Folkman 1987; Lazarus 1966). In the words of Richard Lazarus,
“emotions are always about person–environment relationships that involves harms (for the
negative emotions) and benefits (for the positive emotions)” (Lazarus 1991, 819). In other
words, emotions are ‘relational’ which means that they function to mediate the personenvironment relationship. This provides the person with the motivation to act in those situations.
Lastly, this section discusses how our internal psychology is also materially changed by
the situations they respond to. New research into neuroplasticity demonstrates this recursive
relationship between the brain and culture. Those neural structures responsible for emotion are
changed by the very social interactions that they relate to (Wexler 2006; Barret 2017; Prinz
2014). As a result, different people emotionally appraise situations differently depending on
their experiences. This social aspect creates a cultural dimension to emotion: not only are
cultural situations generated by shared emotional experiences of the group, but those situations,
in turn, also rewire the material structures of emotion. This is an important point for my
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argument because it clarifies as to why rights emerge from universal mechanisms while
simultaneously practiced differently relative to one’s culture.

Emotion as a Real and Universal Disposition
Researchers in the early 20th century believed that emotions were learned solely through culture
(Evans 2001, 3). According to this belief, emotion was similar to the empiricist understanding of
language in that experience alone taught you how to properly emote. Because it was believed
that emotion was learned through a framework of one’s unique cultural experience, researchers
considered emotion to be culturally specific. In fact, it was thought that different cultures would
feel different emotions (Ibid, 5).
This cultural theory of emotion was challenged by Paul Ekman in the 1960s whose
research argued that the cross-cultural experience of emotion is more similar than different. To
prove this, Ekman researched the emotions of isolated groups far removed from Western culture
(specifically, the preliterate groups of New Guinea). After telling group members stories that
they can culturally relate to, he then showed them photographs of Americans making facial
expressions and asked them to match the story with the photos. He found that they had no
problem matching the facial expressions of a different cultural member with the stories of their
own culture. This research demonstrated that two different and separate cultures expressed
emotions in the same way, casting serious doubts on the theory that emotions were culturally
relative.
Ekman concluded that there are “basic emotions” innate to all people and which all other
emotions stem from. Scientists debate how many basic emotions there are (for instance, Mowrer
argues that there are only two while Arnold argues that there are eleven) but most agree with
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Ekman that anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise should be on the list. It would be a
mistake, however, to assume that the universality of our emotions is limited to the small list of
basic emotions. Shaver et al show how a list of six basic emotions produces 25 secondary
emotions and 143 tertiary emotions (2001, 26-56). In general, we all possess an incredibly
extensive repertoire of emotions that all people, regardless of culture, can experience.
The reason why emotion is similar cross-culturally is because it is rooted in the shared
dispositions of the human body. Specifically, emotion is produced by two primary parts of the
nervous system – the brain and the autonomic nervous system. The brain is responsible for
processing information for emotion. Important parts of the brain involved with emotion are the
limbic system which includes the thalamus, hypothalamus, hippocampus, and amygdala. The
autonomic nervous system controls bodily changes not associated with conscious thought. I
discuss the functions of these parts here.
The thalamus serves as a junction which transmits information along two pathways to
what researchers call the “low road” and “high road.” The low road sends information from the
thalamus to the amygdala, a part of brain responsible for regulating emotion (such fear, anger,
grief, etc.). The high road is less direct and sends information from the thalamus to the sensory
cortex. There it is appraised before traveling to the amygdala (Gelder, Honk, and Tamietto 2011;
Pessoa and Adolphs 2010). Emotion produced along the low road is automatic and results in
reflexive behavior designed for self-defense while the high road undergoes more processing of
the situation.
The hypothalamus plays a crucial role in activating the autonomic nervous system. It’s
separated into two parts: the sympathetic nervous system and the parasympathetic nervous
system (Kreibig 2010). The former is responsible for action while the latter keeps the body still.
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The sympathetic nervous system is generally active during emotion and sends a signal to the
adrenal gland which produces epinephrine and neuro-epinephrine. These prepare the body for
action and result in changes in heart rate, blood pressure, perspiration, pupil dilation, etc.
The reason these physiological processes are universal is because they are a product of
evolution.

Evolutionary theories of emotion discuss the role that evolution has played in

developing emotions. While Ekman’s research was controversial at the time, he wasn’t the first
to challenge the cultural theory of emotion. Charles Darwin also rejected the idea that emotions
are learned solely through culture observing that blind people emote the same way as everyone
else. Darwin believed that emotions were innate to human nature and proposed an evolutionary
theory of emotions in the 1870s. For him, the universality and innateness of our emotions
implies that they serve an adaptive role in our evolutionary success. In fact, evolutionary
theorists today point out that all mammals share the same neural architecture implicated in basic
emotions.
Evolution by natural selection occurs when an organism survives long enough to
propagate its genes. Simply put, when there is a hereditary variation of traits within a species,
and when some of those traits are more conducive for survival and reproduction than others, then
those traits will be sexually passed on to the next generation and become more widespread in the
population. Organisms with traits not conducive for survival or reproduction don’t survive long
enough to mate and, therefore, don’t pass on their genes. Those traits with no adaptive value
perish with the unsuccessful organism.
Like any other physiological trait, emotion is also subject to the pressures of natural
selection. Evolutionary theories of emotion discuss how it serves as a trait with great adaptive
value. For example, fear drove us to flee from danger, anger caused us to fight for our survival,
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disgust kept us safe from rotted food and feces, etc. In other words, emotions aided in our fitness
by helping us respond to stimuli in the environment. Whichever emotions contributed to the
fitness of our ancestors were sexually passed on to the next generation.
It’s appropriate, then, to consider emotion as innate and universal faculties that tie us to a
common ancestry. Our neurophysiological similarities are expressed in the language of our
genes and evolved through our collective history. Scientists can trace everyone’s mitochondrial
DNA to a woman who lived in Africa 200,000 years ago (Cann, Stoneking, and Wilson 1987) as
well as trace all of men’s Y-chromosomes to a man that might have lived around the same time
(Gibbons 1997). The discovery of both Mitochondial Eve and Y-chromosome Adam confirm
our shared evolutionary history. As a result, members of the human family are more alike than
different – genetically speaking, we are all 99.9% the same (Rosenberg et al 2002).
Furthermore, over a third of our genes, the highest proportion in human body, are expressed in
the human brain, an organ that makes up only 5% of our body mass (NIH 2010).
The fact that emotion is rooted in the material makeup of the person speaks to two
aspects of emotion – their ontological nature, and their universality. Emotion implicates material
structures of the human body which makes emotion ontological real.

Additionally, these

emotive structures are a product of a shared evolutionary history which speaks to their
universality. These two points are important because rooting rights in a stratified ontology
requires identifying those real universal mechanisms.

Situations as a Necessary Framework for Emotion
The last section discussed how emotion implicates real psychological structures, but it is
important to discuss how social situations are a necessary framework to feel and express
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emotion. As mentioned before, emotion mediates the person-environment relationship, and
some understanding as to how emotion arises from situations is important to discuss.
Most definitions of emotion emphasize the importance of a social context to feel emotion.
For instance, Sternberg defines emotion as “a feeling comprising physiological and behavioral
(and possibly cognitive) reactions to internal and external events” (1998, 542). Scherer defines it
as “an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five
organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as
relevant to major concerns of the organism” (2004, 137-157). Paul and Mendl define it as “an
emotion is a multicomponent response (subjective, physiological, neural, cognitive) to the
presentation of a stimulus or event” (2018, 2). Even the Oxford dictionary includes both social
and psychological dimensions by defining emotion as “a strong feeling deriving from one's
circumstances, mood, or relationships with others.”
In general, researchers agree that emotion is a complex phenomenon in response to
primarily some socially relevant event.

However, theories as to how emotion arises from

situations disagree over the process as to how this happens. One of the most well-known
theories is the James-Lange theory which combines the independent work of William James and
Carl Lange. Both argued that emotions arise by a physiological reaction to an event (Cannon
1927). Specifically, an external event will produce some physiological arousal (rise in heartrate,
muscle tension, perspiration, etc.) and an emotional experience comes from how we interpret that
response. This theory challenged traditional understandings of emotion. It was thought that we
react to events because we feel something about it. For instance, we tremble at the sight of a
bear because we are scared. However, the James-Lange theory proposes instead that we are
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scared because we are trembling at the sight of a bear. According to James, “We feel sorry
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble” (James, 1884, p. 190).
Walter Cannon and Philip Bard disagreed with this theory noting that people experience a
range of physiological reactions linked to emotions without actually experiencing emotions. For
instance, you may be trembling not because you saw a bear, but because your legs are tired or
because the weather is cold. Additionally, emotions often occur quicker than the physiological
states associated with them.

They proposed an alternative theory in 1927 suggesting that

physiological reactions and emotions are felt simultaneously without one necessarily causing the
other (Cannon 1927). Their theory, then, gives very little attention to the role of thought or
behavior and, therefore, less attention to the social aspect of emotion. According to this theory,
the sight of a bear makes you tremble and feel fear at the same time.
In 1962, Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer proposed the two-factor model which
combines elements of the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard theories. The model suggests that the
person must identify the reason for a physiological arousal to occur and then call it an emotion.
In other words, external stimulus results in physiological responses that are cognitively
interpreted as emotions (Schachter and Singer 1962). In this sense, they incorporated a social
aspect of emotion.

Like the James-Lange theory, people infer emotions based on their

physiological responses. The difference is that people do so based on cognitive interpretation of
the situation. This marks its similarity with the Cannon-Bard Theory because the situational
context implies that physiological responses can produce varying emotions. In general, this
model focuses on the role of cognition in identifying the reason for experiencing emotion.
New research from Joseph LeDoux suggests that biology plays a primary function while
conscious thought has very little to do with it. For him, emotional reactions develop along the
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low-road (from the thalamus to the amygdala) bypassing any conscious appraisal process (often
considered the high road from the thalamus to the neocortex) (Ledoux 1998). This is because
emotions are hard-wired into the brain. Most likely, the Amygdala reacts to incoming sensory
input which activates the body’s response system.

This however, does not discount the

importance of appraisal. Instead he argues that appraisals are also hard-wired into the brain.
While each theory discussed the important role that the dispositional level plays in
interacting with situational factors, they differ in how they prioritize the importance of one over
the other.

This demonstrates a long debate between researchers over the role that

neurophysiology versus environmental conditions play in emotion. Both the James-Lange and
Schacter-Singer theory emphasize the role that our environment plays in emotion – this is
especially true for the Schacter-Singer theory which argues that there is a separate stage for the
contextual appraisal of emotion which emphasizes the role that our conscious interpretation of
social conditions play. Both the Cannon-Bard theory as well as LeDoux emphasized the primary
role that biology plays over conscious thought. Because physiological processes play a larger
role rather than cognitive interpretation, the interpretation of social events reflect automatic
reflexes.
The point of reviewing these theories is not to defend one over the other but, instead, to
highlight an important point that they all agree on. Each of the theories affirm emotion as a
psychosocial phenomenon – emotion not only entails both dispositional and situational
phenomena, but that it is generated by both interacting with each other. Although these theories
disagree over the exact interaction between situation and disposition, each understands both to be
an important dimension to emotion. The fact that the observable and unobservable dimension of
emotions interact with each other is an important point for my argument because it helps
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establish a stratified ontology of rights where observable emotional phenomena (situations,
behavioral responses, etc.) are produced by, and interact with, unobservable generative
mechanisms (physiological arousal, cognitive appraisal, etc.).

Emotive Dispositions and Situations Change Each Other
The previous two sections discussed the inner psychology of emotion and the role that situations
play in feeling emotion. Emotion reacts to situations and provides the motivational force for
behavior to interact with the situation a certain way. In this sense, emotion serves as the
generative mechanism underpinning social behavior.

This fits with the stratified ontology

outlined by critical realism – unobservable emotive dispositions constitute the domain of the real
which react to and motivate behavior on the domain of the actual.

This section, though,

discusses the other side of that relationship – how the material structures of emotion are also
physically changed by the situations they respond to.
This is best expressed in new research of neuroplasticity which studies how the brain
changes. In general, neuroplasticity simply refers to changes in the brain’s architecture. It was
originally believed that the brain was more static (Cicchetti and Curtis 2006; Leuner and Gould
2010), but research now demonstrates that our neuroanatomy is continually reorganizing itself,
often in response to some social situation. This may refer to changes in grey matter, synaptic
rewiring, or reallocation of tasks to a different brain regions, etc.
Donald Hebb started research on neuroplasticity and demonstrated that learning leads to
changes in our neural circuitry. Everything we do activates some part of the brain responsible
for carrying out that task. When we learn new tasks, our brain makes new connections between
neurons, and those connections are strengthened the more we practice those new tasks. His
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research gave the rule that “neurons that fire together, wire together” which explains as to why
repetition is so important in the learning process. Ultimately, Hebb showed us that our brain
structures adapt, by way of cognitive and behavioral response, to incoming stimuli.
Much of the research on neuroplasticity has focused on its medical implications in
response to brain trauma (Gerloff et al 2006; Nudo 2007; Li and Carmichael 2006) or
psychological disorders (Kuhn et al 2014; Pittenger and Dumen 2008; Liu 2017). However,
neuroplasticity should not be thought of as a purely medical phenomena. The fact that the brain
changes in response to external stimuli speaks to a larger part of who we are as products of our
culture. New research is now exploring the role of culture on the brain (Doidge 2007; Wexler
2006; Nisbett and Masuda 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). This bourgeoning
research demonstrates that the material equipment we use to make sense of the world is, in turn,
reshaped by it. In the words of neuroscientist Brian Wexler, “humans alone shape and reshape
the environments that shape their brains” (Wexler 2010) which is to say that we are products of
cultural reproduction. If ‘neurons that fire together also wire together’ then how we reiterate
cultural norms and customs strengthens those neural circuits associated with those tasks. We
physically change at the neural level to mirror the cultural norms that we reproduce.
How the brain is shaped by culture has important implications for emotion. Emotion is
embedded in the material architecture of the brain – as stated earlier – and how cultural norms
mold that neural architecture also molds how we appraise future iterations of those culture
norms. Lisa Feldman Barrett has researched this complex relationship between culture and
emotion and how emotions are constructed and reconstructed by our previous experiences – also
known as the constructivist theory of emotion.
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Barret is the not the originator of this theory. The idea that emotions reflect workings of
culture more than biology dates back several decades (some of that research includes:
Hochschild 1979; Averill 1980; Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman, 1980; Kleinman and Good 1985;
Harre, 1986). Averill provides a basic understanding of emotion:

[E]motions are viewed here as transitory social roles, or socially constituted syndromes.
The social norms that help to constitute these syndromes are represented psychologically
as cognitive structures or schemata. These structures -- like the grammar of a language -provide the basis for the appraisal of stimuli, the organization of responses, and the
monitoring of behavior (Averill 1980, 305-306)
Barret’s contribution to the theory articulates how the construction of emotion changes the brain
to adapt to culture. She argues that emotions are products of how we categorize and predict our
social environment, the result of which alters the brain. According to her research, our emotional
response to a situation is the result of how the brain predicts or anticipates emotions based on
how those feelings have been categorized in previous similar experiences. I explain this below.
Categorization refers to how we organize information. Information is understood through
mental representations called concepts. These concepts simply refer to our ability to think about
an object such as a spoon or a pair of shoes. We later categorize these concepts into groups in
order to better understand them. We understand that spoons are for eating after we categorize
them as a utensil. We understand shoes are for wearing after we categorize them as an article of
clothing. Categories help us understand the world by giving meaning to our concepts.
According to Barret, these categories do not refer to natural organizations of objects.
Rather, they are socially constructed groupings produced by the need to share and exchange
concepts between people via language and culture. Our ability to connect to others socially
requires our understanding of that social reality so that we may be a part of it. This requires that
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our personal categorization process conform to our cultural understandings. In other words, how
we understand concepts through categorization is culturally contingent.

In this sense,

categorization is not a process of finding natural similarities between concepts but, instead,
constructing those similarities in accordance with culture.
Barret argues that the categorization of concepts shapes our entire understanding of social
reality, including the emotions we feel. Not only must the situations that we experience be
categorized, but also how we feel in response to those situations in order for them to have any
emotional meaning. Emotions, just like spoons and shoes, must also be put into concepts. How
we make sense of those emotion-concepts, then, requires that we categorize them in order to give
them social meaning. The categorization of emotion-concepts occurs throughout our social life
where we are continually constructing similarities between common situations and how we feel
about them. If the categorization of concepts is a social process whereby concepts may be
socially shared and exchanged, then how we categorize our feelings are also done in accordance
with how they can be socially shared and exchanged. How we construct emotion, then, is
determined by the categories shared and exchanged via language and culture.
Given the plasticity of the brain, Barret argues that the construction and reconstruction of
emotion through reiterated cultural experiences shapes the brain in such a way that informs how
it will experience future iterations of similar experiences. Again, if “neurons that fire together
also wire together,” then the emotional appraisal of future situations is conditioned by how those
emotive dispositions have been shaped by previous cultural situations. In the words of Barret:

This kind of anatomical change, called plasticity, also occurs with experience. Your
experiences become encoded in your brain’s wiring and can eventually cange the wiring,
increasing the changes that you’ll have the same experience again, or use a previous
experience to create a new one (Barret 2017, 281).
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In general, the emotions that we feel are, at least in part, culturally reproduced in ways that
change the brain’s architecture to anticipate and appraise future iterations of those culture
experiences in similar ways.

Section Conclusion: Correcting for the Epistemic Fallacy
The previous three sections demonstrate as to why empiricist social sciences methods are not
enough to study emotion and society. Their focus on observation reduces emotion to observable
behaviors and ignores, or even rejects, the unobservable generative structures that produce them.
As a result, the empiricist understands emotion in terms of the situation that they occur in. In so
doing, they commit the epistemic fallacy by reducing the nature of emotion to what can by
scientifically observed.
In reality, emotion operates on both the observable and the unobservable level. The
social-psychology of interactionism recognizes this which corrects for the epistemic fallacy
because it divorces the generative dispositions from the behaviors that they produce.

As

mentioned earlier, this fits with the stratified ontology outlined in critical realism where
dispositions constitute the domain of the real which generate behaviors on the domain of the
actual.
However, the discussion on neuroplasticity demonstrates that this relationship between
situation and disposition is more complex because the material architecture of emotion is
changed by the very situations they react to. How we appraise current situations is part of an
ongoing processes of how previous experiences have rewired the brain.

This recursive

relationship between situation and disposition can be expressed through Bhaskar’s critical
naturalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, the social sciences are different than the
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natural sciences in that social phenomena can in turn affect the generative structures producing
it. This is best expressed through the Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA) which
illustrates the recursive relationship between two levels of phenomena.

In this sense, the

psychology of emotion not only produces behavior but, in turn, is either reproduced or
transformed by the situations it reacts to.

Emotion Entails both Facts and Values
The last section discussed the ontological dimension in terms of the real unobservable structures
that function to produce emotion.

This part, then, discusses how emotion provides the

epistemological dimension of rightness. Natural law philosophies argue that human reason
serves as the foundation of rights but, as discussed earlier, human reason cannot logically sustain
both the positive and normative dimension of rights without committing the naturalistic fallacy –
claims about rightness cannot be rationally derived from facts about the natural world. Shifting
attention from reason to emotion solves this problem because it explains both the normative and
ontological dimension of rights without one contradicting the other: a) felt emotion constitutes
our normative awareness of rightness which b) derives from the ontologically real emotive
structures of body.
The first section discusses the popularity of rationalist assumptions in early to mid-20th
century moral psychology. Researchers interested in understanding the psychology of rightness
and values studied childhood development and how children come to learn pro-social behavior.
This research relied on empiricist methods where researchers observed how children interact
with their environment and then asked them questions in order to understand the reasoning
behind their behavior. It was believed that probing the rationale behind the child’s actions would
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help researchers understand the thought process behind moral behavior. More recent research,
however, casts doubts on this research by demonstrating how providing reasons for actions serve
more as post-hoc justifications. It also demonstrates that most of what we do happens below the
level of consciousness.
The second section discusses the link between emotion and rightness by considering the
dispositional dimension of moral psychology. I discuss new research on the neurophysiology of
value judgments and moral decision-making. Specifically, I review research on how brain injury
and psychopathy affects antisocial behavior as well as new experimental fMRI research on prosocial behavior. Research on brain injury and psychopathy demonstrate the role that emotional
deficits in the brain play in anti-social cognition and behavior, while neuroimaging research
reveals how value judgments and moral decision-making activate the same parts of the brain
responsible for emotion.
The third section discusses the role of emotional situations on value judgments. Again,
emotion often serves to appraise events relevant to the person-environment relationship. New
research in moral psychology demonstrates how changes in the situation often lead to changes in
value-judgments. This research demonstrates the importance of an interactionist approach to
social research – specifically, how value judgments of rightness are produced by situations
interacting with emotional dispositions.

Ethical Rationalism in Modern Psychology
Previous chapters discussed the influence of rationalist assumptions in moral philosophy
throughout history. Plato (424/423-348/347 BC), Augustine (354-430), Aquinas (1225-1274),
Grotius (1583-1645), Locke (1632-1704), Kant (1724-1804), and Finnis (1940) each emphasized
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the role that reason plays in moral understanding. Here I discuss how early 20th century research
on moral psychology continued much of this rationalist tradition.

Specifically, empiricist

methods of observation framed right and wrong as a rational process of learning from our
experience.
Psychological research in the early to mid-20th century assumed that pro-social behavior
was a product of upbringing (Hoffman 1970; Baumrind 1971). This reflected the emphasis that
empiricism placed on experience in shaping the individual. In this case, right and wrong was a
learned process from one’s parents and family life. This made child-development a popular site
to research moral psychology. Other literature in moral development researched how children
learn morals outside of the family. One of the most important psychologists in this area has been
Jean Piaget who wrote The Moral Judgments of a Child in 1932. He argued that a child’s friends
and classmates play a more important role in shaping a child’s moral learning than parents do
(Piaget 1997). He researched this by observing how moral standards can manifest in children
through interactions with their peers. He developed his theory by asking children a series of
questions meant to probe their thought process (Singer 1978). He believed that understanding
the reasons behind their actions would help develop an accurate theory of moral learning.
Lawrence Kohlberg, a student of Piaget, continued this approach by researching the
reasons behind moral behavior. Kohlberg conducted a series of experiments asking children how
they would respond to a moral dilemma and why. One of the most well-known dilemmas was a
story about a man who couldn’t afford medicine for his dying wife, so he broke into a drug store
to steal it. The actual thoughts of the child were less important than the way that they were
making decisions. For Kohlberg, this provided a way to view how we reasoned in moral
dilemmas.
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This was a popular approach in the field of moral development and was further developed
by Elliot Turiel who constructed one of the most well-known theoretical models for moral
development known as the ‘social domain model’ (Turiel 1987). Turiel administered a series of
interviews which inquired as to how they evaluate social issues. He used these to understand
why children act the way they do by asking them to explain their reasons (Turiel, Hildebrandt,
and Wainryb 1991).
However, Turiel’s use of such devices assumes that information is used to evaluate the
consequences of an action before one makes a moral judgment about it. This may seem like
common sense, but recent research demonstrates how value-judgments have very little to do with
methods of rational thought. Modern psychology has shown that much of what we think and do
is unconscious. In fact, about 98% of reasoning occurs below the level of consciousness (Lakoff
2007, 68). It’s doubtful that the complex life of moral agents can be explained within the
boundaries of that meager 2%. Rather, our moral sense reflects unconscious and emotional
processes of the body.
In fact, psychological research now demonstrates how people search for a reason to
justify an action that has already been taken (Kunda 1990). Recent research conducted by Haidt,
Bjorkland, and Murphy demonstrate how the reasons people provide to explain their moral
preferences usually serve as a post-hoc justification for their emotionally loaded biases (2000).
The team asked test subjects during a laboratory experiment about a controversial topic that
elicited a strong emotional response (incest) and the respondents were instructed to justify their
belief as to why incest is morally wrong. Haidt and his team then would challenge the subjects
by providing a rebuttal for each justification the subjects would give.
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For example, if respondents said that a brother and sister getting pregnant would increase
the changes of the child being born with birth defects, then the testers would claim that they were
using contraceptives. Despite their inability to offer a reason with negative consequences, the
majority of test subjects continued to hold their original opinion and believed that the act is
simply wrong.
What such a study suggests is that to judge something as morally wrong is highly
influenced by our emotions about it. In other words, our moral rationalizations often times begin
with an emotional belief and in search of something to justify it. Rightness, then, has little to do
with reason because value judgments are made prior to such justifications. Rather than using
reason to reconcile different sides of a controversial topic, individuals are prone to certain biases
where they either select reasons that support their personal emotional values or omit those that
don’t (Baron 1995; Keith et al 2013). In other words, people pick and choose the evidence that
backs up their argument. In these contexts, reason does not advance the pursuit of rational moral
discovery but serves as a strategic process to defend one’s emotional biases. Given the role that
bias plays in moral judgments, how are we to determine that the respondent’s reasons recorded
by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Turiel are not mere attempts to post-justify their emotionally loaded
opinions. Simply put, there is more to our moral judgments than pure human reason. I discuss
this below.

The Insufficiency of Reason
To illustrate the insufficiency of reason in moral cognition and behavior, this section briefly
reviews literature on the role of emotional deficits in moral decision-making and antisocial
tendencies. Specifically, the literature on brain lesions and psychopathy demonstrate how a lack
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of emotionality, not rationality, inhibits prosocial behavior.

Research regarding both

psychopaths and those with damage to particular brain regions exhibit emotional deficits that
lead to harmful or malicious behavior, even when they rationally understand the moral weight
behind their actions. This literature serves as a paradigmatic shift in moral psychology which
reveals how reason and knowledge alone are insufficient components for moral behavior.
Instead, the research into psychopathy highlights the importance of emotion in orienting the
individual towards appropriate moral behavior.

Brain Lesions
Several studies have demonstrated how brain trauma causes personality changes. The
most well-known case is the Nineteenth Century railroad worker Phineas Gage who suffered
head trauma and serious damage to the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (VMPFC). He survived
the accident, but the trauma led to major personality changes in the form of immoral/criminal
behavior. Recent research by neuroscientist Damasio reported on an individual named “Elliot”
who suffered a brain tumor in the same part of the brain of Gage’s damage (Damasio 1994).
Both Elliot and Gage represented very similar cases as they both maintained their cognitive
abilities (In fact, Elliot scored above average on intelligence tests). Despite the fact that their
cognitive abilities were unchanged, they both suffered the same personality changes towards
immoral and criminal behavior.
Damasio performed tests on Elliot to understand this. For examples, in a laboratory
experiment showing Elliot gory pictures, Elliot reported to experience no emotional response but
noted that he would have felt differently (more in line with healthy people) before the tumor
(ibid 1994). In a follow up study, Saver and Damasio asked Elliot a series of questions regarding
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moral judgments which revealed no deviations from normal behavior (Saver and Damasio 1991).
Elliot’s answers reflected normal moral knowledge, but his antisocial behavior demonstrated a
an intellectual disconnect. According to Damasio, this reflects Elliot’s inability to judge his
everyday behavior due to the loss of his emotional faculties.

While he could rationally

discriminate between behavior that was either right or wrong, Elliot lacked the emotional
orientation to recognize the moral weight of those behaviors.
Recent studies have continued Damasio’s research studying those with similar brain
damage to further understanding the role that these areas play in moral behavior. Several of
these brain damage cases have evidenced the role of emotional functions with moral judgments.
For instance, Anderson et al demonstrate how those with damage to the ventral, medial, and
polar prefrontal cortex tend to engage in antisocial behavior (such as lying and stealing) with no
negative affect to IQ (Anderson et al 1999, 211). Other research conducted by Grafman et al
also correlates antisocial behavior with frontal damage (Grafman et al 1996).

Psychopathy
In addition to the literature on brain lesions, research on the psychopath’s tendencies for
antisocial behavior has also advanced our understanding on the role that emotions play in moral
judgments.

Such antisocial behavior associated with psychopathy comes from deficits of

cognitive structures or processes imperative for moral judgments. Specifically, the literature
highlights the psychopath’s emotion deficits with their inability to experience empathy (Hare
1991). According to Blair et al, who study antisocial behavior in psychopaths, the “clinical and
empirical picture of a psychopathic individual is of someone who has some form of emotional
deficit” (Blair et al 1997, 342). Such emotional deficits are not related to IQ or socioeconomic
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status (Hare, Hart, and Harper 1991, 1003) again demonstrating how moral judgements have less
to do with reason and more to do with emotion.
Researchers have studied the emotional indifference in psychopaths by testing their
ability to recognize emotional expressions of other people (Blair 2001, 716; Blair, Colledge, and
Mitchell 2001, 296). Most of these studies illustrate that psychopaths lack the ability to detect
certain emotions in the facial expressions.

To illustrate this, Blair et al used a series of

photographs of people expressing different emotions.

Testers showed pictures of neutral

expressions and displayed more emotionally intense photographs but increased the level of
emotional intensity over time. The subjects had to record when they could identify emotional
changes and psychopaths had a harder time doing this than emotional normal subjects (Blair,
Colledge, and Mitchell 2001, 491-498). Others have replicated these findings, such as Kosson et
al whose research demonstrates how psychopathic subjects were unable to understand fear,
sadness, and disgust (Kosson et al 2002, 398-411). Both of these studies demonstrate how
psychopaths are impaired regarding the recognition of disgust. Blair et al also found that
psychopaths experience pain and distress less intensely (Blair 1997, 342). Their inability to
experience negative emotions further suggests that it is difficult for them to experience empathy
or feel guilt. In fact, Mithcell et al found, like the subjects with brain lesions, that psychopaths
also perform the Gambling Task poorly which further corroborates their emotion deficits
(Mitchell, Colledge and Leonard 2002, 2013-2022). Additionally, Kiehl et al (2001) conducted a
study demonstrating that psychopaths process emotionally salient words differently. While
healthy individuals process such tasks through the posterior cingulate gyrus (which showed
increased activity in healthy subjects), different brain regions for psychopaths were used in order
to compensate for their emotional deficit.
109

While psychopaths fail to demonstrate proper emotions, they still have the knowledge of
their actions being wrong. Checkley first studied psychopathy in 1941 and his work, The Mask
of Sanity, compared it to colorblindness (Checkley 1988). According to him, psychopaths may
say that they understand, but there is no way for them to tell that they do. This idea of a
disconnect between healthy individuals and psychopathic individuals in regards to moral
understanding was further researched by Blair who found that psychopaths conceptualize
‘wrong’ only in terms of norms which can be enforced (Blair 1995, 571). They may fear getting
punished, but they do not understand the moral weight behind their actions. Blair further
evidenced this in his work which showed how psychopathic criminals differed from others in
their interpretation of the “moral/conventional distinction.” In this distinction, Blair describe
morals as rules that right in their own way while conventional rules are instituted by some
authority in society. For example, cheating is not illegal but many judge it as morally wrong,
while jaywalking is not morally wrong but is against the law. Blair found that psychopaths have
a hard time distinguishing between the two because of the emphasis that they place on
enforcement.

Further research in the area of legal rules by Gray et al demonstrates how

psychopathic murderers do not associate violent behavior in a negative light (Gray et al 2003).
Instead, psychopaths see violence in terms of how it serves their interests (Blair 2001, 716).
It should be noted that research into psychopathy shows no relation to parenting style
(Wootton et al 1997, 292-300). Again, psychopathy does not reflect a lack of knowledge or
proper upbringing. These studies demonstrate that those unable to process emotions normally
are more prone to antisocial behavior and make improper moral judgments. Their emotional
deficit is tied to their propensity for antisocial behavior because they lack the emotional literacy
for properly making moral judgments.
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What these studies do illustrate is that a rational understanding of moral standards does
not necessarily lead one to act in accordance with them. In fact, those with an emotional deficit
are likely to act in ways that run counter to them. For them, standards of morality are simply
social rules with no real natural standard of rightness. This demonstrates the necessity of
emotion in moral cognition.

Emotive Dispositions in Moral Decision-making
Other psychological research into the morality concerns research focused on the neuroanatomy
of moral cognition and works to identify the parts of the brain associated with moral judgments.
Neuroscience has introduced new methods and instruments into the study of moral psychology,
specifically the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which highlights brain regions
associated with observed behavior. Much of the research interested in moral cognition involves
the use of fMRI while subjects perform some task, such as responding to hypothetical moral
dilemmas, during brain scans
Moll et al were one of the first to compare moral with non-moral stimuli using fMRI and
identified several parts of the brain responsible for moral judgments (Moll, Oliveira-Souza,
Eslinger 2003; Moll et al 2005; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, and Eslinger 2002). They asked subjects
to respond to moral sentences (for instance, “we can break the law when necessary” or “the
elderly are useless”) in contrast to factual sentences (“stones are made of water” or “telephones
never ring”) (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger 2003). The team used neuroimaging to measure the
brain activity of the subjects who were instructed to respond with either “right” or “wrong” to
either the moral or factual sentence. They found different kinds of sentences activated different
parts of the brain. Specifically, moral sentences activated complex emotional functions and
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witnessed more neural activity. Other neuroimaging studies by Moll et al used morally salient
photographs (Moll et al, 2002).

This kind of research evidences the emotional structures

underpinning of our understanding of rightness. The following are more detailed examples of
such studies.

The Ultimatum Game
Other brain imaging experiments have shed light on moral judgments in areas of fairness
and reciprocity. Reciprocity reflects an ancient ideal held in the golden rule that you treat others
fairly and as you want to be treated. Every religious text has stressed some form of the golden
rule in their teachings.

Some have even argued that a sense of reciprocity served as an

evolutionary adaptation upon which social behavior has evolved (Gintis 2008, 241-253). The
Ultimatum Game is a common game employed in experiments with two players and is used to
explore our sense of fairness. One of the test subjects plays as the proposer, is given a certain
amount of money, and is told to split it with the other player. The other subject plays as the
decider who can either accept or reject the amount of money. While the proposer can offer any
amount of money to the decider, they have to still consider as to whether the decider will accept
or reject the amount. If they accept in, both players keep the money, but if they reject it or to
reject the offer than neither player gets any money.
If a moral sense of fairness played no part, then the decider would say yes to every offer
because something is always better than nothing. However, research conducted by Sanfey et al
demonstrates how players don’t do this – proposers tend to offer half of the money while
deciders reject most of the proposals that offer only a quarter of the total money (Sanfey et al
2003). In other words, the results of the game demonstrate some expectation of reciprocity.
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Specifically, the decider’s decision to reject the proposer’s unfair offer reflects a willingness to
punish the greedy player rather than gain materially.
Sanfey et al conducted these experiments while scanning players in fMRI machines and
found that several parts of the brain are activated during unfair play. The specific brain regions
activated were the bilateral anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), regions often
associated with emotional responses. Sanfey’s team suggest that these brain regions associated
with negative emotion suggests that fairness and reciprocity are emotionally laden.
This is not to say that emotions play the only part of such exchanges. The team also saw
increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) which is responsible for higher
thinking such as planning. The team interprets this as a cognitive conflict between the rational
considerations of reward on one hand and the emotional concerns of fairness on the other.
Ultimately, the game illustrates how individuals judge the fairness using both rational and
emotional processes – reason allows individuals to judge the point at which the an offer is worth
accepting while emotion provides the individuals with the will to punish players who fail to act
fairly. The fact that players are willing to make material sacrifices from unfair offers suggests
that the emotional basis for judging fairness and reciprocity, and that they are powerful enough
to overwhelm the rational interests of rewards.

The Trolley Problem
Harm is one of the most basic moral foundations. Most religious or philosophical
traditions have vilified intentionally harming someone else.

One of the most well-known

standards is John Stuart Mill’s ‘harm principle’ which has influenced not only moral thought but
has served as a basic tenet for much of Western legal scholarship as well. The rule is simple
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enough and states that one should be free to do as one pleases as long as it does not harm
someone else. According to him, harming someone else is the ultimate moral transgression.
One of the most cited experiments using the fMRI to observe moral cognition regarding
harm was conducted by Greene et al who researched the cognitive and emotive processing
involved in a moral dilemmas. His study employed the runaway trolley problem, a moral
dilemma that distinguishes between personal and impersonal harm (Greene et al 2001).
According to the dilemma, a runaway trolley will kill five people if it continues on its present
course. You have the ability to change that course, however, by flipping a switch which will
change the trolley’s direction onto an alternate set of tracks. On this set of tracks is only one
person who will likely get killed instead of five. The dilemma then involves the decision to flip
the switch where your action results in the killing of one person to save five. Greene et al
demonstrates that most people decide to save the five people by sacrificing one. However, this
dilemma only measures moral judgments in an impersonal way (by way of flipping a switch).
To capture how emotion changes our moral judgments, Greene et al added a similar
second question with a twist. Again, a runaway trolley threatens to kill five people on its current
course, as you and a stranger are standing on a footbridge next to the tracks about to witness the
disaster. However, there is no switch to redirect the trolley to an alternative set of tracks.
Instead, the only way to save them is to push the stranger onto the tracks thus derailing the
trolley and saving the five people. While the consequences are the same, compared to the
previous questions, most people say that this scenario is not moral.
Greene et al offer an explanation related to the role that emotion plays. They asked their
subjects these questions while in an fMRI. They came up with a personal/impersonal distinction
to measure the emotional salience of the situation.

They believed that the “up close and
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personal” nature of the situation determines moral judgments. Their results demonstrate how the
decision requiring personal judgment calls produce increased activity in the areas of the brain
responsible for emotion and social cognition, specifically the posterior cingulate cortex, the
medial prefrontal cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus. The decision for an impersonal moral
judgement saw increased activity in the parts of the brain responsible for higher cognitive tasks
in the inferior parietal lobe and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Greene et al performed this
experiment with a much larger sample size and found that personal judgment calls also saw
increased activity in the amygdala.
Since this experiment, other experiments have focused on mapping moral activity in the
brain to determine where and when moral judgments occur. Green et al were not the only ones
to suggest that moral reasoning occurs in the VMPFC. Moll et al also witnessed increased
activity in this area while conducting fMRI experiments on subject engaged in moral judgments,
while viewing morally salient photographs (Moll et al 2002; Moll et al 2007). Waldermann and
Dietrich have also evidence the role the role of the VMPFC which implies its importance for
responding socially to directly harming someone or in invoking negative emotion in directly
harming someone (Waldermann and Dietrich 2007).

Moral Judgments Adjust to Situational Changes
If our moral judgments do reflect our emotional biases, than how constant and fixed are our
values? Because they believed that knowledge and learning served as the key sources to moral
cognition, previous thinkers assumed that our values systems were relatively stable and changed
only due to our exposure to new information. However, how we make moral judgments is
highly influenced by our easily manipulated emotional state. Specifically, research suggests that
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emotions influence moral judgments in a way where a preexisting negative emotion may
increase the emotional salience of a moral transgression.

Schnall et al demonstrates the

relationship between disgust and moral judgments by asking test subjects to rate moral actions.
To measure the role of preexisting emotion (disgust), they had half of the subjects answer the
questionnaire sitting in either a disgusting room or were told to recall a disgusting personal event
before-hand. Their results demonstrated that those cued with disgust rated moral transgressions
more severely than the control group. They found that subjects who scored higher on body
consciousness rated moral judgments more severely. According to them, “since the effect
occurred most strongly for people who were sensitive to their own bodily cues, the results appear
to concern feelings of disgust, rather than merely the primed concept of disgust.” In general,
negative feelings intensify negative moral appraisals (Schnall et al 2014).

What this

demonstrates is that not only may our reasons function as post-hoc rationalizations for our
emotional biases, but how easily manipulated emotions may change how we evaluate morally
salient situations. Such research challenges the tradition of moral psychology advanced by
Piaget, Kohlberg, and Turiel which assumed that knowledge and learning functioned as key
sources of moral judgment. Research demonstrates, though, the effect that emotional situations
play in shaping our moral behavior.

Milgram’s Shock Experiment
One of the most well-known studies into the situational role of ethical behavior is Stanley
Milgram’s 1963 research into obedience. Milgram was personally curious about the German
holocaust and how normal people could permit and engage in horrible acts of cruelty. At the
time, many argued that Germans somehow harbored tendencies towards an “authoritarian
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personality” (Adorno et al 1950). Milgram, however, was disgusted by theses dispositional
explanations and wanted to show that Americans were just as capable of committing acts of
cruelty.
Milgram designed an experiment to observe how far psychologically ‘normal’ people
would harm others in following the orders from an authority figure (Milgram 1963). Under the
pretext that they were participating in a study regarding the role of punishment in learning, test
subjects were appointed the role as either “teacher” or “learner.” A man in a laboratory coat, the
“authority figure,” ordered the teacher to administer electrical shocks to the learner if the learner
answered a question incorrectly. The learner, in fact, was a confederate to the study and received
no actual shocks, but persuasively acted as if he did. The teacher, however, expressed a great
deal of anxiety from the authority’s orders to increase the voltage which conflicted with their
concern for the learner.

Despite their worries and moral convictions, every test subject

administered some level of shock and two thirds increased the voltage to the maximum degree.
Milgram’s shock experiment does yield significant conclusions, both dispositional and
situational, regarding the power of authority to compromise our moral inclinations. On the
dispositional side, the anxiety expressed by the test subjects in response to the authority figure’s
orders demonstrates that people do have inclinations to behave one way despite what the
situation is demanding from them. In other words, people do possess certain dispositions that
preexist each situation they interact with. Milgram’s experiment evidenced two of them – on one
hand is the inclination to do no harm (as also discussed in the trolley problem) evidenced by the
feelings of stress and anxiety expressed by the test subjects. On the other hand is the inclination
to obey authority, evidenced by the subject causing harm on the learner against their judgement.
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However, Milgram’s experiment yields important situational conclusions as well. The
fact that an authority figure’s presence can induce one’s behavior to betray their inclinations
demonstrates the power of situations. Again, situations can influence behavior by ‘activating’
the dispositions of the subjects interacting with them. Two dispositions can be activated at once,
but how the situation activates them relative to each other determines how people behave within
those situations. How we behave in moral contexts, then, is not just a matter of our moral
dispositions, but how the situational design of those contexts activate moral dispositions.
Milgram’s experiment demonstrated this. He designed a specific situational context which can
induce harmful behaviors from people who are inclined to do no harm.
Milgram conducted follow-up experiments to further explore the role of the situational
design on behavior (Milgram 1965). In each, he changed specific situational factors in order to
test how they change behavior. For instance, he removed the “authority figure” (a scientist in a
lab coat) from the room and witnessed a drop in obedience by 20.5%. The absence of an
authority figure changes the situation in such a way that people are less inclined to betray their
moral dispositions. In another example, the teacher had to force the learner’s hand down into a
shock plate, rather than simply flipping a switch. As a result, obedience dropped dramatically to
30%. People are less likely to obey an authority figure when the design of the situation places
more emphasis on the harm of the learner.

Milgram’s experiments demonstrate is how a

situation, adjusted for activating certain emotional dispositions, affects moral behavior.

Zimbardo’s Prison Experiment
Another well-known situational experiment is Phillip Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford Prison
experiment. While the aim of the study was to explore how public roles and identities shape
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social behavior, the experiment yielded important results regarding moral behavior as well. Like
Milgram’s shock experiment, Zimbardo’s prison experiment demonstrated how normal people
put into extreme situations can behave in ways that betray their moral dispositions (Zimbardo
2007).
Zimbardo wanted to explore as to whether the commonly reported instance of violent
behavior reflect personality disorders of the guards or the environmental conditions of the prison.
He tested this through an experiment which simulated a prison environment for several days
where test subjects were assigned the role of guard or prisoner. Twenty four test subjects
deemed to be both physically and mentally healthy were randomly assigned to play one of these
roles.
To simulate the real-world experience of prison, the experiment was designed to ensure
that each role received a certain kind of treatment from the other. Those who played prisoners
were arrested, given prisoner’s clothes and placed in a jail cell for the experiment. Those who
played guards were given uniforms and weapons to represent their authority and granted the
authority to maintain order as long as they didn’t use physical violence.
Both prisoners and guards adopted their roles within a matter of hours. Guards began
asserting their authority over the prisoners while the prisoners quickly became mores submissive.
Guards pushed the boundaries of their authority by relying on more abusive tactics until the
prisoners thought they have gone too far. In response, prisoners organized a rebellion which was
put down by guards who then felt justified in using even harsher forms of punishments. The
experiment was terminated early on day six due to the cruel behaviors adopted by the guards and
the psychological and physical distress suffered by the prisoners.
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It is important to remember that the test subjects were psychologically and physically
healthy. The physically abusive nature of the guards cannot be explained by pre-existing deviant
behavior, nor could the psychological trauma experienced by the prisoners be explained by any
disorders either. The biggest contributing factor to their behavioral changes were the situational
designs which reinforced the kind of behavior that was expected of the role they would play. In
fact, once the experiment was done, subjects who played guards were both surprised and
ashamed of the kind of behavior that they adopted.
Zimbardo argues in his book, The Lucifer Effect, that the prison experiment evidences
how, given the right conditions, moral people can commit acts of cruelty. He refers to this as
moral disengagement (ibid, 307) where an individual’s moral standards lose their ability to
influence or appeal to an individual’s behavior or decision-making. This occurs when the design
of a situation disables a person’s capacity for empathy and caring, etc. As in the prison
experiment, the guards’ situational experience emphasized their need to maintain order over the
wellbeing of the prisoners. In essence, the experiment activated dispositions associated with
authority and obedience, as opposed to those associated with compassion and clemency, which
explains the moral disengagement of test-subjects.

Section Conclusion: Correcting for the Naturalistic Fallacy
Earlier scientific research, relying on empiricist methods of observation, assumed the role of
reason in moral psychology. As discussed in the previous chapter, empiricist methods assume
that causal laws can be identified on the same level as the observable behavior they produce. As
a result, moral psychology (spearheaded by the work of Piaget, Kohlberg, and Turiel) believed
that methods of observation can identify the source of a child’s moral understanding.
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Specifically, they treated the reasons children gave for their actions as the causal laws governing
their behavior. However, language functions on the level of observation, and researchers made
the empiricist mistake of treating children’s answers as somehow expressing the unobservable
mechanisms governing their behavior. As a result, they fail to understand the psychological
source underpinning moral behavior.
In general, empiricist methods of moral psychology continued to commit the naturalistic
fallacy by conflating right with reason. Speculative reasoning cannot serve as a premise for
practical knowledge without conflating “ought” with “is.” Therefore, the ethical rationalism of
empiricist moral psychology cannot logically sustain both the normative and positive dimensions
of rights without internal contradiction.

These internal contradiction become apparent, as

research conducted by Haidt reveals, when one fails to change their moral decisions in the face
of new information. Reasons serves more to post-justify moral actions after they have already
been decided on. In other words, empiricism’s focus on rationality fails to fully understand both
the ontological and epistemological dimension of right.
The research reviewed here demonstrates how emotion, not reason, underpins our moral
decision-making. Studies researching the structure of the brain concluded that moral cognition
requires some capacity for emotion. Additionally, studies researching the situational side of
morality concluded that efforts to disengage a person emotionally may result in immoral
behavior. In general, this demonstrates how emotion can sustain the normative side of human
rights.
In general, emotion serves a necessary function underpinning our moral behaviors and
thoughts. corrects for this because the unobservable side of emotion carries both a positive and
normative dimension which doesn’t rely on the former to rationally justify the latter. Our
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normative sense of rightness is informed by the visceral experience of an emotional appraisal,
while its positive nature is affirmed in the materially real psychological structures that produce
them. The normative dimension of rightness, then, is not dependent on a rational understanding
of how values derive from nature, but is nonetheless still grounded in nature by virtue of these
felt experiences deriving from ontologically real emotive structures of the human psyche.
However, emotive dispositions don’t explain everything. Again, emotions are relational,
which is to say that they are always about something – they serve to appraise the situations that
we are in. Social psychology has demonstrated that how they appraise a situation is, in large
part, shaped by how the situational design activates them. Rightness, then, is not only a matter
of emotive dispositions but, also, how those dispositions interact with situations. In general,
rightness is complex product of emotion and society interacting with each other.

Chapter Conclusion: Emotion, Right, and Change
This chapter argued an emotive approach to right resolves both the epistemic fallacy and the
naturalistic fallacy. I briefly review some of those points here.
First, my focus on emotion resolves the epistemic fallacy because I frame it within a
social-psychological framework that divorces the generative mechanism from the behaviors that
they produce. In doing so, I can discuss how the dispositional and situational dimension of
emotion fit into a stratified ontology. Ontologically real emotive dispositions operate on the
domain of the real which generate behaviors on the domain of the actual. It is also important to
emphasize the other part of this relationship, namely how the situations that emotion reacts to
can materially change the cognitive architecture that generates emotion.

This fits with

Transformation Model of Social Action which illustrates how social phenomena can change the
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generative structures underpinning this. This is the case with emotion as the situations that we
appraise make changes to how the brain reacts to future situations. In general, the socialpsychology of emotion functions in a way that coheres with critical realism.
Second, my focus on emotion resolves the naturalistic fallacy because an emotional
ontology can sustain the normative dimension to human behavior.

Normative behavior is

produce by an emotional motivation, but does not require a rational understanding of how those
emotions work or where they come from. Instead, a sense of right is informed by the visceral
experience of emotion which is nonetheless still grounded in nature by virtue of it deriving from
ontologically real psychological structures. It is also important to emphasize that a sense of right
underpins how human rights are practiced, but it does not translate into a fixed set of human
rights principles. Because emotion relates us to our environment, this sense of right is always
culturally situated and reflects how social interactions are mediated within a group.
Additionally, the idea that emotion and culture are recursively related (as discussed with
reference to the TMSA) means that our sense of right evolves over time with cultural changes.
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Chapter 4
An Emotional Ontology of Human Rights: Proposing a Combined Approach

Introduction
The primary argument of this dissertation – that international human rights are founded on the
emotional foundations of the people they serve – is premised on very particular ontological and
psychosocial perspectives. Chapters two and three discussed what those perspectives are and
how they address the limitations in the human rights literature. Chapter two discussed the first
track of my argument which claims that critical realism can address the limitations of empiricist
approaches. Chapter three discussed the second track which argues that the social-psychology of
interactionism can address the limitations of rationalist approaches.
Up to this point, each of these broad perspectives have been discussed as separate tracks
without a clear explanation as to how they relate to each other. The aim of this chapter, then, is
to piece these tracks together into a combined approach to human rights. Specifically, this
combined approach integrates the ontological framework of critical realism with the
psychosocial framework of interactionism in a way that relates emotion to human rights. In
doing so, I arrive at two human rights models – the first builds on transcendental realism and the
second builds on critical naturalism.

The transcendental realist model illustrates how

international human rights structures emerge from the emotional interactions of rights bearers.
The critical naturalist model illustrates the recursive relationship between human rights
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structures and rights bearers as a way to explain cultural differences and historical change in
human rights practices.

Chapter Argument/Aims
By integrating critical realism and interactionism into a combined approach, I resolve a puzzle as
to how something as personal as emotion relates to the collective nature of human rights. After
all, human rights involve macro-scaled structures (political, legal, cultural, economic, historical,
etc.) that operate on different socio-spatial levels than emotion. Because emotion is subjectively
experienced on the individual level, the argument that it serves a foundational role for collective
human rights requires a justification that resolves the micro/macro dualism. This dualism refers
to a distinction between phenomena on different socio-spatial scales (small phenomena on micro
scales versus larger phenomena on macro scales) and how they relate to each other.
This puzzle as to how the subjective experience of emotion generates public goods has a
temporal dimension as well. The reason for this is that causal relations resolve much faster on
micro levels than they do on macro levels – large structures emerge over an extended period of
time, but their ability to affect people’s behaviors occurs rather quickly. I demonstrate in this
chapter how integrating critical realism and interactionism into a combined approach can resolve
the spatiotemporal dimension to the micro/macro dualism as it relates to emotions and
international human rights.
I arrive at this combined approach by building on the similarities between critical realism
and interactionism, while allowing the differences of each to inform the other. The primary
similarity between the two is that they both discuss the individual-society relationship. In this
sense, they both address how micro- and macro-scaled phenomena relate to each other, though
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they model it in different ways. Critical realism uses structure-agency models to theorize how
the recursive relationship between the individual and society is governed by time. Interactionism
uses situation-disposition models in order to theorize as to how our inward psychology shapes
and molds interpersonal and intercultural relations. Together, they paint a portrait of how the
emotional interactions of agents shape, and are shaped by, the situational design of the social
structure they interact with. In general, this basic framework that relates dispositioned agents to
structural situations helps resolve the micro/macro dualism as it pertains to emotion and
international human rights.
This basic framework allows me to construct the two models mentioned above. The first
is a transcendental realist model that corrects for agreement theories by establishing a stratified
ontology of human rights. It illustrate how international human rights structures emerge from
the emotional interactions of human rights bearers. The second is a critical naturalist model that
uses the transformational model of social action (TMSA) to correct for the relativist theories. It
illustrates the recursive relationship between human rights structures and human rights bearers in
order explain cultural differences and historical changes in human rights practices.
While both models discuss the same relationship (how emotions and rights relate to each
other) they discuss different spatiotemporal dimension of it. The transcendental realist model
discusses how large structures emerge over time, while the critical naturalist model demonstrates
how the recursive relationship between structures and agent occurs on a shorter timeline.
Because they speak to different spatiotemporal dimensions of human rights, they should be seen
as separate models from each other. Below is a brief explanation of the two models.
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A Transcendental Realist Model
As discussed in chapter 2, agreement theories argue that human rights reflect international
structures of ‘core commonalities’ or ‘overlapping consensus’ (Beitz 2009, 73-95). Again, these
theories are built on an empirical realist philosophy which assumes a flat and closed system.
This leads the empiricist to observe causal relations in a spatially controlled environment. As a
result, agreement theorists search for the foundations of international human rights on the same
socio-spatial level that they are practiced on. Because these theories argue that rights apply to all
cultures, they argue that international agreement serves as the foundation of human rights.
Because closed systems lack stratification, however, these theories are unable to explain
as to what gives rise to international agreement – they are simply presupposed. A transcendental
realist model corrects for this because it assumes an open and stratified ontology which can
address how phenomena on larger spatial scales emerge from smaller ones. In doing so, it is able
to link the emotive dispositions mediating the micro relations between rights bearers to the
macro human rights structures that emerge from them. Because the model focuses on how larger
structures emerge, its causal/constitutive relations resolve much slower than they do in the
critical naturalist model.

A Critical Naturalist Model
As discussed in chapter 2, relativist theories are critical of international human rights because
they argue that rights reflect the cultural agency of the members practicing them.

Like

agreement theories, they do assume a closed system where their search for the foundations of
rights takes place on the same socio-spatial level that they are practiced on. Unlike agreement
theories, though, relativism is built on transcendental idealism which affirms the role that our
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interpretation of social reality plays in constituting it. As a result, relativist theories hold that the
constitution of rights are founded on the cultural agency to construct and interpret them.
Because relativist perspectives assume a closed system, like agreement theories, they too
suffer from certain limitations – specifically they take cultural agency for granted. While
agreement theories are unable to explain what gives rise to intercultural structures of agreement,
relativist perspectives are unable to explain what makes intracultural agency possible. A critical
naturalist model corrects for this because the Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA)
illustrates the recursive relationship between structure and agency while, simultaneously
affirming the ontological primacy of structure. Specifically, it establishes the dispositional
structures that allow/constrain cultural agency while recognizing how the cultural situations that
emerge, in turn, reproduce/transform those dispositional structures.

Because this model

discusses how those micro causal mechanism (emotional interactions between rights bearers) are
changed by the macro-structures they generate, causal relations resolve much faster than they do
in the transcendental realist model.

Chapter Structure
The chapter is organized into three parts. The first part outlines the transcendental realist
framework that models the causal/constitutive relationship between human rights and emotion.
It begins by discussing how critical realism can resolve the micro/macro dualism.

This

discussion focuses on the importance of open systems (uncontrolled environments) and the role
they play in relating units of research on different socio-spatial levels (micro versus macro).
Following that, I outline the two critical realist models mentioned above and how they relate
human rights structures on the macro level to their foundations on the micro level.

The
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transcendental realist model of emergence outlines how larger human rights structures arise from
their foundations.

The critical naturalist model of social change outlines the recursive

relationship between those structures and the foundations that generate them.
These models serve as the ontological support for which, in the second part, I build my
interactionist framework on in order to specify the role that emotion plays as the foundations of
rights. To set this up properly, this part begins with a discussion on ‘microfoundations,’ a
theoretical term that refers to the smaller parts that comprise larger structures. By anchoring my
argument in the discussion of microfoundations, I locate the foundations of rights on a separate
socio-spatial level underneath the human rights structures they generate. This allows me to
outline the relationship between emotion and rights in interactionist terms: larger human rights
structures serve as the situations in which emotive dispositions generate behavior. I build this
interactionist framework on the two critical realist models outlined in part one.
illustrates how human rights structures emerge from emotional foundations.

The first

The second

illustrates how social change results from how those human rights structures affect, in turn, the
very emotional foundations that gave rise to them. Overall, this serves as a combined approach
which outlines the causal relationship between human rights structures to their emotional
foundations.
The third part discusses how this combined approach contributes to a practical
understanding of contemporary human rights issues. In illustrating this, it is important to state
that my approach is not meant to rationally justify a list of specific human rights items –
attempting to do so would only reproduce the errors of rationalist approaches. Rather, I focuses
on the social conditions necessary for the recognition of human rights. If people realize rights
and responsibilities through their emotional interactions with others, then the social and political
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conditions that protect these emotional interactions are required for the recognition of human
rights. The need to guarantee these conditions constitutes a right on its own, a special kind of
right which Amartya Sen and others have called “meta-rights.” In general, meta-rights are rights
that protect other rights. In the words of Sen, “a meta‐ right to something, x, can be defined as
the right to have policies, p(x), that genuinely pursue the objective of making the right to x
realizable” (1982, 345). Meta-rights, then, do not refer to the rights that arise from the emotional
interactions of people but, rather, ensure that such interactions can take place.
As a way to provide a practical illustration of this, I discuss the rights of immigrants and
refugees and how recent ethno-nationalist efforts to strengthen state borders threaten those rights.
Specifically, the recent move by western governments to strengthen their national borders
function to inhibit their citizens from interacting with immigrants and refugees. Immigrants and
refugees, then, are deprived the ability to make meaningful emotional connections with other
groups of people and, as a result, their rights are never realized. Instead, western governments
manipulate the emotions of their citizens using ethno-nationalist sentiment which stoke fears and
anger towards immigrants and refugees. This undermines the social conditions necessary for the
rights of immigrants and refugees to be realized by inducing an emotional disengagement
(similar to that evidenced by the work of Milgram and Zimbardo in their situational studies).
The rights of refugees and immigrants, then, can never be realized under such conditions. I
argue that certain meta-rights (such as the right to belong and the right to free movement) can
protect the conditions necessary for immigrants and refugees to relate to U.S. and European
citizens in emotionally meaningful ways.
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Part 1: Resolving the Micro/Macro Dualism
The main argument of this dissertation – that international human rights are based on the
emotional foundations of the people they serve – implies that structures of international human
rights are related in some way to the individuals that comprise them. This introduces a puzzle as
to how collective public goods can be founded on the privately felt emotion of the people they
serve. Resolving this puzzle, then, requires asking the question as to how smaller parts give rise
to a larger whole. This question implicates the micro/macro dualism which refers to a distinction
between phenomena occurring on small spatial scales versus that of larger ones. As Wight says,
the distinction “is concerned with the analysis of face-to-face conduct (everyday activities,
diplomatic exchanges) and more impersonal phenomena such as institutions and distribution of
power and resources” (Wight 2006, 104-105).
Traditionally, the IR discipline resolves issues of scale by locating its units of research on
a levels-of-analysis framework. This framework was first introduced by Kenneth Waltz in Man,
the State, and War where he painted a portrait of international politics as occurring on three
levels or “images” – the system, state, and individual levels of analysis (Waltz 1959). The
micro/macro dualism is similar to Waltz’ levels-of-analysis framework in that they both refer to
different spatial levels of social reality. It is different, though, in that the micro/macro dualism
refers to units-of-analysis at which a level may be specified. Once the researcher identifies their
units of analysis, they decide as to which level is appropriate for their research. As David Singer
put it, they can choose to focus “upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon
the system” (Singer 1961, 77).
Recognizing the difference between units-of-analysis and levels-of-analysis is important
because my argument specifies two units on different socio-spatial levels (human rights is one
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unit and the emotional interactions of rights bearers is the other). Arguing that human rights
emerge from the emotional interactions of the people they serve specifies a causal/constitutive
relationship between units on the individual level (emotional interactions between rights bearers)
and units on the international and cultural level (emergent human rights structures). In short, my
analysis of how macro human rights structures emerge from the micro parts constituting them
necessarily traverses multiple socio-spatial levels.
This poses challenges for empiricist methods which prefer to conduct research on a single
level of analysis. Again, empiricist research assumes a closed system (controlled environment)
where researchers may observe how causal relations manifest in the form of constant
conjunctions (if A then B forms of relations). Manufacturing such a closed system is usually
done by restricting research to a single level-of-analysis in order to control for intervening
variables from other levels. In fact, Waltz argues in Man, the State, and War that causal
principles for any research question may rest on all levels-of-analysis. As a result, researchers
treat each level as separate and independent and, therefore, traditionally restrict causal analysis to
a single socio-spatial level.
This may sound like an orderly way to conduct research, but it does not accurately
portray how causal relations resolve in the social world. Social relations rarely manifest as
constant conjunctions because social reality operates as an open system where units on all levels
are interrelated in complex ways. As a result, a causal mechanisms on one level-of-analysis
rarely generates the same consequent on a different level (this is why it is possible for universal
emotional foundations to give rise to different human rights practices). In other words, the lack
of a constant conjunction does not mean that micro-leveled units and macro-leveled units do not
interact with each other. It is obvious that they do. For instance, human rights laws do affect the
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behavior of rights bearers and, conversely, the behaviors of rights bearers may change those
same international laws. These kinds of causal relationships are difficult to research, however,
when scholars assume a closed system.
This tendency to assume a closed system is evident in the empiricist human rights
approaches. Both agreement and relativist theories place the foundations of rights on the same
socio-spatial level as the human rights practices they endorse. For instance, agreement theories
search for cases of core commonalities and overlapping consensus on the same socio-spatial
level as international human rights. Relativist theories do the same by locating the foundations
of rights in the in-group practices of particular cultural. Both of these perspectives claim to
understand the nature of rights, yet they restrict their analysis to a single level. This illustrates
the limitation of empiricist human rights theories – their assumption of a closed system prevents
them from exploring how units-of-analysis on different levels-of-analysis are interrelated.
Open systems correct for this because they allow me to model the micro/macro
relationship as it relates to human rights and their foundations.

There are two specific

dimensions that open systems allow me to model: a socio-spatial dimension and socio-temporal
dimension. As discussed above, the socio-spatial dimension refers to causal relations specified
on a level-of-analysis. It is additionally important to account for the socio-temporal dimension
where the speed at which these relations resolve depends on their socio-spatial level – causal
relations between large structures occur much slower than causal relations between people. This
is an important dimension to model because human rights structures emerge over an extended
period of time while their ability to affect individual behavior occurs rather quickly. In general,
modeling the micro/macro relationship between human rights structures and their foundations
requires accounting for both dimensions of space and time.
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Critical realism allows me to model both of these dimensions of the human rightsemotions relationship. Specifically, I arrive at two models: a transcendental realist model which
illustrates a stratified ontology of human rights and a critical naturalist model which illustrates
how human rights change through the TMSA. While both portray the same relationship (that
between emotion and human rights) they each model different dimensions of it.

The

transcendental realist model explains how larger human rights structures emerge from their
smaller foundations over an extended period of time. The critical naturalist model explains the
spatiotemporal dimensions of the recursive relationship between rights and rights bearers. I
provide the two models below.

A Transcendental Realist Model of Emergence
This section models how human rights structures emerge from their foundations. Bhaskar’s
transcendental realism provides the philosophical framework to illustrate both the ontological
and spatial dimensions to this. Generally speaking, transcendental realism establishes a stratified
ontology where observable phenomena emerge from their unobservable generative mechanisms.
While the levels in this stratification are ontological in nature, it nonetheless recognizes that the
observable and unobservable phenomena on those ontological levels likely function on different
socio-spatial levels as well. Transcendental realism was discussed in length in chapter 2, but it is
important to provide a brief review of its tenets here so they may be applied to human rights.
As discussed previously, transcendental realism aims to correct for the epistemic fallacy
committed by empiricist sciences by divorcing ontology from epistemology. It does this by
distinguishing between the transitive (the social experience of science) and the intransitive (the
real phenomena science attempts to explain). This distinction between the intransitive world and
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our transitive experience of it emphasizes that there are dimensions of the world not accessible to
scientific methods of observation. This exposes the limits to empiricist approaches to human
rights which assume that human rights are completely observable phenomena.
Transcendental realism corrects for this by proposing a structure of reality which includes
both the transitive and intransitive dimensions. The inclusion of the intransitive dimension
provides a more multidimensional portrait of causal relations because it introduces two new
ontological conditions – stratification and openness.

These two conditions are critical for

understanding the unobservable dimension of human rights and why the observable dimension
does not always follow the logic of the constant conjunction.

I briefly discuss these two

conditions and then explain how they fit into my model.
The first is stratification which adds multidimensionality to social reality by establishing
different ontological levels. These ontological levels place the transitive dimension at the top
(domain of the empirical) and the intransitive dimensions below (domain of the real and of the
actual). Occupying the intransitive dimensions are the unobservable generative mechanisms
(domain of the real) and the real causal phenomena that they produce (domain of the actual).
This stratification is important because it illustrate how human rights practices on the domain of
the actual are generated by the unobservable mechanisms on the domain of the real.
The second condition (openness) characterizes the uncontrolled environment in which
these causal relations resolve.

While stratification stretches reality to establish multiple

dimensions vertically, openness stretches it horizontally to recognize that there are always
multiple causal phenomena interacting with each other on each ontological level. The condition
of openness, then, explains as to why causal relations do not resolve as constant conjunctions.
Because causal phenomena resolve in an uncontrolled environment with multiple interacting
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relations, causal mechanisms typically do not reproduce the same consequent. The effects
produced by a causal mechanism in one system is likely to vary from the effects of the same
causal mechanism in a different system. This explains as to why the universal foundations of
rights on the domain of the real produce cultural differences in human rights practices on the
domain of the actual – because the domain of the actual consists of other causal phenomena
(social, historical, political, economic, etc.) which human rights phenomena interact with.
Both of these conditions (stratification and openness) paint a complex portrait of causal
relations which introduces the concept of emergence – an important concept for understanding
how human rights arise from their foundations. As discussed in chapter 2, emergence refers to
the production of wholly new phenomena that is irreducible to, but still dependent on, the
mechanisms that produced it. In an open system, multiple causal mechanisms interact in ways
that produce new phenomena that is qualitatively different and quantitatively greater than the
sum of its generative parts. While the production of this new emergent phenomena still depends
on the generative mechanisms underpinning it, it nonetheless functions as a completely separate
and independent thing that constitutes its own ontological level.
The domain of the actual emerges in this manner from the domain of the real. It is
qualitatively different and quantitatively greater than the domain of the real given the mere fact
that it reveals itself via human experience, but it still depends on the domain of the real for its
production. The practice of human rights (which occurs on the domain of the actual) constitutes
a small part of this experience and, therefore, is understood as an emergent phenomena that must
arise from some mechanism on the domain of the real.
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A Critical Naturalist Model of Social Change
This section models how those emergent human rights structures affect the very dispositional
foundations that generated them. Bhaskar’s critical naturalism provides the causal framework to
illustrate this. As discussed in chapter 2, the primary difference between the natural sciences and
social sciences is the prevalence of dualisms present in the latter. Bhaskar corrects for this
through the Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA). It illustrates how the recursive
relationship between the generative mechanisms and the phenomena they produce are governed
by time. This is important for illustrating how the human rights structures (domain of the actual)
affect the emotive dispositions (domain of the real) that generate them.
Again, the prevalence of dualisms refers to the many of the philosophical, theoretical, and
methodological, problems that the social sciences are unable to resolve. Such dualisms include
agency/structure, individual/society, theory/practice, facts/values, etc. The reason behind these
problems is that, unlike the natural sciences, the structures produced on the domain of the actual
in turn affect the causal mechanisms that produced them on the domain of the real. For the
social sciences, then, the causal arrow points in both directions. This is the case in matters of
human rights because the same reiterated behaviors that constitute larger human rights structures
eventually become constrained by them.
A prominent IR theory that works to understand the recursive relationship between cause
and effect is constructivism. It assumes a reciprocal relationship between the ideational world
and the material world – ideas affect our behaviors and our behaviors affect our ideas. This
serves as a basis for constructivist to argue that agency and structure are co-constituted (relativist
research to human rights is often associated with this constructivist approach). The problem with
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assuming this co-constitutive relationship, however, is that two objects cannot both cause and
effect each other simultaneously. As Bhaskar argues in his critical naturalist philosophy, there
must logically be an ontological starting point which first makes the recursive relationship
possible. In other words, the relationship must be governed by time. He corrects for this by
establishing the ontological primacy of structure which makes it possible for the actualization of
agency to in turn effect it.
This recursive relationship is illustrated in the TMSA which is designed to solve for the
problem of dualism. It builds on the stratified ontology articulated in transcendental realism in
order to establish the ontological primacy of structure. While these structures serve as the
generative mechanisms that produce phenomena, that phenomena can either reproduce or
transform the mechanisms that gave rise to them. Once those mechanisms are either reproduced
or transformed, they can impose their power that either allows or constrains future phenomena to
affect them again.
The TMSA, then, can understand the recursive relationship between human rights
practices and their foundations.

The foundations of human rights generate human rights

practices which can, in turn, affect those same foundations that gave rise to them. Specifically,
the foundations of rights generate human rights behaviors and allow/constrain the agency of
those

behaviors

to,

in

turn,

reproduce/transform

those

foundations.

Once

reproduced/transformed, those foundations have new causal powers to generate different human
rights practices which, again, will either be allowed/constrained continuing the same cycle. This
explains as to why human rights structures change over time.
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Part 2: A Combined Framework for Emotion and Human Rights
While the last part provides a critical realist outline to theorize the relationship between human
rights structures and their generative foundations, this part builds on those models with an
interactionist framework in order to specify those foundations in emotional terms.
Interactionism provides the disposition-situation outline to theorize about the foundational role
that emotion plays in generating human rights practices.

By establishing emotion as the

foundation of human rights, interactionism specifies the smaller units that constitute larger
human rights structures. It is important to begin, then, with a brief discussion on how the
discipline addresses questions of how smaller units give rise to larger one.
Smaller units of analysis are often neglected in the IR discipline. Not only do IR scholars
tend to limit research to a single level-of-analysis, as discussed in the previous part, but ‘higher’
levels are often favored over ‘lower’ ones. This is not surprising given that much of the
substantive issues discussed in IR (armed conflict, global poverty, the environment crisis, etc.)
reach across large spaces of the globe which makes them more easily researched at higher levels,
such as states and systems. This has led the discipline to develop a rigorous understanding of
those higher-leveled actors, but it has left our understanding of lower-leveled actors (such as the
individual) greatly underappreciated.
This is unfortunate because states and systems are ultimately constituted by the
interactions of people, and the social-psychology that shapes those interactions. As Valerie
Hudson argues, “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human
decision makers acting singly or in groups” (Hudson 2005, 1). For this reason, it is important for
the IR discipline to consider the social-psychology of people and the role they play in
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constituting larger structures in world politics. Because the social-psychology and behavior of
people function as the parts that constitute larger human rights structures, it is important for IR
scholars to take these units on lower levels-of-analysis seriously. Specifically, it is important for
scholars to take seriously how these smaller units give rise to larger structures.
The study of how larger scaled phenomena arise from smaller ones is a relatively new
interest for the IR discipline which studies those smaller parts under the term ‘microfoundations.’
Daniel Little defines microfoundations as “detailed accounts of the pathways by which macrolevel social patterns come about.” They “provide an account of the circumstances of individual
choice and actions that give rise to aggregate patterns” (Little 1998, 4).

In general,

microfoundations refer to the smaller or lower-leveled units at work in larger or high-leveled
phenomena. These smaller units are what John Elster calls “the nuts and bolts, the cogs and
wheels of the internal machinery” (Elster 1983, 24-25). For Joshua Kertzer, microfoundations
are important when “one explains outcomes at the aggregate level via dynamics at a lower level”
(Kertzer 2016, 83). Microfoundations, then, are an important concept for my research which
considers how international structures of human rights are constituted by the rights bearers on the
lower level.
While higher levels of analysis have enjoyed a privileged status in IR, recent trends are
now recognizing the importance of microfoundational explanations in social science research. In
fact, Kertzer has commented on this trend declaring that the discipline is witnessing a
“microfoundational moment” (Kertzer 2014, 82). The theoretical and scientific discussion aimed
at developing microfoundations began with the work of Collins (1981), Elster (1989), and
Coleman (1990) but is being developed more recently by Hedstrom and Swedbert (1998),
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Gerring (2007), Hedstrom and Ylikosko (2010), and Kertzer (2014). To quote John Gerring, this
trend demonstrates that “macro is out, and micro is in” (Gerring 2007, 176).
The need for scholars to consider microfoundations is especially true for human rights
research because rights implicate people on the individual level. While this is true for most
international issues (conflict, poverty, and environmental collapse are all felt by individuals),
human rights are distinct from other issues because they are meant, at least in theory, to
specifically target the values of people. As discussed in previous chapters, these values arise
from the complex relationship between dispositions interacting with situations. Therefore human
rights scholars should consider the microfoundational role that dispositions play in generating
these values.
This illustrates a limitation for human rights approaches that do not consider
microfoundations – they research international structures of human rights without understanding
how they relate to the interests of rights-bearers. This is particularly true for agreement theories
which research human rights in terms of international structures of ‘core-commonalities’ or
‘overlapping-consensus’ (Beitz 2009, 73-95). They ignore the microfoundations of rights-bears
and, instead, frame rights in terms of the macrofoundations of international agreement.
Agreement theories, then, assume a top-down approach which subordinates the rights of people
to the powers of international structure. As a result of this framing, rights do not reflect the
values and interests of rights-bearer but, instead, structures of international politics.
A human rights approach that does take microfoundations seriously are naturalistic
philosophies, particularly the derivationist forms given their ontological focus. They assume the
microfoundational role of human rationality from which human rights emerge; specifically,
rights arise as common goods from the values of rational actors. However, derivationism is a
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form of moral philosophy and it eschews scientific questions of causality. For this reason, it
cannot elaborate on the causal process by which rights arise from reason (it is also important to
remember that their presumption of rationality also commits the naturalistic fallacy).
I aim to correct for these limitations in the next two section by specifying which
microfoundations serve as the generative mechanisms and by modeling how human rights
emerge from them. Interactionism allows me to do this by building its situation-dispositional
framework on top of the critical realist models outlined above.

Dispositions serve as the

microfoundations that generate human rights. As discussed in chapter 3, dispositions refer to a
person’s internal mechanisms which are responsible for their tendencies to behave a certain way.
These dispositions can become “activated” (Tett et al 2013) by the person’s social environment,
also known as a situation. The specific dispositions that I refer to in the following models are the
emotive mechanisms discussed in previous chapters. Again, I specify emotion not only because
they motivate behavior (Spielberg et al. 2008; Pessoa 2009; Chiew and Braver 2011; Roach,
2016; Damasio 2018) but also because they serve as appraisals in moral situations (Damasio
1994; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger 2003; Green 2001; Haidt 2003). By facilitating for moral
judgments that motivate behavior in response to a situation, emotive dispositions serves as the
microfoundations that generate human rights.
The next subsection discusses this within a transcendental realism framework in order to
explain the emergence of human rights. The subsection following that discusses this in a critical
naturalist model in order to explain how human rights change over time. While they both refer
to the same microfoundations – emotive dispositions – they each refer to different aspects of
them.

The transcendental realist model emphasizes the fact that emotion is universal and

relational in order to explain how different human rights practices emerge from the same
142

common emotional nature, while the critical naturalist model emphasizes the fact that these
emotive dispositions are subject to change in response with experience in order to explain why
human rights practices change over time.

Interactionism, Transcendental Realism, and Human Rights
This section builds on the transcendental realist model discussed earlier with an interactionist
framework in order to discuss how the observable and unobservable dimensions of emotion are
related to human rights. The causal relationship between emotion and human rights is made
possible by the ontological framework (openness and stratification) outlined in transcendental
realism. I discuss how this ontological approach to interactionism can explain the relationship
between emotion and rights.
I specifically make two points: The first is that ontological stratification is a necessary
condition for theorizing how dispositions appraise situations. By rooting our sense of rightness
within these dispositions, I establish the reality of human rights as part of this ontological
stratification. In this sense, my argument functions as a naturalistic approach to human rights by
framing them as emerging from nature. The second is that an uncontrolled open system is a
necessary condition for resolving the micro/macro dualism. Open systems allow for people to
share their experience where one’s situation intersects and overlaps with others where those
events enter the public consciousness. While an open systems allows for these situations to be
shared with others, it is also likely that those situations are going to be appraised in different
ways consistent with larger cultural/political/economic/historic structures. In this sense, my
argument recognizes how the practice of rights are relative to culture.
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Stratification and Natural Rightness
Ontological stratification is a necessary condition for theorizing disposition-situation
transactions. As discussed in previous chapters, situations serve as the external forces of a
person’s environment that impose social expectations, norms, roles, etc., while dispositions serve
as the internal mechanisms which may become ‘activated’ in order to appraise a situation and
motivate behavior in response to it. The interaction between the two assumes that the socialpsychology of behavior operates on a stratified ontology similar to that of transcendental realism.
Because dispositions refer to the internal (unobservable) characteristics necessary for generating
behavior, they function as the transcendental mechanisms on the domain of the real. The
behaviors they produce, as well as the situations they respond to, constitute the domain of the
actual.

In this light, disposition-situation transactions functionally affirm an ontological

stratification.
This stratified ontology provides for the emergence of human rights. As discussed
earlier, emergence refers to actual phenomena constituting something wholly new and
irreducible to, while still dependent on, the real mechanisms that generate it. Specifically,
emotion functions to appraise situations and motivate behavior, but this dual function produces
something greater – a sense of rightness, an epistemological understanding of what someone is
due as well as the responsibilities we share with others. The fact that this sense of rightness
reflects real dispositional mechanisms of human emotion affirms human rights as a real part of
this stratified ontology.
In this sense, my argument serves as a naturalistic approach to human rights in that I
anchor them within the nature of reality. Specifically, rights reflect our epistemological sense of
rightness, but stem from real ontological mechanisms that generate them. The next sub-section
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discusses as to why these real mechanisms, while they are real, do not translate into universally
shared practices.

Open Systems and Behavioral Differences
Disposition-situation transactions occur in an open system, which is to say that they occur in an
uncontrolled and complex social environment. This means that situations are rarely removed
from other situations and, instead, they overlap and intersect with others.

Many times, a

situation is narrowly defined as a specific event – it could be a banal event like buying a
newspaper, or it could be a very serious event like an officer shooting an unarmed teenager. In
an open social system, however, these two events are likely to intersect where buying the
newspaper leads to you reading about the shooting. In other words, situations intersect and
overlap with others in an open social system where they are shared and spread.
It is also important to note that situations are not always narrowly defined as specific
events. They could be more broadly construed as general social factors as well. (Norenzayan,
A.; Choi, I.; Nisbett, R. E. 2002). For instance, your racial and ethnic background, your socioeconomic status, or your gender all constitute situations because they refer to broader social
factors that shape your experience. In fact, situations usually combine elements of both the
specific events with broader social factors. Take the example of the cop shooting the teenager.
Research into implicit racial bias has shown that police appraise the threat-level of black people
differently than that of white people. Whether the teenager was black or white may have been a
determining factor as to why the cop decided to shoot him. The race of the teenager may also
shape how the story is appraised by those reading it in the newspaper. This is especially true as
the American public becomes more aware of the how police use violence disproportionately
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against the black community. In general, situations can operate on multiple levels of analysis
(Khilstrom 2015) and they may be understood as specific events or as broader social factors.
These two features of situations – the fact that they a) operate on multiple levels and b)
that they occur in an open system – aids in resolving the micro/macro dualism. First, the fact
that actual events on a lower level intersect with higher-leveled structures within the same
situation demonstrates how macrostructures affect micro-situations (for example how structures
of racism affect specific events of police use of violence). Second, these situations occur in an
open system where they intersect and overlap with other situations. This intersection and
overlapping allows for the situation to be shared and grow into the public consciousness.

The Emergence of Natural Rights in a Complex World
The two ontological conditions of stratification and openness provide a framework to theorize
about how the observable and unobservable dimensions of emotion relate to human rights.
Emotive dispositions on the domain of the real appraises situations and inclines behaviors, both
of which constitutes an epistemological sense of rightness. This sense of rightness emerges from
how situations on the domain of the actual interact with (activate) those dispositions. This
advances a naturalistic approach to human rights by rooting them in an ontological stratification.
These emotive dispositions allow for people to interact with their situation.

Again, these

situations occur in an open system where they intersect and overlap with other events. Emotive
dispositions, then, not only relate us to our own direct situation, but to those of others where they
enter the public consciousness. It is through these publicly shared emotional experiences that we
recognize the rights of others. This is how larger human rights structures emerge from the
microfoundations of human rights.
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However, just because people are related to each other in an open system, does not mean
that our emotional appraisals of situations translate into universal rights practices. The very
nature of an open system entails a plurality of political, cultural, economic, historical, etc.
situations at both the micro and macro level. Each of these situations are complex and lend
themselves to appraisals that, while they reflect universal dispositions of emotion, are translated
into different behavioral responses given the details of the situation.

For this reason, my

argument also recognizes that human rights are culturally relativist. Rights reflect the same
ontological foundations on the domain of the real, but how they are translated into practice
depends on the social contexts of the domain of the actual.

Interactionism, Critical Naturalism, and Human Rights
While the previous section used a transcendental realist model to discuss how human rights
emerge from their microfoundations, this section uses a critical naturalist model to discuss how
human rights change over time. I build an interactionist framework on top of this critical
naturalist model in order to illustrate how the source of change comes from the very
microfoundations that gave rise to them. The main tenet of interactionism is that dispositions not
only produce behaviors in response to a situation, but are also changed by that same situation. In
this light, the emotive dispositions that incline behavior towards a sense of right, are also
reshaped by the cultural situation they appraise and respond to. This recursive relationship
accounts for gradual shifts in human rights practices over time. Critical naturalism is particularly
equipped to illustrate this by way of its Transformation Model of Social Activity (TMSA). I
build an interactionist framework on top of the TMSA in order to illustrate the recursive nature
of disposition-situation transactions as they relate to human rights.
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The Recursive Relationship between Disposition and Situation
As discussed previously, critical naturalism’s TMSA is designed to resolve the
prevalence of dualisms in the social sciences.

This typically refers to debates over

structure/agency or individual/society. However, the fact that interactionism assumes a recursive
relationship between people and their environment reveals dispositions and situations as another
dualism. On one side, interactionism assumes that dispositions produce behavior in response to
an appraisal of some situation. Those behaviors change the situations by becoming part of it.
On the other side, that situation responds to the produced behavior which changes how those
emotive dispositions appraise future situations. In short, interactionism assumes a reciprocal
relationship where both dispositions and situations shape the other. However, two objects cannot
both cause and effect each other simultaneously. The challenge, then, is to unpack how this
relationship unfolds in time.
The TMSA provides the framework to illustrate this recursive relationship between
situations and dispositions.
relationship unfolds.

Specifically, it articulates the order of which this recursive

It first establishes observable phenomena as a causal product of

unobservable mechanisms. Again, this fits with transcendental realism which assumes the
ontological primacy of the domain of the real. Once those observable phenomena are produced,
they in turn reshape the generative mechanisms that produced them.

In the context of

interactionism, the situations that are changed by behaviors produced by disposition can, in turn,
reshape those dispositions that responded to them.
This kind of change where situations affect one’s dispositions can occur through
neuroplasticity, which was discussed in previous chapters. New research in neuroplasticity
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demonstrates that our cognitive structures do not only affect how we behave in society, but those
social interactions do make physical changes as to how those cognitive structures work (Doidge
2007; Wexler 2006; Nisbett and Masuda 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). In
other words, our social experiences change our brain. While can we accept the ontological
reality of the body’s dispositions, we must also accept that they change according to the social
situations that they respond to.

Emotional Experience and Change
Emotion is one of those dispositional attributes that is changed by our social experience.
How the brain is shaped by culture has important implications for emotion.

Emotion is

embedded in the material architecture of the brain, and how cultural norms mold that neural
architecture also molds how emotive dispositions appraise future iterations of those culture
norms. Emotion not only prompts behavior in response to a situation, but the experience of those
situations also make material changes to the emotive dispositions responding to them. New
research into neuroplasticity demonstrates this recursive relationship between emotion and
culture (Wexler 2006; Barret 2017; Prinz 2014). As a result, people emotionally appraise
situations differently depending on their personal experiences.

This dynamic evidences a

cultural dimension to emotion: not only are cultural situations generated by shared emotional
experiences of the group, but those situations, in turn, also rewire the material structures of
emotion.
As discussed earlier, our emotional response to a situation is the result of how the brain
predicts or anticipates emotions based on how those feelings have been categorized in previous
similar experiences. These categories do not refer to natural organizations of objects. Rather,
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they are socially constructed groupings produced by the need to share and exchange concepts
between people via language and culture. Our ability to connect to others socially requires our
understanding of that social reality so that we may be a part of it. This requires that our personal
categorization process conform to our cultural surroundings. In other words, how we understand
concepts through categorization is culturally contingent. In this sense, categorization is not a
process of finding natural similarities between concepts but, instead, constructing those
similarities in accordance with culture.

Human Rights and Social Transformation
How we appraise a situation occurs through an emotional process that has been shaped by
how we have appraised previous situations.

This recursive cycle of turn taking between

dispositions and situations explains how the relationship between emotion and rights produce
behavioral variations over time. If emotion provides us with our sense of rightness, and those
same material mechanisms are changed by the same situation they appraise, then our sense of
rightness is a product of our cultural surroundings just as much as it is related to our nature.
Issues of human rights, then, reflect not only our universal emotive dispositions but, also, how
those dispositions have been shaped by previous situations. This explains as to why people
appraise situations differently using the same universal inventory of emotion. This explains not
only why human rights are culturally relative but, also, as to why human rights within a culture
change over time. In other words, human rights are real in the sense that they reflect ontological
structures of the human mind but, because those structures change by interacting with our
cultural environment, so too does our sense of rightness.
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Part 3: Human Rights in a World of Borders: An Illustration
This section uses the combined approach outlined above in order to demonstrate the kind of
contributions it can make to a practical understanding of human rights issues. I do this by
considering a particular human rights context as an example of how this combined approach
analyzes real world problems. The context I consider is the human rights of immigrants and
refugees as well as the role that political structures (such as citizenship and border security) play
in threatening their rights. Specifically, I argue how the right to belong and the right to free
movement constitute meta-rights which can protect the social and political conditions necessary
for people to realize the rights of others through emotional and meaningful interactions. This is
becoming increasingly important with the rise of ethno-nationalist movements pushing for
stricter border security which prevents immigrants and refugee from engaging in those emotional
interactions with citizens of the country they are moving to.
The first section discusses how rights, generated by our emotive dispositions, constitutes
the domain of the real.

The second subsection discusses how these rights, while they

ontologically rooted in the domain of the real, may not be actualized (or may even be violated)
on the domain of the actual. This may occur because the domain of the actual functions as an
open system where other political, economic, cultural, and historical structures may work to
undermine or weaken the conditions necessary for the realization of rights. The third subsection
discusses the role that science plays in transforming those structures. Here I bring in the TMSA
to demonstrate how an ontological approach not only explains the foundations of human rights,
but produces an emancipatory impulse to transform the structures that violate those foundations.
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Domain of the Real: The Nature of Emotion and Human Rights
The argument put forth in this dissertation is that human rights emerge from the emotional
mechanisms that generate them. They invoke visceral feelings which inform us of our values
and incline our behaviors to conform to those values. (Haidt 2012; Greene 2013; Pinker 2003;
Saver & Damasio 1991; Moll et al 2002). Emotion provides us with the sense of right – what
people are due and the responsibilities we have to each other. Not only are notions of rightness
and justice laden with emotion (Chebat and Slusarczyk 2005; De Cremer and Van den Bos
2007), but our ability to recognize the inherent dignity of others or empathize with their suffering
is a purely emotional capability as well (Damasio 1994; Frith 2001).
This sense arises from the social interactions we have with others where emotion
appraises the situation and mediates how we relate to it.

These social interactions form

emotional bonds through which a sense of rights can arise. The reason for this is because
emotion communicates ideas and feelings to others by facial expression, verbal cues, body
gestures, etc. (Adolphs 1999). In fact, those who observe our expression are likely to feel similar
emotions (Eisenberg et al., 1989; Ohman & Soares 1998). This refers to another important
phenomena known as mirroring or contagion where people feel the same emotion that they
observe from someone else. This is true for facial expressions (Dimberg et al. 2000), vocal
messaging (Pickering & Garrod 2004), and body movements (Chartrand & Bargh 1999). In
other words, people relate to each other on such an emotional level that their feelings and
thoughts may be replicated in others.
Emotion doesn’t just mediate interpersonal relations, it also facilitates the cultural
transmission of ideas and maintains social cohesion (Matsumoto, D., & Juang, L., 2013). In
other words, social interactions occur in an open system where people are continually interacting
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with others within larger cultural structures. What emerges from all of these interactions is a
larger cultural sense as to how people should be treated and the public rights and responsibilities
they share with others. As stated before, emotions are universal and it is this universality that
allows for people to relate to each other through which we can recognizes everyone as
possessing the same rights. The fact that real psychological structures underpin this shared sense
of right affirms the idea that human rights are ontological goods reflecting natural parts of our
shared humanity.
However, in a stratified ontology, those ontological mechanisms on the domain of the
real may not always actualize on the domain of the actual. The reason for this is that the
conditions necessary for the realization of human rights may not present themselves. In fact,
there may be other structures that work to undermine those conditions. The specific condition
necessary for the realization of human rights are opportunities for people to form emotional
connections through social interactions. In an open system, however, behavior is always shaped
by other causal structures (cultural, political, economic, etc.) which shape how rights are
recognized, practiced, and enforced. This means that the conditions necessary for emotional
interactions may never appear in the presence of those other structures if those structures assert
more causal power within the open system. As a result, the rights on the domain of the real may
never actualize on the domain of the actual.
For this reason, I argue that the conditions necessary for the realization of rights be
protected. In doing so, I refer to another special kind of right called meta-rights. Essentially,
these are “rights that protect rights” (Garden 2014, 855). Amartya Sen introduced the concept of
meta rights in “The Right to not be Hungry” where, according to him, “a meta‐ right to
something, x, can be defined as the right to have policies, p(x), that genuinely pursue the
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objective of making the right to x realizable” (1982, 345). Meta-rights, then, do not refer to the
rights that arise from the emotional interactions of people but, rather, ensure that such
interactions can take place.
As a way to provide a practical illustration of this, the next section discusses how ethnonationalist efforts to strengthen state borders function to inhibit the interactions that immigrants
and displaced people have with citizens. Specifically, governments rely on these nationalist
sentiments in order to manipulate the emotions of their citizens in negative ways. I argue that the
right to belong and the right to free movement constitute meta-rights that can protect the
conditions necessary for all people to relate to one another in emotionally meaningful ways.

Domain of the Actual: States and Human Rights Violations
Sovereignty is an organizing principle of international relations, which is to say that the nationstate serves as the core structure that shapes world politics. States, then, exercise a great deal of
power over issues of human rights, and those claiming a right must do so within the framework
of sovereignty. The most common requisite for the enjoyment of human rights, then, are forms
of civic belonging/inclusion – citizenship or nationality. Those who do not belong, or those who
are not allowed entry into a community, are denied the social interactions from which an
emotional connection with other citizens can take place. Their inability to establish emotional
and meaningful relations with others means that their rights and humanity are never realized.
This is a growing problem today with more people on the move and with governments
responding with harsher immigration policies and border closures.
However, the problem itself is not new, and a human rights critique of sovereignty was
first put forward by Hannah Arendt’s 1949 work The Origins of Totalitarianism. Here, she
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expressed skepticism towards the idea of a human rights system that relied on the state to
guarantee them. In such a system, people do not enjoy rights by virtue of their humanity but,
rather, because they belong to a state. In other words, it is not enough to be human – you have to
be a citizen. She referred to this as the “right to have rights.” In her words:

[T]he right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should
be guaranteed by humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible
[…because] the present sphere of international law […] still operates in terms of
reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states (Arendt 1973, 298).

Even though Arendt wrote this over sixty years ago, the dilemma is still very real today. The
ability to recognize, protect, and enforce natural rights still relies on socially constructed
mechanisms of civic membership. This poses challenges for those who have no citizenship,
whose citizenship is under question, or are seeking new citizenship. In general, a human rights
system organized principally around sovereignty actually serves as a form of discrimination
against those without state-recognition.
Those likely to suffer from this kind of discrimination are refugees and the forcibly
displaced, immigrants, and stateless groups of people. The situation of these people is defined
by their lack of civic belonging/inclusion which encourages them to move across borders in
search of it. The challenges that these groups face has only grown in contemporary politics. The
total number of people forcibly displaced from their homes worldwide has hit a record high of 68
million as of 2017. 25 million of these people are refugees, the biggest group of which are
Syrians fleeing from conflict.

There are an additional 10 million stateless people denied

citizenship for reasons other than forcible displacement. The rising number of people fleeing
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their homes or looking for refuge represents a large portion of the people on the move (UNHCR
2018).
Immigration also explains a large portion of people whose rights are under threat.
Immigration rates are on the rise. In 2017, 58 million international immigrants lived in the U.S.,
78 million lived in Europe, and 80 million lived in Asia (United Nation, 2017). Immigration
takes on many forms, and one kind likely to suffer from some kind of rights violation are
irregular, or undocumented, immigrants. There were 11.3 million undocumented migrants living
in the U.S. in 2016, (Fazel-Zarandi, Feinstein, and Kaplan 2018) though the number of irregular
migrants to the U.S. has dropped precipitously in the past decade. Other countries host a large
number of undocumented migrants as well – there are between 2 to 4 million in Europe, and
several million in India and China (though government data is rarely current or accurate for these
countries) (Migration Data Portal, 2019).
In general, more and more people are on the move in search for membership and
belonging. This movement, however, makes them vulnerable to other forms of discrimination.
The reason for this is that it challenges traditional sovereign structures which have grown
accustomed to controlling who crosses over state-borders. In response to this increased flow of
refugees and immigrants, states have erected barriers to entrance.

For instance, European

countries responding to the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 began tightening border control. In
2016, the EU made a deal with Turkey to prevent people from crossing into Europe (if anyone in
Turkey tried to cross into Greece they would be sent back. For every one Syrian sent back to
Turkey, the EU would accept one refugee) (Rankin 2016). In 2017, Europe made a deal with
Libya to stem increased flows from Africa. In exchange for stopping boats from leaving Africa
and entering Italy, the EU gave money to Libya and give money and training to Libya coast
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guard (BBC 2017). Probably the most drastic and surprising move was Great Britain’s decision
to exit the EU, a decision shaped by rising fears of the influx of immigrants and refugees.
The United States has exhibited the same response to flows of immigrants and refugees
entering through its southern border. Despite the fact that illegal crossings of the southern border
have decreased (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn, 2018), illegal immigration has become one of the
most salient political topics in American politics. In fact, it defined the platform of Donald
Trump who won the 2016 presidential election with the promise that building a border wall
would prevent future illegal crossings. This wasn’t the only move of the Trump administration
to target immigrants and refugees. After Trump won the election, he quickly instituted a “zero
tolerance” immigration regime defined by strengthening the authority of ICE, instituting a
“Muslim ban” that barred the entrance of immigrants from Arab countries, and separating
refugee and migrant children from their families at the border.
These are just some examples of how the Western world has responded to increased
refugee and immigration flows. The methods that states use to do this – through militarizing the
border, banning groups of people, turning rescue boats around, arbitrarily arresting people,
deportation etc. – are designed to prevent refugees and immigrations from interactions with
citizens. Specifically, they deny outgroups the right to belong and to move to the ingroup.
Immigrants and refugees are deprived of the social interactions that build emotional connection.
As a result, the rights and humanity of these groups of people are never recognized. The efforts
of nation-states to control who crosses their borders, then, effects the rights of tens of millions of
people.
Sovereignty, then, serves as a core structure in the open global system that exerts a great
deal of causal power on issues of human rights. Governments not only deny refugees and
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immigrants the right to belong and to move, but they garner support from their citizenry to do so.
They do this by shaping the emotional appraisals of their citizens. The very act of controlling
who belongs to, and moves into, the country facilitates this goal. By denying who enters into the
state, governments regulate the interactions of their citizens and, in doing so, shape how they
emotionally appraise refugees and immigrants. Governments, then, manipulate the emotions of
their citizens to portray them in negative ways. This demonstrates the control that governments
have in controlling how the situation of immigrants and refugees are appraised by citizens.
For instance, many of the political forces behind Europe’s border politics have shaped
how people perceived people crossing their borders. They did this through methods of emotional
manipulation to stoke fears over the rise of refugees and immigrants. The best example of this is
the pro-Brexit politicians which campaigned on a false narrative immigrants and refugees
increase crime and that granting them citizenship somehow leads to an erosion of ‘European
values.” These methods proved to be successful because they resulted in British voters deciding
to leave the EU (Zavala, Guerra, and Simao 2017; Clark Goodwin, and Whitely 2017). This
illustrates how the state shaped how its citizens appraised the refugees and immigrants.
Other examples include Viktor Orban’s Hungary who has relentlessly scapegoated
immigrants and refugees as a way to explain the country’s problems. He has used emotionally
charged language to demonized refugees (for instance, “Muslim invaders”) and he has recently
proposed a law to criminalize helping refugees (Wallen 2018). Austria’s Sebastion Kurz has
done the same by proposing anti-immigrant laws. These have included denying immigrants
access to public welfare programs, banning women from wearing the veil, and mandating that all
migrants speak German. These kinds of policies are popular in Italy as well. Italy’s coalition
government, made up of the Five Star movement and far right league, has made it a priority to
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cast immigrants and refugees in a negative light. Their first move was to turn away a migrant
rescue boat. The rise of far-right movements is present in other countries as well. For instance,
government officials in Poland’s applauded a white-nationalist march of 60,000 people back in
2017. In France, Marine le Pen lost her election, but still gave voice to social conservatives who
are applying pressure on Macron to take a harder stance on immigration.
All of these efforts display how governments shape how their citizens appraise the
situation of immigrants and refugees. This demonstrates a great deal of power that governments
have in manipulating the emotions of their citizens. This kind of manipulation requires that
governments shape the environment (or situation) in a specific way as to actualize some
emotions over others. Instead of empathy and compassion, governments have relied on fear and
anger in their framing of immigrants and refugees. This reflects how the situational designs in
Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments resulted in a moral disengagement (by masking the
emotional salience of a situation, test subjects in Milgram’s and Zimbard’s experiments become
morally disengaged).
refugees.

This same phenomena occurs within the context of immigrants and

When governments prevent their citizens from interacting with immigrants and

refugees, they prevent them from forming social and emotional ties necessary for realizing the
rights of immigrants and refugees. Citizens then become morally disengaged with the plight of
others, especially after governments negatively manipulate the emotions of their citizens. In
other words, states control the interactions of their citizens on the domain of the actual as a way
to prevent them from recognizing the rights of others on the domain of the real. Preventing this
requires that some protections be put into place that ensure immigrants and refugees the ability to
interact with others in emotionally meaningful ways.
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Domain of the Empirical: Science and Social Transformation
The previous two sections demonstrated the contributions an ontological approach can makes to
human rights research. They did this by discussing the situations of refugees and immigrants in
order to demonstrate the rights of people (the domain of the real) and how states violate those
rights (on the domain of the actual).

While those two sections discussed the scientific

contributions an ontological approach can make to human rights, this final section discusses the
emancipatory contributions that such an approach can make. I discuss the role that science plays
in social transformation, and how an ontological approach to human rights may provide insights
as to how people’s rights may better be protected. Specifically, I discuss the dualism between
knowledge production and social action in terms of the TMSA and how this may underpin an
emancipatory impulse to protect human rights.
As discussed before, critical naturalism works to resolve the prevalence of dualism in the
socials science through the Transformational Model of Social Action (TMSA). This particular
model demonstrates how the recursive relationship between two entities is governed by time.
Critical realists use the TMSA to discuss the relationship between cause and effect, structure and
agency, individual and society, and so on. But the TMSA is also used to resolve the dualism
between theory and practice as well. This expresses the recursive relationship between the
knowledge produced by science and the social action that science attempts to explain. The
scientific effort to understand the generative structures underlying social action also informs the
transformative efforts to change them. In turn, those transformative efforts to change social
structures results in a new scientific understanding as to what those structures are. In other
words, critical realism exposes the blurred line between theory and practice and, more
importantly, demonstrates the emancipatory role of science in social change.
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According to critical realism, then, the scientist is part of social change whether they
acknowledge it or not, and the empiricist standards for value-neutrality are misinformed. After
all, social science does not take place in a closed system – as researchers, we are very much
embedded in the social reality we work to explain. Without acknowledging this, our theories
meant to understand the facts of the world serve merely to reproduce them. In particular, the
theory/practice dualism plays out in a way where theory serves as the structure which constrains
the practice of our agency. In this sense, actually serve as a form of oppression – theories meant
to objectively explain society later inform society as to what is possible and/or right.
This is best illustrated with empiricist theories of human rights, in particular agreement
theories. Again, agreement theories argue that human rights reflect international agreements,
consensus building, or core similarities between states. By assuming states as the unit of
analysis through which human rights are constructed, they unwittingly reaffirm sovereignty as a
natural principle of world politics. A popular term in reference to this is “methodological
nationalism” (Beck 2000; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; Chernilo 2006; Amelina, et al, 2012).
This refers to assumptions within the social sciences that presuppose the state as the natural form
of social organization and uncritically accepts and reifies it as the ordering principle within world
politics. By privileging the status of the state, agreement theories advance a methodological
nationalism which frames human interest and values in terms of the state. In doing so, they fail
to recognize the role that the state plays in undermining the social conditions necessary for
realization of human rights (as discussed in the previous section). In this sense, agreement
theories serve as a form of oppression – they uncritically reify the state without recognizing its
role in violating human rights.
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Scholars interested in a more emancipatory IR discipline should envision a new portrait
of world politics where the structural constraints that condition our agency are not simply given.
Instead, the scientist should keep in mind that underpinning social transformation is the recursive
relationship between the theories they propose and how social agents put them into practice. An
ontological orientation towards world politics can correct for this because it not only exposes the
structures responsible for our oppression, but it also yields an emancipatory impulse that informs
society how to transform those structures.
This couldn’t be more important for issues of human rights. If states have the power to
violate human rights partly because sovereignty is assumed as a naturally occurring principle in
world politics (an assumption in which the empiricists are complicit) then science bears some
responsibility for those whose rights have been violated by state power. If human rights are
naturally occurring goods by virtue of our emotional nature, then acknowledging our emotional
connection to the human rights systems that we study provides us with an emancipatory impulse
to research alternative visions of world politics – visions that understand human rights as
emerging from the unobservable part of humanity rather than states.
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Conclusion: Implications, Limits, and Future Research

I conclude this dissertation with a brief summary of its central themes, their implications for
human rights, and the limitations of my argument. The first section quickly summarizes my
argument around its major themes in order to reiterate how it address the limitations of previous
human rights approaches. It is important to reiterate these themes as they set up the rest of the
chapter to discuss the implications and limitation of my research. I focus specifically, on the
how the ontological theme of my argument corrects for the epistemic fallacy committed by the
empiricist approaches, and how the emotional theme corrects for the naturalistic fallacy
committed by the rationalist philosophies.
The second section discusses the major implications of these themes and why they matter
for human rights. First, the ontological dimension to my argument resolves a paradox as to how
human rights are both naturally real and culturally contingent. Traditionally, these two concepts
have been seen as mutually exclusive – empiricist approaches focus on contingency, while
naturalistic approach focus on nature. However, a stratified ontology illustrates how human
rights activity, while culturally contingent, still reflects the natural structures underpinning them.
Second, the emotional dimension features new ways to think about human rights. Rationalist
approaches have traditionally emphasized the importance of individual rights, personal
autonomy, self-determination, etc. but an emotional approach places focus on community and
social change.
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The third section discusses the limitations to the ontological and emotional dimensions to
my argument and how future research can correct for them.

The major weakness to my

ontological approach is methodological/scientific. While my critical realist approach provides a
more satisfying theoretical understanding of the causal nature of human rights, the knowledge it
produces does not lend itself to falsifiability. The major weakness to my emotional approach is
theoretical/psychological. While my emotional approach provides a more convincing case for
rights than rationalist approaches, emotion alone does not explain the emergence of rights. My
aim for this dissertation was justify an emotional approach and to firmly situate it within the
debate, but future research needs to elaborate on the complex relationship between emotion and
reason.

Summary of Argument
The central argument of my dissertation is that human rights are real public goods that reflect the
emotional foundations of the people they serve. Because this argument has two dimensions to it
– an ontological and psychosocial – it is organized into two tracks in order to discuss how they
each address the limitations of previous human rights theories.
The first track argued that the ontological nature of human rights reflect their foundations
underpinning them. Taking ontology seriously corrects for the empiricist approaches to human
rights (agreement theories and relativist approaches) which commit the epistemic fallacy. By
framing human rights merely as the expression of a common core or overlapping consensus,
agreement theories reduce human rights superficially to their practices with no deeper
understanding as to the nature of rights. Relativist approaches, while they disagree politically
with agreement theories, are nonetheless guilty of the same thing. By reducing human rights to
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culturally reiterated behaviors and discourses, relativist approaches frame rights as socially
constructed with no understanding of the ontological building blocks they are constructed from.
I correct for this through a critical realist approach which assumes a stratified and open
system where unobservable causal structures generate observable human rights activity. This
critical realist approach corrects for empiricist theories because it does not conflate the
foundations of human rights with the activity they produce. While agreement theories base the
universality of rights on internationally agreed upon norms, my critical realist approach identifies
the universal causal mechanism that make possible such international agreement. Additionally,
while relativist approaches argue against universality of rights based on the cultural variations of
their practice, my critical realist approach recognizes how such cultural variations derive from
universal causal mechanisms generating them in an open cultural system.
The second track of my argument argued that emotion serves as those causal mechanisms
that generate human rights activity. My focus on emotion corrects for the rationalist approaches
to human rights (derivationist and inclinationist philosophies) which commit the naturalistic
fallacy. Derivationist approaches focus on the ontology of our rational nature as the source from
which our understanding of rights derive. In doing so, however, they attempt to draw a practical
‘ought’ from a speculative ‘is.’ Inclinationist philosophies try to overcome this problem by
focusing on the epistemology of our rational understanding of rights which, they argue, are nonderivable. With no ontological basis, however, inclinationist approaches fail to anchor human
rights within a naturalistic framework.
I correct for this through an emotional approach which assumes an interactionist
framework between dispositions and situations. Our understanding of human rights emerge as
emotional appraisals from dispositional-situation transactions. Basing human rights on emotion
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overcomes the naturalistic fallacy because it does not base our practical understanding of right on
speculative knowledge about the world. In this sense, my argument is similar to inclinationist
approaches – emotion simply inclines us towards right action. It is different than traditional
inclinationist approaches, however, in that it specifies the ontological basis from which these
inclinations derive. They derive from real emotive dispositions interacting with, and appraising,
social situations.

Implications for Human Rights
Both the ontological dimension and the emotional dimension to my argument provide new ways
to think about human rights that challenge traditional perspectives. First, by arguing that actual
human rights activity emerge from their ontologically real foundations, I demonstrate
paradoxically how rights are both natural occurring and socially contingent. Second, by arguing
that emotion serves as those real foundations, I demonstrate how human rights reflect the human
need for social interaction and community. I discuss both of these below.

Both Natural and Contingent
My argument provides new ways to think about human rights beyond the views expressed by
empiricists and naturalistic approaches. These two approaches are often seen as irreconcilable –
naturalistic approaches view human rights as real goods that reflect basic and universal laws,
while empiricist approaches recognizes how rights are culturally and historically contingent.
However, my argument demonstrates how it is possible to theorize about rights as both natural
and contingent based on the assumption of a stratified and open system.

166

Ontological stratification allows me to theorize how human rights activity is founded on
universal natural laws. The domain of the real represents the universal laws which naturalistic
approaches focus on, while the domain of the actual represents the human rights activity that
empiricist approaches focus on. The former underpins the latter which illustrates that human
rights activity reflects the natural structures generating them. Despite the cultural and historical
variations in human rights activity, they are nonetheless generated by the same universal
structures that underpin them.
How is it possible for universal structures to produce cultural and historical variations of
human rights practices? The answer lies in the fact that human rights activity occurs in an open
system. As human rights activity emerge from their natural foundations, they interact with a
multitude of other structures (cultural, political, legal, economic, historical, etc.). Each of these
shape how human rights activity emerges and the forms in which they are practiced. In other
words, how human rights foundations on the domain of the real are translated into the human
rights activity depends on the social conditions of the domain of the actual.
This paints a picture of human rights that merges aspects of empiricist approaches with
aspects of naturalistic approaches.

Empiricist approaches are correct to assume that the

contingency of human rights implies their social construction.

However, they ignore the

ontological building blocks that rights are constructed from. Naturalistic approaches correct for
this, but they argue that these natural foundations necessarily translate into fixed universal
human rights laws. This is incorrect given that such natural foundations on the domain of the
real serve merely as causal potentials rather than hard laws per se.
Generally speaking, human rights reflect the natural foundations of the people they serve
and, for this reason, these public goods should be taken seriously as a responsibility we have to
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each other. Yet rights are culturally and historical contingent depending on how rights bearers
appraise and interact with their social environment.

Taking human rights seriously, then,

requires that we reject fixed and absolutist views of human rights. A truly just human rights
project, then, should understand rights as naturally occurring goods that reflect the complex
relationship we have with our social environment and with each other.

Community and Social Transformation
My argument that emotion serves as the foundations of human rights highlights new dimensions
of rights ignored by rationalist approaches. The first is that an emotional approach emphasizes
the importance of social interaction and community. This breaks from traditional rationalist
approaches to human rights which have focused on the rights of the individual and personal
autonomy. Second, an emotional approach can understand social changes in human rights
activity while rationalist approaches have traditionally thought of human rights as fixed and
absolute. I discuss both of these here
Rationalist approaches, especially those rooted in enlightenment philosophy, have
traditionally focused on the individual’s right to personal autonomy and self-determination. An
emotional approach does not dispute these rights, but it emphasizes the importance of sociality
and community. Emotion functions to mediate our social interactions and inclines us to build
relations with others. The same emotional foundations that mediate our social interactions also
underpins our sense of rightness. Human rights, then, emerges from our interactions with others
and, as a result, reflects our needs for social connection and community. The fact that rights are
built on social interactions reveals the reciprocal relationship rights bearers have with each other.
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The role that emotion plays in mediating our social relations, then, serves as the basis for
envisioning a just human rights project built on mutual respect and reciprocity.
The second implication of an emotional approach is that human rights change and evolve
over time. Rationalist approaches traditionally assume human rights as historically fixed laws,
but an emotional approach recognizes how the relationship between emotional beings and their
social environment is defined by change. Not only does our environment change, but how we
appraise our environment changes as well. Again, the science of neuroplasticity demonstrates
how gray matter and the neural circuitry of the brain change due to the situations it appraises and
experiences. As a result, our sense of rightness changes and adapts to the historical conditions of
our social environment. This is an important point to make because it implies that society can
make changes in human rights thought and practice. The fact that our emotive dispositions adapt
to new experiences serves as a basis for thinking about how society can foster positive changes
for a respectful global human rights project.

Limitations and Future Research
Each of the thematic dimension to my argument correct for various limitations of other human
rights approaches. The strength of my argument, then, rests on both of these two tracks because
they each provide a more convincing case of human rights by addressing the fallacies committed
by other approaches. It is worth nothing, however, that each of these tracks has limitations of
their own and that the biggest strengths of my argument may also pose the biggest weaknesses.
The major limitations to my critical realist approach is that a) its rejection of empiricist
philosophy does not produce knowledge that lends itself to methods of falsifiability and b) its
focus on open systems prevents it from making judgments on specific human rights issues. The
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major limitations to my emotive approach is that a) it does not yet articulate the role that human
reason plays in the emotional process of generating rights and b) emotions can easily be
manipulated and does not yet explain how to overcome this. I discuss them here and how to
address them in future research.

The Ontological Dimension
My ontological track corrects for the epistemic fallacy by using a critical realist framework to
articulate the causal relations between human rights and their foundations. This is a major
strength to my argument because it provides a more convincing theoretical understanding of
causal dynamics than what empiricist approaches offer. This strength, however, is also a major
weakness – critical realist methods are purely transcendental and inquiry into the theoretical
structures that make human rights possible. This does not produce knowledge which can be
tested according to hypothetico-deductive methods of science. There is no way to falsify my
argument that human rights reflect the emotional foundations of the people they serve. As a
result, my argument remains purely theoretical.
While this may be a major limitation for those wishing to conduct empirical experiments,
critical realist methods are necessary for producing knowledge that empiricist approaches cannot.
Specifically, we must assume the transitive/intransitive distinction if we are to ask
transcendentally what makes human rights possible, even if such assumptions cannot be falsified.
The only alternative is to assume a flat system which reduces ontology to epistemology.
Additionally, restricting knowledge to that which can be falsified prevents us from asking how
such intransitive structures produce transitive phenomena in an open system. In no way could a
falsifiable experiment understand the how the relationship between emotion and rights intersects
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with culture. Researching these relationships as constant-conjunctions fails to understand how
they really work in uncontrolled environment.
It is important to note the limitation a critical realist argument can make about specific
claims to human rights. Because my argument assumes an open system, it does not serve as
stable basis to arrive at conclusions about specific human rights issues. Again, the claim that
emotion serves as the foundations is a transcendental argument (as opposed to empirical
argument), so any specific claims about particular human rights issues must follow the same
method. For this reason, my approach can only make arguments for specific human rights
claims based on the knowledge of how emotion works. Even then, knowledge on the nature of
emotion does not translate into specific human rights. Instead, it serves as a theoretical tool for
thinking about meta-rights, as I discussed in the previous chapter.

The Psychosocial Dimension
This dissertation spent a lot of time explaining how emotion works and its relationship to human
rights. This was a necessary task in order to demonstrate how an emotive approach corrects for
the limitations of the rationalist approaches. However, my focus on emotion does not deny the
importance of human reason. Cognitive processes are rarely void of executive thinking, and our
sense of rightness should not be seen as any different. In fact, most cognitive activity is a
complex of both emotional and rational processes which cannot be disentangled from each other.
My review of the theories on emotion emphasized this point and a great deal of other research
has discussed the relationship between the two. Future research should explore the complex
relationship between emotion and reason and how they fit into human rights.
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Specifically, future research should work on explaining the role that rationality plays in
appraising human rights situations. As stated throughout the dissertation, our understanding of
human rights emerge from how emotion relates us to our social environment and appraises
situation. An emotional appraisal of some activity may inform us that someone’s rights have
been violated, but this does not always inform us as to what should be done. Again, rights are
not only those goods that we are due but, also, the responsibilities we have in providing those
goods for each other. There is little value in claiming something as a human right if it cannot
reasonably be provided. Claiming a human rights then, requires some rational knowledge as to
what can be reasonably done to prevent or address a rights violation. Future research can
explore how the production and delivery of human rights goods, while they reflect an emotional
sense of rightness, are informed by a rational understanding of what can be done.
Another important limitation to point out is that emotion, while it does serve as the real
causal structure that generates human rights, is also easily manipulated by other political
situations they interact with. In this sense, the feelings that emerge from an appraisal of a
situation may not reflect an unbiased sense of rightness but, instead, the power of political forces
in manipulating the situation to their advantage. I actually discussed this in the last chapter’s
illustration on how states manipulate our feelings towards outgroup people. This dissertation has
not fully developed an explanation in how to best address this, but understanding how it works
helps to explain as to why human rights violations continue to occur.

Specifically, my

interactionist approach provides a framework to think about how human rights situations are
shaped by larger political structures in a way to mask the emotional salience of human rights
victims.

Future research on this provides promise in explaining as to why human rights

violations persist.
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